TEHRAN – A Bahraini political analyst says Saudi Arabia has unsatiable desire to undermine Iran’s power and stability.

“Do not forget that Saudi Arabia always has an appetite and a desire to harm Iran whenever it finds an opportunity,” Abbas Bu Safwan tells the Tehran Times. 
 “Whenever a hardline president who deals tough with Iran is elected in America, Saudi Arabia is the first to welcome,” Bu Safwan adds.
 According to the Bahraini writer, Saudi Arabia is afraid of the Islamic model in Iran, and this is questioning American Islam in the region. “Saudi Arabia is under pressure because of Iranian democracy, as there are elections and freedoms in Iran, and this is what embarrasses the unilateral authoritarian regime in the (Persian) Gulf.”
Following is the text of the interview:

Q: Can you update us about the latest developments regarding the Bahraini people’s movement against the Manama regime? Has the opposition failed?
A: There is no doubt that most of the movements that began in 2011, and what we call the Arab Spring movements in Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and Yemen, faced meddling by Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and other states that form the axis of counter-revolution.
So, either they suppressed this movement, like what happened in Bahrain, or the protests were contained, as happened in Yemen the first time when the counter-revolution (coalition) wanted to produce the same old regime led by Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, or in Egypt, in which the revolution degenerated into a military coup.
Therefore, Bahrain is not an exception in this region in which the dreams of Arab folks and peoples to achieve equality and reform have turned into a kind of nightmare that haunts Arabs.
Currently, most of the opposition leaders are either in prison or in exile, and the government is still using violence against citizens.
In Bahrain, it is no longer possible to hold any political activity, organize a demonstration, or hold a political meeting for an opposition party.
 The opposition forces had their parties dissolved, as were the Al-al-Wefaq party, the Waad party, and the National Democratic Action Society. Parties in Bahrain are called associations.
Political activity, civil society, and the freedom of the press are all tied up and restricted, and nobody can act in the political scene freely.
However, after all these suppressions, the Bahraini government has not been able to subdue the opposition, and the opposition is still alive and well, saying a big no to the regime; it is still steadfast in its positions defending equality and reform as well as national independence, which is vital.
Of course, Americans have played an unconstructive role in the region, and do not forget that the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council has turned into a base for giant American aircraft carriers.
In Qatar there is a large airbase; in Bahrain a military base; in Kuwait an American military base; and in the Emirates an intelligence base. The Pentagon plays a major role in setting policies for the region through these bases.
So, if we want to monitor American policies, we should not follow what the White House says or what the U.S. State Department says. We must track the statements issued or the policies formulated by the Pentagon and the military institutions primarily concerned with the security of U.S. bases in the region.
What is happening is that America equates the security of its military bases with the security of the Arab rulers and governments, and thus the advocates of reform in the region and popular and political movements are considered enemies of America because America wants to preserve the rulers’ thrones.

Q: How do you evaluate the attitudes of the Persian Gulf states towards the Bahraini movement?
A: As for the countries of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, these countries, in general, are not enthusiastic about turning Bahrain into an oasis of freedom because they fear the transmission of what they call “infection”.
But there is no doubt that a country like the Emirates or Saudi Arabia is stricter than others, and we may have noticed in 2011 how the Saudi and Emirati armies stormed Bahrain, how they attacked the opposition, and how they were part of the violence against those calling for political reform, participation in the political process and the necessity of holding the election.
The Saudis fear unrest in the oil-rich Eastern Province, which is predominantly Shia. The Emirates sees that the opposition is part of an Iranian alliance and this is what makes Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Israel stand with each other in the alliance against the national opposition in Bahrain.
The Bahraini movement’s demands are mostly balanced as it calls for human rights and equality in Bahrain, but the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council countries reject all kinds of criticism.
The Bahraini opposition has always paid the price for any U.S.-Iranian dispute because America views the opposition as a friend of Iran.
This is the case for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, which played negative roles, not only in the case of Bahrain but also in the case of Yemen, Syria and Libya.
With all of these stations, they played negative, erroneous and detrimental roles in the region.
Stability can only be achieved through political reconciliation and national consensus, while Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have pushed Bahrain to live under the rule of a tyrannical government, a minority and a small family that dominates the country and control its destiny.
As for Kuwait in 2011, it advised the Bahraini regime to address protests through dialogue. Therefore, Kuwait did not send forces to Bahrain, and Oman was also working to ensure that the Bahraini authorities did not resort to suppressing people and parties.
Oman, Kuwait and Qatar tried not to get involved in the violence inside Bahrain.

Q: Do you see any sign of softness in the Saudi and Emirati position towards the Bahraini opposition?

A: But the Emirates and Saudi Arabia have become part of the problem through engagement in suppressing movements in Bahrain; the killing of an Emirati officer in the middle of Manama is evidence of the Emirates’ involvement in the shedding of Bahraini blood.
The Saudi and Emirati position towards the Bahraini opposition is tough, as they reject any discussion with the opposition and refuse to acknowledge the existence of different views in Bahrain. This is the major dilemma. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates provide all security services and military support for a military solution in Bahrain.

