TEHRAN - Shargh analyzed the letter sent by Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, Youssef Rajji, to Abbas Araghchi. According to the paper, Rajji formally informed Araghchi that, at the present juncture, he could not accept Tehran’s invitation for an official visit.

However, he emphasized that this refusal should not be interpreted as a rejection of dialogue. This letter can be read within a framework of multilayered political considerations: First level: Rajji’s cautious language and diplomatic timing reveal that Lebanon is facing unprecedented political and security pressures. Second level: Lebanon’s request to hold talks with Iran in a “neutral third country” indicates Beirut’s effort to manage relations with Tehran in a controlled format, distanced from regional sensitivities. Third level: Rajji’s message reflects Lebanon’s attempt to preserve its “room for maneuver” with all actors. Beirut does not wish to sever or weaken ties with Iran, but seeks to define them in a managed, low-tension framework acceptable to external pressure groups. This situation suggests that Lebanon’s understanding of the new regional and international environment is that Tehran–Beirut relations must enter a “regulated and supervised” phase—one in which Lebanon balances continued engagement with Iran against mounting Western-Arab pressures.

Etemad: The Middle East in America’s new National Security Strategy

Etemad commented on the U.S. National Security Strategy of November 2025. The paper argued that in this document, the Middle East no longer holds its former central position in American foreign policy, though vital interests in the region remain intact. The strategy effectively redefines the Middle East from a “zone of threat” into a “zone of opportunity.” Washington’s reassessment is driven by three structural shifts: First, America’s relative self-sufficiency in energy production and its return as an exporter. Second, the transformation of the international order from superpower rivalry to great-power competition, with East Asia—not the Middle East—as the main arena. Third, the weakening of Iran as a significant player in the global order, due to military and coalition pressures. From this perspective, the United States is moving away from costly wars and heavy military presence toward a new strategy that can be described as “offshore balancing”: maintaining influence and interests through a network of regional allies—from Israel to Saudi Arabia—without the burden of direct intervention.

Sobh-e-No: Snapback did not work

In an article, Sobh-e-No addressed Iran’s annual oil sales record. Despite sweeping sanctions and the activation of the snapback mechanism, Iran’s oil exports reached a seven-year high, generating nearly $4 billion in monthly revenue. According to the oil minister, this production increase was achieved with Russian assistance in equipment and technology, while China has remained Iran’s main oil buyer under long-term agreements. Following the sanctions, Iran has actively sought new partners to strengthen its oil and gas industry, with China and Russia considered its principal allies. Beijing continues to purchase a large share of Tehran’s oil despite sanctions, while Moscow cooperates in technology and equipment. New tanker-tracking data shows that Iran’s exports have reached their highest level since U.S. sanctions intensified in 2018. This record has been set even though the U.S. sanctions framework against Iran’s energy sector and tanker fleet has not been lifted; in fact, in recent months, under the so-called activation of the snapback mechanism, sanctions on individuals, companies, and ships have been further expanded.

Iran: A strong and important partner for Kazakhstan

In an interview with the Iran newspaper, Ali Akbar Jokar, Iran’s ambassador to Kazakhstan, discussed President Pezeshkian’s visit to Kazakhstan. Jokar stated that the president’s presence in Kazakhstan provides an opportunity for a shared understanding of current conditions and the identification of new paths for investment and trade exchanges. The combination of private-sector participation with high-level political talks creates a chance for Tehran and Kazakhstan to design new formulas and mechanisms for security and economic cooperation, elevating their already positive and solid relations to a higher stage. The meeting between the Iranian and Kazakh presidents at the highest political level signals a convergence of views and shared approaches on security issues. With its focus on economic development and creating a secure environment for growth, Kazakhstan regards Iran as an important partner and influential power. The ongoing visit sends a clear message to the region: through bilateral consultations, Tehran and Kazakhstan can design new formulas for cooperation and further strengthen relations that have already been in very good condition.