TEHRAN — Iran has developed technical capabilities to identify and disrupt unauthorized Starlink satellite internet terminals, while intensifying its efforts through international regulatory channels to compel the service to comply with telecommunications rules governing its operations inside Iranian territory.

Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace, said Iranian specialists had developed and tested several systems to identify and manage satellite communications, adding that one of these technologies had been deployed during unrest in December.
Aghamiri said approximately 80% of Starlink communication packets in Iran had been disrupted during that period, while much of the remaining traffic had become largely ineffective. 

He stressed that Iran’s countermeasures extended beyond interference with the Global Positioning System (GPS), saying domestic specialists had developed other technologies to identify satellite user terminals and interfere with communications between transmitters and receivers.
Identifying unauthorized Starlink terminals remains a priority for Iranian authorities, he added, arguing that the technology could be countered through a range of technical measures.

Beyond GPS interference: identifying and disabling terminals

Starlink, operated by SpaceX, delivers broadband internet through a constellation of satellites in low Earth orbit. Users connect through specialized ground-based equipment known as user terminals, which communicate with satellites passing overhead.

The system's architecture enables terminals to switch between satellites as their positions change, helping maintain connectivity. This network design also presents challenges for authorities seeking to identify individual terminals operating without authorization across a large territory.

Technical interference with satellite communications and the remote deactivation of user terminals are distinct approaches. The former seeks to degrade or interrupt the communications link, while the latter involves the satellite operator identifying a terminal's location and disabling its access to the network.

Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace secretary said the country's countermeasures were not limited to GPS disruption and that Iranian specialists had developed additional capabilities to address satellite communications. His remarks point to a broader focus on terminal identification and communications interference rather than reliance on a single technical method.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has separately confirmed that Starlink has the technical capability to geolocate user terminals and disable them remotely. At its 100th Radio Regulations Board meeting, the ITU noted that Starlink had identified and disabled more than 2,500 terminals operating illegally in a particular area, demonstrating the system's capacity to restrict access geographically.

The ITU's findings are significant to Iran's argument that the operator can take more direct action against terminals operating in territories where its services have not been authorized. 

Iran takes Starlink dispute to international regulators

Iran's objections to Starlink's operations are not confined to technical and security concerns. Tehran has pursued the issue through the ITU for several years, arguing that terminals transmitting from within Iranian territory must comply with the country's national telecommunications regulations and applicable international rules.

Aghamiri said Iran's Ministry of Communications had submitted multiple complaints and supporting documents to the ITU over the past two to three years. Tehran has also raised the matter with the relevant Norwegian regulatory authority and the US side, while Iran's Foreign Ministry has issued a formal warning to Norway.

The dispute centers on the authorization of satellite transmissions and the responsibilities of the administrations associated with Starlink's satellite-system filings. Under the ITU framework, satellite transmissions from within a country's territory must comply with applicable regulatory requirements, including provisions governing authorization to operate transmitting earth stations.

In October, Iran formally protested to Norway over the ‘continued failure’ to take effective action against unauthorized Starlink operations. The Foreign Ministry summoned Norwegian Ambassador to Tehran Paul Bjornstad and called for immediate measures to halt transmissions from terminals operating without authorization.

Iranian officials have also raised security concerns, believeing that the United States and Israel have used satellite communications infrastructure to support activities directed against the Islamic Republic. Tehran maintains that the operation of foreign communications equipment without its authorization raises questions of national sovereignty as well as national security.

What the ITU has decided

The ITU's Radio Regulations Board has examined the dispute since March 2023. Its decisions have repeatedly called on Norway and the United States to take appropriate measures to ensure that Starlink transmissions from unauthorized terminals inside Iran are stopped.

At its 101st meeting in March 2026, the Board concluded that Norway's actions were not compliant with obligations under relevant ITU resolutions and Article 18 of the Radio Regulations. It urged Norway and the United States to take all appropriate measures available to them to have Starlink immediately disable unauthorized transmissions within Iranian territory.

The Board also noted that Starlink had the technical capacity to locate terminals and deactivate them remotely. At the same time, it asked Iran to continue its own efforts, to the extent possible, to identify and deactivate unauthorized terminals.

At its 102nd meeting, held from June 29 to July 3, 2026, the Board reiterated its position. It noted that the dispute had remained unresolved since 2023 and that no response had been received from the Norwegian or US administrations on the latest submissions under consideration.

The Board again urged Norway and the United States to comply with the relevant provisions and called for immediate action by the operator to disable unauthorized transmissions inside Iran. However, it also reiterated that it lacked the authority to suspend satellite-system frequency assignments solely because the notifying administration had failed to comply with the relevant resolution.

The distinction is important: the ITU has pressed for enforcement of existing rules but has not ordered a blanket shutdown of Starlink's satellite network or suspended its frequency assignments.

A wider debate over satellite internet and national sovereignty

The dispute highlights a growing challenge in international telecommunications governance: how to regulate global satellite broadband systems whose signals can reach across national borders and whose user terminals can be transported into countries where the service is not authorized.

For Iran, the central issue is not simply access to satellite internet technology. Tehran argues that the operation of transmitting terminals within its territory must respect national authorization requirements and that the service provider and the relevant administrations have a responsibility to prevent unauthorized transmissions.

Aghamiri also pointed to Starlink's use in military conflicts, particularly Ukraine, arguing that satellite communications can support functions extending beyond ordinary civilian connectivity, including military command and control, drone operations, intelligence gathering and espionage networks.

His comments reflect Iran's position that satellite communications infrastructure must be assessed in light of its potential dual-use applications, particularly when deployed in a conflict environment. Such concerns have become increasingly prominent as commercial satellite networks play a growing role in military communications and battlefield connectivity.

The Iranian official also referred to statements by US officials and SpaceX chief executive Elon Musk concerning Starlink's wartime use, arguing that the technology should not be regarded exclusively as a civilian communications service.

For Tehran, the combination of technical countermeasures and international legal action represents a two-track response: developing domestic capabilities to address unauthorized satellite communications while seeking enforcement of international telecommunications regulations.

The unresolved ITU proceedings suggest that the dispute will continue to test the balance between the global reach of commercial satellite networks, the responsibilities of their operators and the regulatory authority of states over communications transmitted from within their territory.