In an in-depth interview with Anton Mardasov, a noted expert on Russian foreign policy and Middle Eastern affairs, the Tehran Times delved into the multifaceted relationship between Russia and Iran. 

The discussion explored the evolving nature of the two countries strategic partnership, marked by both cooperation and cautious maneuvering. Key topics included the historical context of their anti-Western alignment, the significance of economic agreements like the 2023 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) free trade agreement, and the limits of Iran-Russia military and technical collaboration. 

Mardasov also addressed the impact of sanctions, the role of personal dynamics in bilateral ties, and Iran's nuclear program as a geopolitical tool. Additionally, the conversation highlighted the pragmatic approaches of both nations in navigating regional conflicts and the potential for deeper economic cooperation to strengthen bilateral partnership. 

Below is the full text of the interview: 

How would you describe the current state of Russia–Iran relations?

Relations between Russia and Iran are like a stock market chart - they have sharp ups and downs, but the ties are developing, and this is recognized by everyone - both optimists and skeptics. The specifics of Russia's and Iran's anti-Western cooperation are well known, and thanks in large part to the anti-globalization partnership, their relations have been expanding and deepening in leaps and bounds, with occasional slight setbacks amid existing contradictions and even resentments. However, it is often not taken into account that every relationship has a limit, which depends not only on the political will, but also on a number of other factors, including internal ones. 

The stalling of certain decisions has often been noted not only by Iran, which periodically suspects Russia of behind-the-scenes arrangements, but also by Russia. For example, despite Moscow's conscious decision to maneuver between the conflicting parties in West Asia and refrain from taking drastic steps, the Kremlin offered Tehran as early as 2002 to implement a ten-year program for the development of trade, economic, industrial and scientific-technical cooperation ratified by the Russian government, but the Iranian side ignored the offer and the promising project lost its force as early as 2007. 

Which side of Russia–Iran relations is more important at the moment?

It is clear that politicians often deliberately exaggerate the significance of certain foreign policy steps and decisions. In particular, there were quite a few statements, in particular from the Russian side, which contributed to the exaggeration of expectations from the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in early 2025, including the sphere of security and defense. Nevertheless, it was already clear at that time that this is a rather protocol document that does not oblige either Moscow or Tehran to make any serious decisions. At the same time, another document - a free trade agreement between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran, which was signed in 2023 and is due to enter into force this year - was virtually ignored. Unlike the bilateral strategic agreement, this treaty will allow businesses to make serious savings on duties. In general, the media always pay more attention to military issues, while economic issues often play a more serious role and directly affect the possibilities of military cooperation. 

How strong is current military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran?  

In addition, it should be taken into account that the dynamics of hidden military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran and their interaction through intelligence services has always differed from the situation in the sphere of official trade and economic relations and diplomacy. 

It is clear that Russia is not going to step in for Iran and intervene in real hostilities, and neither will Iran. Now the Russian military-industrial complex is working at maximum capacity not only to meet the needs of the troops fighting in Ukraine, but also because of the announced plans for operational rearmament and deployment of new formations that are to be equipped with armored vehicles, air defense equipment and helicopters to confront the Western military bloc. However, Moscow is unlikely to intervene in the 12-day conflict even without a war in Ukraine, as there is a high probability of escalation of such a possible confrontation.

It should be noted that Iran also tried to act extremely pragmatically in the 12-day war, for example, by refraining from strikes on air tankers that fueled Israeli aircraft, the defeat of which could have greatly inflamed the conflict. 

In general, Russian-Iranian relations are developing, but they have their limits, and this should be clearly recognized. However, it is in the interests of Moscow and Tehran to disguise such limits, since their adversaries naturally take advantage of these restrictions when planning various military, political and economic actions. 

How have sanctions changed the way Russia and Iran work together?

As for the sanctions component, Iran and Russia are capable of finding countermeasures to various solutions. For example, the kamikaze drones that Tehran supplied to Moscow due to the Russian side's shortage of such drones and precision weapons at the time, the consumption of which is extremely high due to the long front line and the Russian-Ukrainian border in general, eventually became truly Russian. These are now multiply modernized drones, which are assembled mainly from Russian components. 

It is clear that in this way Russia not only got rid of itself and rid Iran of accusations of arms supplies, but also got away from direct dependence on Iranian supplies. Nevertheless, the intensive use of Iranian developments at a certain stage of the conflict and their modernization, of course, allowed Tehran to test its developments in today's intense conflict and also multiply their combat qualities. 

Has Iran’s partnership with Russia played a major role in speeding up its defense industry growth?

Besides, it should be taken into account that the purchase of foreign equipment from Russia and China is not a panacea for Iran, which needs to develop its defense complex. Deliveries of Su-35 fighter jets will not change the situation in the field of Iranian aviation or security, but will allow Iranian engineers to get access to more modern solutions, which they can use to modernize their fleet with their own hands. 

A similar story applies to the field of air defense and armored vehicles, where Iran has its own developments, the widespread adoption of which, for example, is being pushed for by the IRGC. At the same time, after the deaths during the 12-day conflict of some Iranian generals who were responsible for relations with Russia and lobbied for a number of joint projects, Moscow has a question as to what extent the Iranian military elite remains committed to past agreements. So, the personal factor should not be discounted. 

How do you view Iran and Russia’s approach to foreign affairs today?

It should also be taken into account that Moscow is not the only one trying to balance and make more cautious decisions by looking at certain West Asian or Western players. Such a pragmatic position, which affects one or another maneuvering, is also characteristic of Iran. In general, when certain agreements stall, it is worth looking closely at the behavior of both players, not just one side, as is often the case. In any case, Russia and Iran have a significant economic potential for cooperation, which is weakly susceptible to sanctions restrictions, for example, within the framework of a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran or other projects. 

What is your perspective on Iran’s nuclear program?

Regarding nuclear weapons, I can say that, in my opinion, Iran itself is not too interested in the 100 percent implementation of a nuclear program. There are opinions, including in Russia, that before the 12-day war Iran used the nuclear program more as a tool for negotiations and bargaining, but after the recent conflict with Israel, Tehran now has no limits. I take a different view. In my opinion, Tehran will also try to negotiate and will not go the way of North Korea's program. 

Perhaps Russian specialists can provide or have already provided some consulting services to Tehran in the field of nuclear weapons, but this does not mean that Moscow is helping Iran to build nuclear charges. On the contrary, in fact, Moscow has always been against the emergence of nuclear weapons in Iran for various reasons and the specifics of the situation in the Middle East in general. Despite some cooperation in this area, which may be more imitative on Moscow's part, I do not think that the situation has fundamentally changed. 

How do you see the partnership between Iran and Russia developing in the coming years?

As for the prospects, as I said above, it is important for Iran and Russia not to dwell on defense, but to comprehensively develop economic cooperation in various fields. I think this will not only help to defuse the situation around their partnership, but in the case of a real threat, to increase cooperation, which will be based on another level of economic relations. 

This may not be the best example in this context, but I, for one, do not have much faith in the prospect of any serious military conflict between the US and China in the future, simply because their economic relations and trade turnover are so serious that neither side in its right mind would go for breaking them up. In this regard, the focus on the economic aspect of bilateral relations is a way out for Russia and Iran, which, on the one hand, will help develop relations and contribute to overcoming the existing mistrust, and on the other hand, it will allow the parties to continue to maneuver with an understanding of this or that interaction with a third party.