BEIRUT—What was introduced after the November 27, 2024 ceasefire as a purely technical arrangement has gradually evolved into a mechanism with political and security implications that extend far beyond its stated purpose. 

The so-called “Mechanism Committee” was promoted as a neutral tool for coordination and de-escalation along Lebanon’s southern border. Yet beneath its technocratic language lies a structure that operates without a legal mandate, lacks constitutional legitimacy, and increasingly interferes in Lebanon’s internal affairs.

This transformation poses a direct threat not only to Lebanese sovereignty, but also to the rule of law, civil liberties, and the integrity of national institutions.
The fundamental problem with the Mechanism Committee is not coordination itself, but the absence of any clear legal foundation.

The committee was not established through Lebanese legislation, parliamentary approval, or a formal government decree defining its scope, authority, and limits. 

As such, it exists in a legal vacuum, exercising influence without accountability. In a constitutional state, no body—domestic or external—may act without explicit legal authorization. The mechanism violates this basic principle.

At best, the committee can be described as a non-binding coordination forum. It is neither a United Nations–mandated force like UNIFIL nor an internationally recognized body with enforcement powers. 

Selective neutrality and political bias

The committee’s credibility further erodes through its selective performance. 

Daily Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty are routinely overlooked, minimized, or reframed, while pressure is disproportionately directed toward Lebanon and its institutions.

This imbalance strips the mechanism of any claim to neutrality and transforms it into a political tool rather than a technical one.

More alarming is the way this imbalance translates into pressure on Lebanese institutions, particularly the army, to undertake actions that infringe on civilian rights.

Suggestions involving house searches or security measures without judicial oversight directly violate Lebanon’s constitution, which guarantees the inviolability of homes and requires judicial warrants for such actions. 

No external “technical” body has the authority to override these protections.

Allowing an external mechanism to shape internal security decisions effectively transfers sovereign authority away from constitutional institutions. 

This weakens the judiciary, compromises the independence of the army, and risks normalizing a system where national forces execute external agendas under the guise of coordination.

From coordination to intervention

The Mechanism Committee held its final meeting on December 19, 2025, at the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, attended by representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United States, France, Israel, and UNIFIL, with the Lebanese delegation led by former Ambassador Simon Karam.

The meeting represented a turning point, as discussions shifted toward expanding field operations inside Lebanese territory under the pretexts of “security arrangements” and “violation prevention.”

 Efforts to expand internal security measures while continuing to obscure Israeli violations confirmed that the mechanism is drifting from coordination toward intervention.

Any outcomes of such meetings remain non-binding unless adopted through Lebanon’s constitutional channels—yet they are increasingly treated as operational imperatives.

The true danger of the Mechanism Committee lies in its normalization. When an extra-legal body becomes a reference point for internal security, the erosion of sovereignty becomes structural rather than incidental. 

Stability achieved at the expense of constitutional authority is not stability, but managed fragility.

Defending Lebanon today requires reaffirming a simple principle: coordination does not mean submission, and no mechanism—however technical its language—can replace the authority of law and legitimate national institutions.