BEIRUT— Amid escalating tensions in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces' (LF) disruption of parliamentary sessions is not merely procedural obstruction; rather, it reflects a calculated political maneuver intricately linked to domestic, regional, and international dynamics.

What appears on the surface as parliamentary theatrics is, in reality, a sophisticated chess game, with Lebanon caught between external pressures and internal political recalibrations.

In recent weeks, American and the Zionist regime of Israel’s threats against Lebanon have intensified, centering on Hezbollah’s arsenal. 

U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack announced that his next visit to Beirut could be his last, warning that without direct negotiations with Israel regarding Hezbollah disarmament, Lebanon would have no protection from Israeli strikes.

This is no longer symbolic rhetoric; Washington seeks to impose a strategic reality in which Hezbollah’s military capabilities are neutralized or at least strictly monitored. Israeli intelligence, reportedly shared with Washington, indicates Hezbollah’s ongoing rebuilding efforts and its potential operations against Israeli targets abroad.

President Joseph Aoun has reportedly warned foreign mediators that any attempt to forcibly remove Hezbollah’s arsenal risks triggering civil strife. 

This places Lebanon in a complex equation: balancing adherence to international demands while safeguarding internal stability and preventing escalation.
Amid this U.S.-Israeli pressure, Egyptian intelligence chief Major General Hassan Rashad is visiting Beirut after meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. According to sources, his role was defined as diplomatic and coordinative, functioning as a complement to Barrack’s threats.

Rashad’s visit underscores Egypt’s active mediation, aiming to calm tensions, support Lebanon’s security, and lay groundwork for political settlement, leveraging momentum from the alleged Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh agreements to “stabilize” the region.

LF’s calculated move

Domestically, the LF is pushing for postponement of parliamentary elections to consolidate Christian political power and preserve their parliamentary influence. 
Since the 2022 elections, LF leader Samir Geagea has sought to strengthen his party as the “spearhead of opposition” to the Hezbollah-Amal-Free Patriotic Movement axis. 

The decline of the Future Movement under Saad Hariri provides an opportunity, but the 2022 results revealed vulnerabilities in some districts, increasing the stakes if elections proceed on schedule.

Postponing the elections allows the LF to regroup, align with potential expatriate voters, and manipulate electoral law adjustments to safeguard their gains. 

This strategy is also tied to Geagea’s presidential ambitions. Maintaining a strong parliamentary and political position is critical to his prospective candidacy.

Paradoxically, while Geagea publicly attacks Nabih Berri and labels parliament a “hostage” of the Hezbollah-Amal duo, there is evidence of quiet coordination between LF and Berri-aligned MPs. 

Private meetings and behind-the-scenes negotiations reflect an acute awareness of Lebanon’s fragile political balance and a preference to wait for favorable conditions rather than risk destabilization.

Internally, the Lebanese Forces (LF) enforce party discipline by leveraging parliamentary boycotts and orchestrated digital media campaigns to consolidate cohesion. The broader goal is twofold: protect parliamentary influence and shape electoral law reforms to solidify future gains.

Israel’s undisguised concern over Hezbollah’s ambiguity

Israeli media and military analysts continue to amplify threats against Lebanon, focusing on Hezbollah’s military resilience and potential retaliation. 

Most notably, Israeli General Tamir Heyman has publicly suggested that disarmament of Hezbollah remains largely theoretical, given the Lebanese state’s inability to confront the group directly.

Intermittent Israeli strikes aim to disrupt, not destroy, Hezbollah’s capabilities, while Iran quietly supports the party’s recovery. This calculated ambiguity allows Hezbollah to maintain deterrence without engaging in full-scale confrontation with the Lebanese government, preserving the delicate internal balance.

Field intelligence indicates Israel is prepared for selective, targeted operations against Hezbollah positions. Meanwhile, Hezbollah refines its missile and drone capabilities, strengthening strategic deterrence while avoiding direct escalation. Israel continues to cautiously manage northern tensions, coordinating with UNIFIL to maintain plausible deniability while demonstrating military readiness.

Europe’s role and the continuity of UNIFIL

UN Security Council Resolution 2790 extended UNIFIL’s mandate until the end of 2026, underpinning Lebanon’s security equilibrium amidst U.S.-Israeli pressure. European powers—France, Italy, Germany, and Spain—seek to sustain their influence in Lebanon through logistical support, technical oversight, and southern patrols, carefully avoiding to provocate Tel Aviv.

France, in particular, uses its permanent presence to manage ceasefire issues, while Italy strengthens the Military Technical Committee (MTC4L) in South Lebanon, maintaining influence without direct combat. Reductions in UNIFIL funding, notably by the US, have forced creative adjustments to preserve European presence, signaling that international actors are recalibrating influence without overt confrontation.

Strategic equation: Internal gains vs external pressures

The LF’s parliamentary disruption reflects a dual strategy. Internally, it protects electoral and political interests and positions Geagea for potential presidential influence. Externally, it aligns with the broader context of U.S. and Israeli pressure to disarm Hezbollah and manage Lebanon’s military posture.

Current balances suggest any attempt at Hezbollah disarmament would be fraught with risk: civil war is a realistic threat, and direct confrontation could destabilize the Lebanese state. 

Meanwhile, the LF’s calculated postponement of parliamentary sessions demonstrates a cautious approach—hedging against electoral risks, reshaping internal alliances, and preparing for potential shifts in the electoral law.

Lebanon’s stability, therefore, remains hostage to this complex interplay of domestic maneuvering and external coercion. One misstep could ignite broader escalation, while carefully calibrated strategies aim to preserve influence, prevent civil strife, and manage regional pressures.

The Lebanese Forces’ tactical disruption is not mere political theatrics. It is a carefully choreographed strategy balancing internal ambitions, external pressures, and the unpredictable calculus of regional geopolitics. 

Geagea’s maneuvers reflect both caution and audacity, leveraging parliamentary rules, media influence, and party cohesion to maximize political leverage.

Lebanon stands at a delicate intersection: internal factions jockey for influence, while external powers—U.S., Israel, and Europe—apply subtle and overt pressure. In this environment, postponing elections is more than a political delay; it is a strategic acrobatic stunt, a quixotic maneuver aimed at recalibrating power and protecting long-term interests in an increasingly volatile landscape.