TEHRAN – During a recent meeting between the Prime Minister of the Israeli regime and the U.S. President, Benjamin Netanyahu referred to the “Libyan model” as an ideal way to engage with Iran.

While this reference might appear diplomatic on the surface, it is, in essence, a direct threat against the country. 

The "Libyan model" refers to the 2003 agreement between Muammar Gaddafi and Western countries (particularly the U.S. and the U.K.) to dismantle Libya's nuclear, chemical, and missile programs. In exchange for promises to lift sanctions and reintegrate Libya into the international community, Gaddafi abandoned many of the country’s strategic capabilities. However, this process not only failed to lead to stability but, with the onset of the so-called "Arab Spring" in 2011, NATO intervened under the pretext of supporting the people and toppled Gaddafi's government. In this note, I will explain why comparing Iran to Libya is not only incorrect but fundamentally lacks strategic value.

Iran vs. Libya: Structural and strategic distinctions

The Islamic Republic of Iran is based on a system of multiple, resilient institutions that, under the leadership of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, maintain an unparalleled cohesion in managing external threats. These institutions, through coordination and synergy, are responsive to both internal and external challenges. In contrast, the governance structure in Libya was entirely personal and tribal. Muammar Gaddafi held central control over the country for four decades, with his governance primarily based on individual will and tribal alliances. Libya’s political system lacked effective and independent institutions, relying instead on Gaddafi’s personal power and tribal coalitions. This structurally vulnerable system led to the collapse of Libya after Gaddafi's overthrow, as the country fragmented into a security and political disaster, divided among various tribal and armed groups. The absence of independent, coordinated state institutions in Libya led to instability and division.

This structural and strategic distinction between Iran and Libya not only underscores the strength of the Iranian government in facing external threats but also emphasizes the necessity of maintaining the independence of institutions and societal management during difficult political conditions. Iran, with its extensive historical and field experiences in maintaining internal cohesion and managing threats, is immune to the structural weaknesses that plagued Libya.

Furthermore, Iran has a rich history of resistance and standing firm against pressures, from the imposed war to debilitating sanctions. In all these cases, instead of capitulating, Iran pursued an “active resistance” model, which is reflected in its maintaining a nuclear program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, its effective regional presence in West Asia, and its negotiations from a position of strength with Western countries under the JCPOA. In contrast, Gaddafi, in an attempt to normalize relations, relinquished his tools of power and ultimately became a victim of the very process he had engaged in.

Iran’s geopolitical position and regional influence are entirely different from those of Libya. Iran is an influential actor on both a regional and global scale, playing an active role from the Axis of Resistance in West Asia to its interactions with great powers. This strategic depth has layered and complex deterrence capabilities. Conversely, Libya, under Gaddafi, was seen as a country with rich energy resources and an important geographical position in North Africa but had a weak regional and international presence. While Gaddafi sought to play a role in certain regional and global developments, his internal limitations and lack of strategic partnerships prevented him from establishing sustainable influence internationally or regionally. Additionally, Western involvement in Libya, particularly through NATO military interventions, led to the loss of any deterrent capacity and caused instability.

Thus, Iran’s geopolitical position and regional influence significantly differentiate it from Libya. With its strategic depth and indigenous power, Iran possesses a complex and effective deterrence capability that is incomparable to Libya's situation.

Unlike Libya, which depended on externally purchased military equipment and lacked strategic defense depth, Iran has developed its own defensive capabilities. Its defense infrastructure is based on a complex network of domestic industries, trained human resources, and advanced technology.

Last but not least, Iran’s mistrust of the West is deeply rooted in historical experience. The fall of Gaddafi after his agreement with the West is the best example to emphasize the repeated warnings by the leader of the revolution about the unreliability of the U.S. and Western powers. Iran’s historical experiences in dealing with the West, including the imposed war, long-term sanctions, and the JCPOA, all confirm the reality that the West, particularly the U.S., has consistently employed double-dealing and deceptive policies in dealing with Iran.

Gaddafi's fall after agreeing to disarm and negotiate with the U.S. is a clear testament to the correctness of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s view of mistrust toward the West. Gaddafi, who agreed to dismantle his weapons and engage with the U.S. in 2003, ultimately failed to achieve his diplomatic objectives and was killed after several years, pressured by NATO and Western military interventions. This event serves as a living example in Iran’s strategic memory, proving that any trust in the West, especially in military and security matters, could lead to an irreparable disaster.

