BEIRUT—Turkey’s dissatisfaction with Lebanon has crystallized sharply following Beirut’s decision to sign a maritime border demarcation and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Cyprus with coordination with Ankara or Damascus.

According to sources, the meeting held on the sidelines of the Doha Forum last week between Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was notably tense, reflecting Ankara’s perception of the agreement as a destabilizing shift in Eastern Mediterranean.

During the exchange, Fidan reportedly conveyed Turkey’s view that Lebanon’s move constitutes an unjustified breach of regional equilibrium and a disregard for states that consider themselves directly concerned by maritime demarcation.

From Ankara’s standpoint, the agreement not only undermines Turkish and Syrian claims but, more critically, places Lebanon itself in a weakened legal and political position in any future maritime dispute.

Turkey further interprets the Cyprus deal as a preliminary step in a broader trajectory that could eventually align Lebanon with Israel along the same energy corridor. 

This concern is amplified by Beirut’s apparent gravitation toward the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum—comprising Egypt, Cyprus, and Israel—while excluding Turkey.

Fidan reportedly expressed surprise at Lebanon’s reluctance to pursue maritime cooperation with Ankara, described by Turkish officials as a longstanding friend, while engaging Cyprus in a manner that could indirectly situate Lebanon within Israel’s strategic orbit.

Turkish assessments downplay the notion of direct U.S. pressure on Beirut, instead viewing the agreement as the product of political-financial lobbying in Washington, allegedly spearheaded by Lebanese–Israeli networks and figures such as banker Antoun Sehnaoui.

In Ankara’s reading, this development is inseparable from the broader Turkish–Israeli rivalry over influence and energy routes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Lebanese sources suggest that President Joseph Aoun acted as the principal sponsor of the agreement, persuading state institutions to advance it outside the normal governmental process. 

The adopted demarcation mechanism reportedly resulted in Lebanon forfeiting thousands of square kilometers of its EEZ, after which Prime Minister Salam’s cabinet proceeded with implementation based on a framework shaped under presidential guidance.

Following the signing, a Turkish delegation visited Beirut to formally register Ankara’s rejection. 

Turkish officials indicated that their government is considering legal action before international forums, arguing that the agreement violates the rights of neighboring states and lacks any semblance of regional consensus. 

This signals the potential for heightened diplomatic friction, particularly as Turkey insists on reopening maritime negotiations.

Critically, the agreement endorsed by the Lebanese cabinet is not a provisional memorandum but a binding treaty conferring fixed maritime rights to a foreign state.
Opponents argue that the reliance on administrative fast-tracking underscores the political—rather than technical—nature of the decision, reflecting externally driven calculations that risk depriving Lebanon of its maritime wealth.

The cabinet approved the agreement and authorized its signing without parliamentary ratification, invoking Article 65 of the Lebanese constitution—a move that has provoked intense domestic backlash.

Turkey’s objections have thus evolved into an official and public stance. 

Ankara issued a strongly worded statement condemning the agreement as a unilateral act that disregards the rights of Turkish Cypriots and warning against international endorsement of what it described as attempts to usurp those rights. 

Lebanese political circles increasingly caution that Lebanon has little to gain from antagonizing Turkey or entangling itself in a broader regional energy confrontation that serves external agendas at the expense of its own national interests.

Ultimately, the maritime agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus cannot be isolated from the broader strategic architecture in which Israel emerges as a principal beneficiary.

Cyprus’s strategic relationship with the Israeli occupation entity is not merely economic or technical; it is deeply military and security-oriented, encompassing joint exercises, intelligence coordination, and logistical cooperation. 

During its ongoing raids on Lebanon and Gaza, multiple reports documented Israeli warplanes operating from, training in, or transiting through Cypriot airspace and facilities. 

Hence, any agreement that enhances Cyprus’s standing and role in the Eastern Mediterranean therefore translates, indirectly but materially, into strengthened Israeli strategic depth.

It is precisely this dynamic that alarms Ankara. Turkey’s objections are not confined to legal or procedural concerns; they reflect a deeper fear of unchecked Israeli expansion—military, energy-based, and geopolitical—under the cover of regional energy arrangements. 

From this perspective, the agreement is far more than a technical demarcation of maritime boundaries: it is a component of a regional order that consolidates Israeli security and influence while eroding Lebanon’s sovereignty and bargaining power at a critical historical moment.