TEHRAN – Richard Nephew, who served as the lead sanctions expert for the U.S. team negotiating with Iran, is of the opinion that “I believe that Director General Amano is simply underscoring that he has a mandate to provide some verification and assurances requiring Section T, but does not have clarity as to exactly what he can insist upon and when.”

Fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, says “That is why the IAEA has been using the complementary access provisions of the Additional Protocol.”

Following is the text of the interview with Nephew:

Q: U.S. delegation in IAEA after recent session in IAEA announced that “We welcome the Director General’s statement that the IAEA continues to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and to conduct complementary access inspections to sites and locations in Iran. Any new and credible concerns of undeclared nuclear activities, including any potential weaponization-related issues, can and must be pursued by the IAEA. According to this, what means “complementary access inspections to sites and locations in Iran”? Is this access beyond the Additional Protocol?

A: No, this is access provided for in the Additional Protocol.  Articles 4-10 of the Model Additional Protocol (the same one Iran signed and has committed to ratify) outlines the process whereby complementary access can and should be granted.(https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf)

Q: Why U.S. again try to bring up Iran PMD Case in IAEA?

A: I do not read this as the United States bringing up the PMD case.  Rather, this is a reference to Section T of the JCPOA as well as a more general statement that, if the IAEA did find information about weaponization-related activities, it should insist upon access to those sites involved.  This, to me, is a statement of general principle that President Obama and his Administration would also have made.

Q: IAEA Director General ask Iran for “more” verification about Section T. It seems that Director General Yukiya Amano’ message is closing to Nikki Haley, United States Ambassador to the United Nations. What is your opinion?

A: I believe that Director General Amano is simply underscoring that he has a mandate to provide some verification and assurances requiring Section T, but does not have clarity as to exactly what he can insist upon and when.  That is why the IAEA has been using the complementary access provisions of the Additional Protocol.  As I have written elsewhere, I believe that this issue is adequately covered by the AP, but it is in everyone's interest -- including Iran's -- to make sure there is no question about Section T violations.  Iran's defense of its sovereignty makes some sense, but we are in a special situation here and -- in my opinion -- Iran still has a burden to demonstrate that its intentions are purely legitimate and peaceful after many years of misleading and deceiving the international community.

Q: Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA Reza Najafi highlighted that “ by limiting Iran’s benefits from the deal the US Government in contradiction with both letter and spirit of the agreement, particularly paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the JCPOA, has taken a negative approach to undermine “successful implementation” of the JCPOA.” This statement is while U.S. try to place sanction Iran on the name of Human Rights and terrorism. What will happen for JCPOA if Iran limited from benefiting of the agreement?

A: First, I must stress that I disagree with the notion that implementation of human rights and terrorism sanctions (or even missile sanctions) is contrary to the spirit and letter of the JCPOA.  The JCPOA explicitly acknowledges that in paragraph 30 with respect to even those individuals and entities whose sanctions designations were lifted by the JCPOA, much less new targets.  But, to your specific question, Iran has made its views quite clear, both in the JCPOA and since: if Iran believes it is being prevented from taking advantage of the sanctions relief it obtained in the JCPOA, then Iran will not continue to implement its commitments in the JCPOA.