TEHRAN- As Syria marks one year since the fall of the Assad government, the country faces unprecedented political, social, and humanitarian challenges.

In an exclusive interview with Tehran Times, Lebanese journalist and political analyst Abeer Bassam provides a detailed assessment of Syria’s deteriorating political landscape, rising sectarian tensions, and the transitional authority’s inability to form a cohesive governance structure. 

She examines the severe humanitarian crisis, including skyrocketing electricity bills, food insecurity, and failing public services, as well as the growing presence of foreign powers—particularly Israel, the United States, and Turkey—in Syrian territory. Bassam also analyzes the implications for Syria’s foreign policy, minority communities, and prospects for democratic transition, offering a sobering outlook on the country’s fragile future.

The following is the text of the interview:

How do you evaluate the political landscape in Syria one year after the fall of the Assad government? Has the transitional authority shown signs of forming a coherent political identity?  

As anyone closely monitoring the situation can see, Syria’s political scene is bleak. The country has lost its central role, both regionally and internationally. Syria was once a leading state in the Middle East, consistently supporting resistance movements from the 1950s through the 1970s. Even in the 1980s, it played a decisive role. During the April 1996 war, under President Hafez al-Assad, Syria led negotiations and imposed a critical equation on Israel, including the protection of civilians.

Where is Syria today compared to the 1990s and early 2000s, when it supplied advanced weapons and developed Kornet missiles for Hezbollah—missiles that successfully destroyed Merkava tanks? The fall of the Assad government has radically altered the political scene, and Syria has lost much of its former influence and standing.

Regarding the transitional authority’s ability to form a cohesive political identity, the answer is clearly no. Even if one accepts the reported millions of people taking to the streets, these numbers are questionable. Observed crowds reflect only a narrow segment of Syrian society, not its full spectrum.

Over the past year, Syria has witnessed horrific massacres along the coast, in Sweida, Homs, and attacks on civilians simply for opposing the authorities. These events confirm that the country remains in a vacuum, contested by multiple forces—including pre-existing domestic groups, newly emerged factions, and external powers vying for influence.

Additionally, we are witnessing the expansion of American influence and Israeli occupation of Syrian territory. Southern Syria is entirely under Israeli control, and Syrian airspace is fully exposed, with no effective deterrence.

Minority communities — including Alawites, Druze, and Christians — have reported deep concerns about reprisals and institutional discrimination. What explains the current “minority anxiety,” and how serious is the threat of sectarian polarization?  

The concerns expressed by religious and ethnic communities — including Alawites, Druze, and Christians — about renewed sectarian polarization are entirely justified. When we say thousands of Alawites were killed on the Syrian coast, we are referring to a community that has endured unimaginable terror. Even the initial protests were, in many cases, driven by violations against these communities, including harassment of women and girls.

It is true that retaliatory violence also occurred among Sunnis themselves — for example, in Daraa, where revenge attacks targeted Sunnis. Ultimately, however, anyone who opposed the current authority became a target, regardless of sect.

A critical fact must be emphasized: the Syrian army was not an army of minorities. While there were limited numbers of Druze and Christians, the overwhelming majority of its members were Sunnis, simply because Sunnis constitute the largest sect in Syria. All those who supported former President Bashar al-Assad — irrespective of sectarian identity — were subjected to harassment, reprisals, and violence.

That said, what occurred in Sweida and along the Syrian coast was particularly terrifying. Today, members of these communities feel unable to live under the current system. I speak with them regularly, and they consistently express a profound lack of safety under what they view as a sectarian order.

Syria’s social fabric is far more complex than Lebanon’s. If Lebanon has 17 recognized sects, Syria has more than 30. Expecting all these groups to submit to the dominance of a single sect is unrealistic and dangerous. What are often labeled as “minorities” actually constitute more than 60 percent of Syria’s population. This reality must be taken far more seriously.

