Nasrallah and Iran
A look at the Hezbollah chief’s ties with Tehran and how he made Lebanon one of Iran’s most important allies
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MADRID – The massive funeral processions held for Sayyad Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on Sunday marked the end of an era, but also the beginning of a new one. Nasrallah, who led Hezbollah for over three decades, was not only the movement’s most visible figure but also a key player in regional politics.
Born in 1960 in a Shiite community in Beirut, Hassan Nasrallah developed a strong interest in Islam and politics, influenced by Imam Musa al-Sadr. He started in the Amal movement but joined the newly formed Hezbollah in 1982 after the Israeli invasion. His political career quickly ascended; by 1985, he was leading Hezbollah's Executive Council and joined the Shura Council. His frequent visits to Iran strengthened the alliance between Hezbollah and Iran under the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine.
A turning point came in 1992. That year, Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah’s then-Secretary General, was assassinated in an Israeli airstrike. Nasrallah, his closest confidant, took over the movement’s leadership and adopted a more uncompromising stance toward Israel. During Mussawi’s funeral, he delivered a speech that would define Hezbollah’s trajectory: “We will continue on this path... even if we are martyred, even if our homes are destroyed over our heads, we will not abandon the choice of Islamic Resistance.”
From that moment on, his rhetoric left no room for ambiguity. Under his leadership, Hezbollah expanded its military capabilities, increased its influence in Lebanese politics, and strengthened its alliance with Iran. The group’s ties with Tehran were not only ideological but also operational. Nasrallah’s longstanding relationship with Tehran shaped the group’s strategy and solidified its position as a major force in West Asia.
More than just an Iranian ally
Despite its close ties to Tehran, Hezbollah was never merely an extension of Iranian policy in the region. The notion that the movement operates as a proxy without autonomy has been challenged both inside and outside Lebanon. The historical connection between Lebanese Shiites and Iran dates back centuries—long before Hezbollah’s creation in the 1980s.
In the 16th century, the Safavid dynasty invited Shiite clerics from the Lebanese region of Jabal Amil to help consolidate Twelver Shiism in Iran. Over the following centuries, thousands of Lebanese students traveled to Qom to study in Islamic seminaries, forging deep familial and political ties with the Iranian Shiite community. This interconnection grew stronger in the 20th century, when figures like Imam Musa al-Sadr and Mustafa Chamran played key roles in reshaping Shiite political identity in Lebanon.
Nasrallah himself consistently rejected the idea that Hezbollah was merely an artificial creation of Iran. He noted that the movement emerged organically as a response to the 1982 Israeli invasion. Nevertheless, he openly acknowledged the influence of the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah’s alignment with the principles of Wilayat al-Faqih.
Beyond logistics and religious affinities, what binds Hezbollah and Iran is a shared political vision. Both see resistance to Western influence as a matter of survival. As Abdallah Safieddine, Hezbollah’s representative in Iran, once stated: “What unites us is our adherence to the principles of Wilayat al-Faqih, as well as our struggle against common enemies.”
Similarly, in a 2018 speech, Nasrallah made it clear that what binds Hezbollah and Iran is not military support, but a shared political vision. “Westerners do not believe in things like ideology. Their biggest mistake is considering the Resistance merely as Iranian mercenaries,” he stated. According to Hezbollah’s leader, the West fails to understand that the Resistance does not operate under a logic of subordination but rather one of ideological harmony.
Nasrallah, who studied in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, had long held the belief that the world is locked in a constant struggle between the oppressed (mostazafin) and the oppressors (mostakberin). When Hezbollah published its founding manifesto in 1985, the defense of the oppressed against the oppressors was one of its fundamental principles.
From this perspective, the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is not based on a patron-client dynamic – as the West likes to portray – but on a political convergence. The concept of Wilayat al-Faqih—the authority of the leader of the Islamic revolution over the community—extends beyond the framework of the nation-state. For followers of this doctrine, Iran is not merely a country but the epicenter of an Islamic political-revolutionary project intended to serve as a model for the entire umma (Muslim community). This is why Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is not seen solely as Iran’s leader but as a political authority beyond its borders.
Nasrallah has repeatedly asserted that Hezbollah does not operate under Tehran’s directives: “Alliance does not mean obedience. It does not mean that when one party makes a decision, others follow without questioning its motivations. That would be coercion, not alliance.” This independence is crucial to understanding the dynamics between both actors.
One of the most revealing episodes of this autonomy occurred during the Syrian war. According to Esmail Kowsari, a parliamentarian and member of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), it was Hezbollah that told Iran the two countries needed to enter the fight against Daesh terrorists. Iranian General Hossein Hamedani confirmed in his memoirs that Nasrallah orchestrated the Resistance’s strategy in Syria and that even operations involving the IRGC were designed by Hezbollah.
Furthermore, various estimates suggest that even if Iran were to withdraw its support, Hezbollah could continue to operate independently. This demonstrates that the movement has built a self-sustaining structure and a financial network that extends beyond Iranian backing.
For these reasons, labeling Hezbollah as a mere extension is reductive. The group is not simply an arm of Iran’s policies but an actor with its own decision-making and operational capabilities. Their relationship is better described as symbiotic: while they share strategic objectives and a common worldview, Hezbollah maintains autonomy in its decision-making.
In this context, the funeral of Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din was not only a farewell for the Hezbollah leaders but also a politically significant event. It marked a pivotal moment for the Resistance in Lebanon amid escalating tensions with Israel. Additionally, it will provide an opportunity for the Lebanese people to demonstrate unity in an increasingly complex regional landscape. The message is clear: the Resistance remains steadfast and will not yield to external pressures.
At the funeral ceremony on Sunday, Hezbollah's fourth secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, repeated remarks previously delivered by Nasrallah 32 years ago at his predecessor's funeral. “Resistance has not ended. A new era of Resistance has just begun,” he said to a sea of mourners.
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