Q: How do you see the reaction of the Persian Gulf states to Ibrahim Raisi's victory in Iran’s presidential elections?
A: First, we have to realize that we cannot talk about a single (Persian) Gulf approach or vision, and it is better to talk about each country separately.
Let’s start with Kuwait, which welcomed Raisi’s victory. Kuwait usually tries to establish balanced relations with the three major powers surrounding it (i.e. Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia), especially after the historical mistake made by Kuwaiti authorities in the early eighties in supporting Saddam Hussein when he invaded some parts of Iran. Saddam’s response to Kuwait was an attempt to annex the country in 1990, while Iran refused Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.
From that moment forward, Kuwait learned to distance itself from problems and to seek a positive relationship with the various parties.
Kuwait, today, prefers to deal with more important issues such as the Palestine cause, therefore decided not to get involved in the normalization of ties with Israel because it follows a balanced policy.
Qatar also welcomed the Raisi election, although Doha’s relations with Iran has fluctuated over the last decades. I think since the Saudi-Emirati blockade against Qatar in 2017, Doha has paid attention to the importance of the Kuwaiti experience.
There are serious concerns about possible Saudi-Emirati efforts to smash Qatar and Kuwait.  
Kuwait learned in 1990 and Qatar in 2017 that they must establish close ties with Iran, and I expect that Iranian-Qatari relations will continue to grow and will not be subject to fluctuations as it was in the past, but this growth in relations will not be at a rocket speed to reach the level of Turkish-Qatari ties. However, it will be unbreakable, and this is a new development in the region.
As for Oman, it is clear that it always seeks to establish relations with everyone, and has long criticized the Gulf Cooperation Council countries for their hostility toward Iran.
Oman has always demanded that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council recognize geography and history, since Iran is part of this region and a large country, and maintaining good relations with it is important. Oman has realized since ancient times that the Saudi move to single out the region is detrimental to stability, so Muscat has sought for many years to establish close relations with Tehran. 
As for the Emirates, its relations with Iran are complex.
I do not think that the Iranian side trusts the Emirates’ policy, but the Emirates remains an outlet for the Iranian economy.
But recently, the Emirates has turned into a Zionist-Israeli platform to harm Tehran, and this is a very complicated issue.
The Emirates is trying to shuffle the cards by opening relations with Syria, an ally of Tehran, but the alliance that Abu Dhabi is building with Tel Aviv is worrying for Tehran.
The Emirates welcomed Raisi's presence, and I think that the two sides are still able to separate the economy and politics; the trade exchange figures are still large, amounting to about $15 billion between the two countries.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia was forced to reconsider its foreign policies with Biden's ascendance to the White House, as Saudis started reconciliation with Qatar, and now the cards are turned over the situation in Yemen.
Iranian-Saudi relations still face many difficulties.
The Saudi side is still calling on the Iranian side to intervene to put pressure on Ansarullah, but Tehran insists on direct Saudi-Yemeni dialogue.
Even if Iran can encourage Houthis to the dialogue, it is Saudi Arabia that must solve its problems with Yemeni sides through direct talks.
I think it is a stumbling block, and the nuclear agreement with the U.S. will determine the course of relations.
But relations between Tehran and Riyadh are not heading to a dramatic change, even if there are efforts to reduce tension.
Do not forget that Saudi Arabia always has an appetite and a desire to harm Iran whenever it finds an opportunity. Whenever a hardline president who deals tough with Iran is elected in America, Saudi Arabia is the first to welcome.
 Saudi Arabia is afraid of the Islamic model in Iran, and this embarrasses American Islam in the region. Saudi Arabia is under pressure because of Iranian democracy, as there are elections and freedoms in Iran, and this is what embarrasses the unilateral authoritarian regime in the (Persian) Gulf.
Also, Saudi Arabia is embarrassed by the balanced, moderate, and wise Islam in Iran, while Riyadh hosts a despicable and murderous Wahhabism that feeds Daesh (ISIS).
The second issue that irritates Saudi Arabia is the Iranian influence in the region, while Saudi Arabia is losing its cards in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Tehran is advancing, as it has managed to consolidate relations with these countries, Riyadh has actually retreated.
Now, Riyadh has begun to review its relations, but it is still unaware of the importance of relations with Tehran. Riyadh is afraid of Iran's missiles, as well as negotiations with Iran. Therefore, Saudi Arabia has warned against any serious negotiations. Therefore, it prefers that negotiations continue only between security agencies in the current period until things become clearer.

Q: Why did Saudi Arabia and its allies refuse to welcome Iran's initiatives (including the Hormuz Peace Initiative) for regional cooperation?
A: Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Bahrain still refuse to establish a regional security system, and on this basis, they refuse to deal with the Iranian proposal to devise a security system in the region, and this is a factor that complicates matters. 
Saudi Arabia still refuses what is called in the American literature the “sharing of influence” between itself and Tehran. Riyadh is still relying on American power, and this is part of the problem in the region.

Q: Do you think the Persian Gulf states are able to restore their previous relations after the removal of the siege on Qatar?
A: In short, Qatar managed brilliantly to split the quadripartite alliance consisting of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.
 From 2017 until the beginning of 2020, the Quartet was negotiating as a united side with Qatar, but after the Al-Ula summit in Saudi Arabia in January 2021, dialogues are taking place between Qatar and each country separately; between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, between Qatar and Egypt, and between Qatar and the Emirates.
Now there is a Qatari-Emirati competition to maintain cozy ties with Saudi Arabia, and I think Qatar is ready to engage in a major conflict with Emirates in this regard.
Qatar does not like the Emirates to monopolize relations with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Doha prefers to focus on the restoration of relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt rather than Bahrain and the Emirates. The situation in the (Persian) Gulf is still bad.