The crisis is not limited to minorities alone. Even among Sunnis, young people are fleeing the country due to unemployment and economic collapse. Among Alawites, many families are now afraid to send their children to universities outside their own cities. In Homs, the situation is especially alarming, with systematic attacks aimed at emptying certain areas of their Alawite population altogether.

There have also been reports of attacks on residents of Al-Sumariyya, an area near Damascus. These were low-income families who had received state-built housing under the previous government, paying affordable installments close to cost. They were forcibly evicted solely because of their sectarian identity, in order to accommodate outsiders.

Another fundamental problem is that many of those who present themselves as Islamists are not Syrians at all. Outside Damascus — which remains something of an exception — individuals can be seen across Syrian provinces whose dress, appearance, and behavior are alien to Syrian society. These include Chechens, Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Turkistanis, as well as Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Tunisians who previously came to Syria to fight.

Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria was the last remaining steadfast Arab state. Today, Syria has been transformed into a strange and dangerous cocktail — one marked by sectarian fear, social fragmentation, and deep uncertainty about the future.

Israel occupied Mount Hermon because it is the most important water source in southern Syria, with massive snow reserves.

Israel’s military footprint has expanded deeper into Syrian territory since the Assad government’s collapse, including airstrikes in central Damascus and ground incursions into southern Syria. How do you interpret Israel’s strategic calculus today — is it primarily security-driven, aimed at establishing buffer zones, or is it exploiting Syrian instability?  

Israel never dared to violate the 1974 Disengagement Agreement after the 1973 war—a war whose importance and achievements many unfortunately refuse to acknowledge. Under that agreement, Syria regained Quneitra and large areas, and carried out a significant military operation to liberate Mount Hermon, particularly its peak.

Once the Syrian government fell, Israel no longer cared. It abandoned all ceasefire commitments and occupied Mount Hermon entirely—Ayn al-Tinah, the Hermon summit, and even areas in Quneitra that had been liberated in 1973.

Today, Israel is acting according to the doctrine of “Greater Israel.” This is the most dangerous aspect of the situation. The revival of the biblical term “Bashan” is telling. Bashan refers to southern Syria—from the Golan Heights through Quneitra to Sweida—an area Israel considers part of Greater Israel.

This occupation is also closely linked to the so-called “David Corridor,” which Israel seeks to control to connect itself to northern Syria and the resource-rich regions of northeastern Syria. This corridor would facilitate oil and gas pipelines reaching not Haifa, but the port of Ashkelon, which is being developed as a major export hub.

Additionally, Israel seeks access to northern Syria to control the old Silk Road routes passing through Aleppo and Idlib toward the Mediterranean coast. Biden spoke of the India–Middle East corridor; Netanyahu speaks of the David Corridor. All claim entitlement to these regions.

Another critical factor is energy distribution. Syria, alongside Iraq, is expected to become a major hub not only for oil and gas but also for electricity distribution from the (Persian) Gulf—this lies at the heart of Zionist planning.

Most importantly, there is the issue of water security. Israel occupied Mount Hermon because it is the most important water source in southern Syria, with massive snow reserves. Since 2020, I have written about Israel’s attempts to control western Daraa, which it now occupies. This region contains vital groundwater and waterfalls feeding the Yarmouk River, which in turn feeds the Jordan River.

Israel seeks to control all water sources in southern Syria and southern Lebanon, including the Litani, Wazzani, and Hasbani rivers, as well as the Shebaa Farms, which are part of the Mount Hermon region.

Syrian instability is not the only factor enabling these gains. The policy of “we have come to slaughter you,” which extremist groups broadcast in videos—a phrase previously unknown to Syrians—has created terror. Al-Jolani, now Al-Sharaa, even threatened Syrians during a recent ceremony by hinting he could return to military dress, trying to project strength to Israel. But he will never fight Israel. 

Sharaa's rise to power was the result of a settlement that included security guarantees for Israel.