The leader of the Islamic Revolution has always emphasized that historical lessons from Iran and other countries, such as Libya, should be seen as instructive in strengthening national independence and deterrent power.

In conclusion, one of the most significant distinctions between Iran and Libya is the presence of the people as a real support for the system. Unlike Gaddafi’s Libya, which lacked meaningful public participation in governance, the Islamic Republic of Iran enjoys substantial support from its people, who have played pivotal roles in critical historical moments, including elections, rallies, and resistance against external pressures. This social capital is the most important strategic support in facing models like the Libyan one.

Here, it is necessary to refer to a key concept in the security and strategic literature: the "Libyan Syndrome," which without understanding, any analysis of the Libyan model would be incomplete and incorrect.

Libyan Syndrome: a lesson for Iran’s strategic memory

The term "Libyan Syndrome" refers to the fear of replicating Libya's fate for countries that forgo their deterrent capabilities. In Iran, this syndrome is not merely a memory but rightly serves as a strategic lesson embedded in the memory of political and security elites. It constantly reminds that any concession in the face of Western promises can turn into an existential cost for a country. As a result, the leader of the Islamic Revolution has continuously emphasized the importance of maintaining national sovereignty and enhancing deterrence capacity.

The Libyan Syndrome is not only prevalent in Iran but also in countries like North Korea, which view the fate of Gaddafi as a lesson to never trust Western promises regarding disarmament.

From a strategic perspective, Libya’s experience serves as a serious warning for the Islamic Republic of Iran, a warning showing that relinquishing components of national power could come at a heavy price. Therefore, Iran must adopt a proactive, multi-layered, and intelligent approach to prevent such an experience. This approach should not only focus on maintaining deterrence capabilities but also on managing the war of narratives and reinforcing internal cohesion.

The first step in this path is to solidify the narrative of Western betrayal. The experience of Gaddafi's fall should be systematically documented and disseminated by media outlets, think tanks, universities, and public diplomacy agencies. This narrative should not be confined to the internal space but must be communicated to the public globally, through tools like documentaries, television programs, artistic productions, and academic analyses, in order to cement the deceptive nature of the Libyan model in the collective memory of nations.

Second, it is crucial to demonstrate Iran’s deterrence power. Iran’s defense, missile, and regional capabilities should be showcased in a balanced and deliberate manner to prevent adversaries from making miscalculations. This display of power should not be one of aggression but of effective deterrence, security, and prevention.

Third, strengthening regional ties and cohesion within the axis of resistance is an irreplaceable necessity. The more cooperation and coordination there is among the actors in the resistance axis against the Israeli regime and U.S. interventions, the higher the cost of threatening Iran, thus discouraging adversaries from embarking on dangerous adventures.

Fourth, there must be active counter-narrative development against the Libyan model by intellectual elites, media professionals, and cognitive domain activists. This counter-narrative should expose the model as a deceptive, costly, and failed approach, and eliminate it from the minds of policymakers and decision-makers.

Finally, bolstering internal cohesion and strengthening national power is the key to overcoming external threats. By increasing social participation, deepening unity among elites, trusting the younger generation, and relying on domestic capacities, the internal pillars of national power can be strengthened—pillars that will withstand any external storm and protect the country from projects like the Libyan model.

A historical warning for the future: Iran has moved beyond the Libyan Model

The Libyan model is not a repeatable example but a historical warning for the Islamic Republic of Iran. A country that, through wise leadership, robust structures, effective deterrence, a history of resistance, and a distinguished geopolitical position, is fundamentally incomparable to Libya. Netanyahu’s reference to this model is more than an attempt at negotiation; it is an effort to weaken Iran both psychologically and strategically and to repeat a failed project to contain an independent power. But the reality is that Iran today is not in the same position as Libya in 2003.

This analysis should guide Iran’s approach to external and internal challenges and help prevent falling into the trap of misguided foreign policy experiments. It is time for Iran to demonstrate its firm stance in the face of external pressures and solidify its position on the global stage.