As the second round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran gets underway this weekend, suspicion and distrust between the two sides remain high. U.S. President Donald Trump continues to make threats against the country I served for years as a policymaker and a diplomat. Understandably, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains cautious. “We are very pessimistic about the other side, but we are optimistic about our own capabilities,” he said recently.

As such, many analysts believe the chances of a deal are slim. In fact, the American side doesn’t seem entirely sure what outcome it wants from the negotiations. U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff has emphasized that any agreement must be “Trump’s deal”—distinguishing it from the 2015 nuclear agreement reached under then-U.S. President Barack Obama. Earlier this week, Witkoff said that Iran could maintain a program enriching uranium up to 3.67 percent. He then reversed course, saying the president’s position was to eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium altogether.

Still, I believe there’s a way forward. These negotiations, which could shape not only the future of Iran’s nuclear program but the broader trajectory of the Middle East, are too important to squander. A deal that eschews war, tackles a comprehensive set of issues—not just nukes—and offers Iran a realistic compromise regarding its nuclear program can work.

Having been directly or indirectly involved in U.S.-Iran nuclear dynamics over the past four decades, I believe America’s historical policies have played a pivotal role in fueling today’s nuclear crisis. In the 1950s, under the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative, the United States laid the foundation for a nuclear Iran, viewing the Shah as a regional ally and guarantor of Western interests. In 1967, the U.S. constructed Iran’s first reactor in Tehran. In 1974, the CIA reported to President Gerald Ford that the Shah could potentially acquire a nuclear weapon by 1984.

But Washington changed its position after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. From that point on, it sought to block Iran from obtaining even peaceful nuclear technology—despite Iran’s rights under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees the right to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy for all signatories. During my tenure in the Iranian Foreign Ministry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, our stance was clear: Iran had abandoned the Shah’s large-scale nuclear ambitions and would refrain from enrichment and heavy water production if the United States provided fuel for the Tehran reactor and European countries honored their pre-revolution contracts to provide reactors and fuel. These negotiations failed mainly because of unwavering U.S. opposition. Had Washington agreed, Iran would likely not have pursued enrichment.

Western resistance spurred Iran to strive for nuclear self-sufficiency—which it  achieved in 2002. Soon Iran’s program became the focus of the International Atomic Energy Agency, prompting negotiations with Germany, France, and Britain. As a member of Iran’s negotiating team, I witnessed Tehran’s unprecedented transparency—including a suspension of enrichment and acceptance of maximum verification measures. We offered Europe a deal: Respect Iran’s peaceful nuclear rights under the NPT, and Iran would offer comprehensive guarantees against weaponization. Yet talks broke down as the United States refused to recognize any form of Iranian enrichment—even within the treaty’s bounds. Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator at the time, told me that Ayatollah Khamenei would never accept a ban on enrichment. “If Iran is to abandon its right to enrich, it will either have to happen after my death, or I will have to resign from leadership,” Rouhani quoted Ayatollah Khamenei as saying in a private meeting.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resumed enrichment in 2006, the same year the United States and the European Union referred Iran’s file to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Over the next several years, six UNSC resolutions sanctioned Iran, which responded by expanding its enrichment capacity. By 2013, Iran was two months from breakout capability. The cycle of escalating sanctions and nuclear advances left both sides at a strategic impasse.

Recognizing the futility of coercion, Obama pivoted. In 2013, the U.S. redefined its red line: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, not enrichment itself. The resulting Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, imposed the most intrusive inspections on Iran while recognizing its right to peaceful enrichment. U.S.-Iran tensions eased dramatically. Under the JCPOA, the breakout timeline extended to at least one year, where it was supposed to remain for a duration of at least 10 years.

Despite Iran’s compliance, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, triggering a “maximum pressure” campaign. In response, Iran increased the level and the capacity of its enrichment, bringing its breakout time down from one year to two months. Former President Joe Biden’s policy of “no deal, no crisis” retained Trump-era sanctions while adding hundreds more—further eroding trust. Iran’s current breakout window stands at one week.

Trump’s threats are only making the situation worse. “There are two ways Iran can be handled, militarily or you make a deal,” he said last month on Fox News. Some have suggested Europe could invoke the JCPOA’s “snapback” mechanism, reinstating UN sanctions. If that happens, Iran has threatened to exit both the JCPOA and the NPT and to pursue nuclear weaponization if attacked. This is the worst-case scenario—one that could plunge the Middle East into chaos and turn Iran into a second North Korea. But I believe the Trump team can succeed in diplomacy with Iran—if it adopts five foundational principles:

1. Diplomacy, not war

America’s legacy of failed wars—from Iraq to Afghanistan—has cost trillions and devastated millions of lives. War with Iran would be exponentially more catastrophic. Trump must abandon the binary of “deal or war” and commit to diplomacy as the only viable path.

2. A comprehensive agenda

Iran has honored all single-issue agreements with the United States—including hostage releases, anti-terrorism cooperation after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the JCPOA—while the United States has failed to deliver on its promises. That’s why single-issue agreements are inherently unstable. Though achieving a comprehensive deal in a short time is also unrealistic, what the two sides need now is a comprehensive agenda—a phased road map beginning with the nuclear file. Success in this domain should pave the way for dialogue on other issues.

3. A realistic nuclear arrangement

The nuclear arrangement must adhere to the rights and responsibilities outlined in the NPT. Iran should enjoy peaceful nuclear benefits in exchange for robust verification measures, including implementation of the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1. Iran may also consider reducing enrichment from 60 percent to below 5 percent and extend JCPOA sunset provisions—including no reprocessing uranium.

To satisfy Trump’s desire for a legacy-defining agreement, the United States and Iran could sign a bilateral accord in which Iran commits permanently to remaining a “non-nuclear weapon state.” In return, the United States should remove all nuclear-related sanctions. Congressional and parliamentary ratification would cement the deal’s durability.

4. Regional de-escalation

The United States and Iran need to engage on regional concerns. They should acknowledge each other’s legitimate interests, negotiate on the disputed issues, and cooperate on matters of common interest. Moreover, halting military tensions between Iran and Israel based on the UN Charter would be essential. The nuclear deal should serve as a springboard for broader mutually beneficial security dialogues.

5. Economic integration

Long-term peace hinges on mutual economic benefit. U.S.-Iran commercial ties could reach hundreds of billions annually. Such integration would anchor diplomatic gains and empower moderates on both sides.

None of this will be easy to achieve. But an agreement is possible, and it would lead to other positive outcomes in the region. Resolving four decades of tension between Iran and its Arab neighbors is equally vital. A regional security framework—initiated through dialogue among the eight Persian Gulf nations—could be hosted by the UN secretary-general with backing from permanent Security Council members. Only through diplomacy, trust-building, and mutual respect can a sustainable security architecture in the region be achieved.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at Princeton University and a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators.

(Source: Foreign Policy)