The U.S. recently waived sanctions on Syria, and President Trump met with Ahmed al-Sharaa at the White House. How do you evaluate the shifting U.S. stance — from sanctions to diplomatic engagement — and what are the geopolitical implications for Syria and the broader Middle East?

I am not surewhether  sanctions were truly lifted. What I do know is that Al-Sharaa was removed from terrorism lists. Yet Syria has gained nothing tangible—no investments, no reconstruction. Many people still live in tents and public parks after being displaced as part of demographic engineering.

The recent meeting in Washington produced one clear result: reaffirming Israel’s security. The new government will not confront Israel; it will guarantee its security—at the expense of the resistance in Lebanon. There was even an agreement to establish a new U.S. military base at Mezzeh Military Airport—an airport historically used to fight Israel and terrorism. The irony is staggering.

Humanitarian conditions remain dire. Electricity supply has improved, but bills have increased more than thirtyfold. People now fear electricity costs. Food prices have soared far beyond salary increases. Water in Sweida is unsafe. Healthcare, once among the best free systems in the region, has become prohibitively expensive. Syrians still rely on emergency aid.

Political change has brought no development—only empty promises. Infrastructure projects will not benefit Syrians, as oil and gas remain under U.S.-backed control in eastern Syria. There are even reports of plans to dismantle the Homs refinery to build housing for newly naturalized foreign fighters.

This dangerous policy that “we have come to slaughter you” has become reality in Syria, creating not fear, but terror among the population.

This dangerous policy that “we have come to slaughter you” has become reality in Syria, creating not fear, but terror among the population.
How has the humanitarian situation evolved since Assad’s fall in terms of poverty, food security, and access to basic services?

While there has been some improvement in electricity supply, this has come at a heavy cost. Electricity bills have risen more than thirtyfold, placing an enormous burden on ordinary Syrians. During the war, electricity production in northern Syria was largely controlled by SDF groups—aligned with the Americans—or by armed groups in Idlib and Aleppo. Today, the Syrian electricity network is more connected, including links to Turkey, but the skyrocketing bills make access unaffordable for many.

Food security remains a critical challenge. Although wages have increased fourfold, the price of goods has risen more than ten times. Access to clean water is also severely limited; for example, in Sweida, water that used to come from reliable springs in western Daraa is now sourced from wells and is often unsafe for drinking or household use.

Healthcare, once considered free and highly accessible, has deteriorated drastically. Medical services and drug prices have soared, forcing many Syrians to rely on emergency aid. Development projects promised after the political transition have largely failed to materialize.

Key infrastructure and natural resources, including oil and gas in eastern Syria, are under foreign control, limiting Syrian benefit. There are also reports of industrial assets, such as the Homs refinery, being dismantled or repurposed for housing provided to foreign groups granted Syrian nationality.

Overall, despite the political change, ordinary Syrians face worsening economic pressures, insecure access to basic services, and a growing sense of panic amid ongoing instability.

When a ruling authority demonstrates a willingness to carry out massacres against its own population—as the world has already witnessed—how can one realistically speak of a genuine democratic transition?

Sharaa has vocalized long timelines for elections and constitutional reform. How realistic are these goals, and what are the main legal, social, and security obstacles to a genuine democratic transition?

Al-Sharaa has indeed spoken of extended timelines for elections, suggesting that they could take place after four years. But what does this actually mean in practical terms? Frankly, by setting elections four years down the line and declaring his intention to rule for that entire period, he is betting on a major shift in realities—whether political, social, or security-related. He is essentially hoping that by then he will have consolidated power and that Syrian society will, in one way or another, have been subdued and brought under control.

The core problem is that after four years, it is unclear how much of Syria will even remain under Al-Sharaa’s authority, making it possible—if at all—to organize genuine, constitutional elections. Sweida, for instance, is openly demanding secession. The Syrian coast is calling for federalism—possibly remaining loosely connected to Damascus, but with substantial autonomy. These dynamics render any attempt to impose fixed electoral timelines, especially for nationwide elections, highly unrealistic.

