TEHRAN – The recent 12-day U.S.-Israel assault on Iran has reignited debates about whether the global legal system retains any real authority or has collapsed under the weight of great-power politics. For Thomas G. Weiss, a leading thinker on international governance and long-time observer of the UN, the crisis is symptomatic of a much deeper breakdown.

In this interview with the Tehran Times, Weiss argues that international law today survives more as rhetoric than as a restraining force. He warns that the UN, paralyzed by geopolitical divisions and decades of neglect, has drifted further from its founding purpose of maintaining peace and preventing aggression. From the misuse of self-defense claims to the near-total absence of accountability for war crimes, he outlines a system in which impunity has become the norm. As the UN approaches a pivotal leadership transition, Weiss contends that the coming years may be the last window to restore even modest credibility to global governance.

The following is the text of the interview:

Many observers believe that the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran marked another moment when international law was completely sidelined. From your perspective, what does this tell us about the current state of the global legal order?

The global legal order is always what states make of it. It is particularly unsettling at this moment because international law seems to be under duress everywhere. In truth, that has always been the case. There is far more rhetoric about international law than real respect for it. And because there is no enforcement mechanism—aside from an occasional Security Council resolution or a World Trade Organization ruling—there is effectively no way to compel states to behave. Today, we have a large number of states misbehaving simultaneously.

The U.S. and Israel justified their operation under the notion of anticipatory self-defense. Does this concept have any legitimate basis in international law, or is it simply a political narrative to justify aggression?

As with many provisions in international law, states interpret terms to suit themselves. UN Charter Article 51’s concept of self-defense has been invoked by many states to justify decisions that had nothing to do with genuine self-defense. Anticipatory self-defense is an even thinner justification—because the threat is not even imminent. It essentially means eliminating a potential threat before it becomes one. It is the weakest possible legal argument, and it is unsurprising that the United States and Israel rely on it regularly.

You have written extensively about the illusion of global governance. Has the UN become more symbolic than functional in maintaining peace and preventing aggression?

One could argue it has been that way since 1945. Respect for law and the UN’s ability to act rise and fall over time. But the present moment may be the worst in my professional career. The UN is essentially on the sidelines when it comes to international peace and security. The Security Council is paralyzed, issuing only the occasional lament.

The UN is an intergovernmental organization based on state interests. It works only when states want it to work. And today, there is absolutely no consensus—especially within the Security Council—on what to do. The General Assembly may condemn Russia in Ukraine or Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, but that is as far as it goes.

If you compare it with organizations like NATO or the EU, those bodies generate tangible benefits from cooperation. The UN today struggles to identify such incentives. And this paralysis extends beyond security. Look at the COP 30 climate discussions in Brazil—there is precious little movement despite a rapidly deteriorating environment.

Do you think international law was ever truly universal, or has it always served as a political instrument shaped by power and privilege?

International law has always been shaped by great powers. After major global conflicts—such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II—victorious powers occasionally act with a moment of common sense and attempt to construct better legal and institutional arrangements.

But ultimately, I often cite Thucydides: the strong do what they will; the weak suffer what they must. Power, not norms or morality, largely determines outcomes. There have been moments when international law has attempted to rise above this—such as with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals—but those were rare. Our present situation is not one of those exceptional moments.

Considering reports of civilian infrastructure being targeted in Iran, could such actions amount to war crimes under the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statute?

I was not directly involved, but based on public reporting, these actions clearly violated international law. Whether bombing military or nuclear facilities constitutes a war crime will be debated for years. But it certainly violated fundamental rules prohibiting cross-border attacks without a declaration or act of war.

However, there will be no accountability. Cases involving Netanyahu and Putin at the ICC are already stalled, and accusations against the U.S. or Israel are even less likely to move forward. impunity is the rule, not the exception.

Based on your long-standing research on UN reform, do you believe there are still viable paths for restoring credibility to international law? Or has the system entered an irreversible phase of decay?

My life roughly coincides with the UN’s—I'm almost 80, and the UN just turned 80. Every five years or so, we see a massive production of academic and diplomatic proposals for reform. Typically, there is noise, debate, and then calls to “reform the reform.”

But today, because of the Trump administration’s assault on multilateralism and severe U.S. funding cuts, pressure for reform may have a greater impact than in the past. The UN’s demonstrated ineptitude in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, Myanmar, and elsewhere has exposed it as a hollow shell of what it was intended to be.

A new Secretary-General will take office on 1 January 2027, with elections beginning next year. This may create space for substantial change—not transformational, but modest and necessary. The easiest area to reform (though still difficult) is the structure of the organization and its international civil service. Several Secretaries-General, beginning with Dag Hammarskjöld, attempted this. The next one will have no choice: resources will be more limited, and the UN’s inability to act will be too visible to ignore. The early months of the next Secretary-General’s term may represent a rare window for more dramatic action. Let’s hope so.