Maybe the most recent mention of India as the “voice of the Global South” was at the G20 summit in September 2023 by PM Narendra Modi, though the country has endeavored for a long time to be branded as such.

This claim, of course, has an obvious implication: what the majority of countries in the Global South say in global forums should be consistent with what India says. It requires that New Delhi, despite its own national interests, at least diplomatically defend the position of whom it represents and use its international standing to amplify its voice.

But this has not been the case so far in the recent Gaza crisis. It was clearly manifested in voting for the late October UN General Assembly resolution calling for an immediate truce between Israeli and Palestinian forces. Although most of the countries from the Global South voted in favor of the resolution, India was among the abstainers. Meanwhile, China, as India’s main competitor in representing the Global South, not only voted in favor but also was a sponsor of the resolution. It was not the only contest between the two from which India came out as a loser. In West Asia, for instance, the fact that Beijing this year brokered a deal between two regional adversaries, i.e., Iran and Saudi Arabia, indicates that India’s rival seems to have the upper hand in paying attention to the challenges of the Global South. Notwithstanding what reasons New Delhi put forward to justify its approach in general and its recent vote in particular, there is little doubt that in the eyes of the people and governments of many countries in the Global South, India fell short of the expectations by standing beside the UK, Germany, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and Australia from the Global North.

Of course, from the narrow national interest point of view, India should be reasonably cautious about voting against Israel. At least 14 percent of its arms come from there, helping New Delhi to diversify its arms suppliers. Historically, Tel Aviv came to India’s assistance in its wars with its congenital enemy, Pakistan. Their bilateral ties on technological and intelligence matters have been consolidated since the formation of I2U2. Israel is also a crucial part of India’s hopes for establishing a new trade corridor to counter Chinese BRI, even though recent events have questioned the chance of its success. India’s inclination to appease the US is just another incentive for New Delhi to refrain from condemning what Israel has done in Gaza since October 7. Last but not least, “Bharat’s” Hindu majority who has a long history of enmity with the Indian Muslim minority sympathize with Israel in its war with Muslim Palestinians, which naturally reflects in the decisions that the BJP as their main representative makes on the crisis.

However, India is also interested in maintaining good relations with its neighbors in West Asia, the reason behind New Delhi’s hesitation in establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel before 1992. The main incentive has been securing the oil supply for India’s rapidly growing economy. The country imports around 40 percent of its crude oil from the region, though the recent spurt of buying Russian oil has reduced the share. Not only jeopardizing that vital source of energy by alienating Muslim-majority countries seems unreasonable, but also the need to cooperate with countries in the “near abroad” for the sake of the security of Afghanistan and the trade path to Central Asia is undeniable. Regarding domestic politics, endangering about 200 million Indian Muslim votes, which BJP struggles to secure in the upcoming election, by refusing to condemn Israel’s acts also seems thoughtless, if not reckless. More broadly, since nearly one-third of the population in the Global South are Muslims, overlooking their expectations would have a huge impact on the outlook for India’s relations with the bloc.

While addressing human rights concerns for many countries in the Global South may seem “luxurious,” it is certainly crucial for their “voice.” India has to show that it respects and takes seriously the common values that hold the “family” together. Killing thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children by Israel in a few days and depriving them of very basic human rights is not a simple issue India could easily turn a blind eye to. Otherwise, the Indian prestige and soft power will be damaged not just in the eyes of Muslims, but in the eyes of all who advocate human rights as common values of humankind.
Traditionally, India’s dominant foreign policy strategy was “non-alignment,” attempting not to align itself unconditionally with any great power or “camp,” but pursuing an independent route. During that period of time, Indian leaders, including Gandhiji, felt free to criticize Israel for its actions in the occupied territories. However, with its new “multiple alignment” strategy, India seeks to appease everyone at the same time, with the illusion that “countries that saw each other as adversaries bec[o]me friendlier with us.” It seems rather impractical. As the Russia-Ukraine war recently proved, while you may have relations with both sides of a conflict, neither of them would trust you as a reliable partner, let alone “the representative” or “the leader.” By sticking to its narrow national interests, India emerges from every new conflict as more and more opportunistic. Even if such a strategy works well for a little country with a limited role to play in the international scene, it certainly does not fit one of the world’s “emerging powers.”

We have learned from history that for countries who had the ambition of “leading” the world, blocs, or regions, the moment finally came in which they had to choose between securing their own short-term national interests and long-term goals that achieving them required sacrificing some of the former. Take the US and the landmark of Vietnam as an example. Although many American realpolitik thinkers warned against bogging down in the quagmire of Vietnam, perhaps “the leader of the free world” had no choice but to uphold its commitment and defend its weak patron in South Vietnam against Communist interventions. It seems that India today faces a somewhat similar situation, though a much easier one since maybe a few expect India to be involved militarily in the Gaza crisis. Instead, the countries of the Global South, or rather, their general public expect New Delhi to support their position in calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza and use its leverage to press Israel to stop bombing civilians there. This is the least India could do.

Words should match deeds. Titles entail duties. If India fails to remember the point, nobody would take its words seriously in the years to come.