Elections require a unified state, and Syria will not be unified within four years if current conditions persist—particularly if Al-Sharaa seeks to monopolize control over certain regions, such as eastern Syria, while claiming to oversee a national democratic process. This contradiction alone undermines the credibility of such plans.

Moreover, when a ruling authority demonstrates a willingness to carry out massacres against its own population—as the world has already witnessed—how can one realistically speak of a genuine democratic transition? At this stage, Syria’s future is deeply uncertain. We cannot make definitive predictions. Could Syrians rise up again? It is possible. Could agreements signed by Al-Sharaa—especially security arrangements benefiting Israel—eventually expire or collapse? That is also possible.
The United States has reportedly conditioned its engagement on minority participation in governance and security guarantees. But the real question is whether Al-Sharaa is willing—or even capable—of delivering on such commitments. Can he truly control the forces that accompanied him, forces that swept into Damascus, the coast, and Homs, and attempted—but failed—to take Sweida? This reality leaves us facing profound and genuine uncertainty.

How has Syria’s diplomatic posture changed during the first year of the transitional phase, particularly in its relations with the United States, Arab states on the shores of the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Iran, and Russia? Does the new leadership have a coherent foreign policy vision?

Recently, we heard claims that Al-Sharaa seeks improved relations with Iran. However, in reality, he is not permitted to establish such relations except within limits imposed by the United States and ultimately decided by Israel. This restriction has also raised concerns in Lebanon, particularly over the possibility that Al-Sharaa’s forces could confront Hezbollah in the event of a new Israeli incursion.

What is clear is that Al-Sharaa has engaged closely with Washington, strengthened ties with (Persian) Gulf states, and deepened relations with Turkey, which remains his primary sponsor. Yet even here, there are tensions. Turkey, in my view, is dissatisfied with Al-Sharaa because it has so far failed to establish even a single military base in Syria—despite its long-standing ambitions.

There is, in fact, a very real Turkish threat to Syria. Turkey officially occupies Idlib, controls Aleppo, has linked the two regions administratively, and has imposed the Turkish language in Idlib since before 2018. Turkish is taught in schools, and Ankara has effectively appointed a high commissioner in the area.

Turkey is an occupying power in northern Syria, pursuing clear ambitions that now clash with Israeli interests. Given Israel’s backing by the United States, Turkey ultimately remains the weaker actor in this geopolitical equation.

As for whether the new leadership has an independent foreign policy vision—the answer is no. There is a vision, but it has been shaped by the United States. As I noted earlier, normalization and security coordination are on the table, but only when Israel decides so. The decision is not in Syrian hands. What is being guaranteed, above all, is the security of the Zionist entity.

Relations with Iran are effectively damaged at this stage. In Lebanon, efforts are being made to maintain a fragile balance—not because Syrians demand it, but because the Lebanese do. This is driven by fears of extremist groups. Lebanon has already endured a dangerous chapter marked by terrorist attacks against its army, security forces, and resistance movements, and this dynamic is likely to be part of any broader Israeli strategy toward Lebanon.

Regarding the (Persian) Gulf states, Al-Sharaa has visited several of them, including Saudi Arabia—the most influential country—where he was officially received. Diplomatic relations remain open, embassies are functioning, and Syrians are once again traveling from Damascus International Airport to (Persian) Gulf states and Turkey.

I am unsure whether flights to Russia have fully resumed, but Al-Sharaa has also appeared in Moscow, where agreements were signed. Most notably—and this is a widely shared assessment—Russian military bases are expected to remain in Syria.

Ultimately, Syria has been torn apart. The country is fragmented, and the greatest losers from Syria’s collapse are the resistance forces in the region, including Syrian resistance groups themselves. Where all of this is heading remains unknown. Frankly, we do not yet know what the final outcome will be.