A mutually acceptable nuclear deal entails compromises by Iran and West: professor
July 1, 2015 - 0:0
TEHRAN – Professor Farhang Jahanpour from Oxford University’s Faculty of Oriental Studies says that a “mutually acceptable” nuclear deal necessitates compromises by Iran and the Western countries in the 5+1 group.
“All the compromises should not be made by Iran and that in order to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement the West should also make some substantial compromises,” Jahanpour tells the Tehran Times.
Following is the full text of the interview:
Q: Iran has ruled out inspection of its military sites under a final nuclear treaty and this has turned into a challenging issue in the nuclear talks between Iran and 5+1 group. Do not you think that demands for inspection of military facilities go beyond the Additional Protocol?
A: According to the Additional Protocol, which Iran has said she would implement if she reaches a nuclear agreement with the West, “Special inspections may be carried out in circumstances according to defined procedures. The IAEA may carry out such inspections if it considers that information made available by the State concerned, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement.”
However, as the above paragraph makes it clear, these inspections will be carried out only in exceptional circumstances and only if the Agency decides that the explanations provided by the State concerned are not adequate. Also, such inspections will be carried out on the basis of “defined procedures”. In most countries that have ratified the Additional Protocol, they have agreed to “managed inspections”, and Iranian authorities have also said that such managed and supervised inspections can be carried out.
This does not mean that the Agency can go anywhere, anytime without the assistance and the supervision of the host country. For instance, it has been suggested that instead of inspecting the military sites that the Agency suspects of having engaged in some nuclear-related operations, the inspectors will be allowed to take environmental samples from nearby soil, without actually entering the site and without gaining access to military secrets. The Additional Protocol specifies that the Agency will only be allowed to carry out “location-specific environmental sampling”, and such access will be “managed access”.
Therefore, inspections of some military sites may be carried out on exceptional circumstances and under the supervision of Iranian authorities, and if they are carried out in keeping with the requirements of the Additional Protocol, they should not pose a challenge to the success of the talks or to a comprehensive nuclear agreement.
The issue of interviewing scientists can be more sensitive in view of Iran’s bitter experiences and the assassination of a number of nuclear scientists. However, with goodwill from both sides this could also be carried out in such a way that the identity of the scientists is protected. Meanwhile, some of the demands made mainly by Neoconservatives opposed to a nuclear deal with Iran are so extreme and so one-sided that they are meant to prevent a deal. Fortunately, the main negotiators are more reasonable and more aware of the requirements, and they know that all these measures should be carried out on the basis of reciprocity.
The allegations of bad faith on the side of Iran run counter to all the intelligence assessments of Iranian nuclear activities, and are also completely at various with the assurances that Iranian negotiators have given to their Western counterparts in the course of 13 years of negotiations, and especially during the intense talks that resulted in the Joint Plan of Action reached in Geneva on 24 November 2014. It should also be stressed that all the compromises should not be made by Iran and that in order to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement the West should also make some substantial compromises.
Q: Aren’t the U.S. and some of its allies in the 5+1 using the Additional Protocol as a pretext to impose a new legal regime on Iran?
A: In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an international treaty, known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, was enacted in 1968 and it entered into force in 1970. Iran was one of the first signatories of that treaty, and so far 191 states have joined the treaty. It has been one of the most successful disarmament treaties in history.
This treaty was a part of the move known as “atoms for peace”, which allowed different nations to have access to nuclear power for peaceful purposes but would prevent them from manufacturing nuclear weapons. Only three countries have not joined the NPT, Israel, India and Pakistan, all of which have developed nuclear weapons. North Korea initially joined the treaty but later on withdrew from the treaty and developed her nuclear weapons.
However, it should be borne in mind that the treaty was based on three pillars:
First pillar was non-proliferation. It called on all the countries with the exception of the five powers that already possessed nuclear weapons, namely the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France, to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Second pillar was disarmament. This clause called on the five nuclear powers to take good-faith action to get rid of their nuclear weapons. Sadly this important principle of the NPT has been totally ignored. On the contrary, nuclear powers have continued to add to the power and sophistication of their nuclear weapons.
Third pillar was peaceful use of nuclear energy. According to this principle, it is the “inalienable” right of all countries to have access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it even calls on nuclear powers to help other countries in their desire to make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
As later on it was discovered that unfettered access to enrichment could lead some countries, such as North Korea, to gain knowledge of nuclear technology and subsequently to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT was amended in 1977 with the Additional Protocol, which tightened the regulations in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Q: What is your prediction of the nuclear talks between Iran and major power?
A: As I have often said in the past, I am still optimistic about the outcome of the talks. Due to various obstacles that have been placed on the path of an agreement by Congress and by other sources, the final agreement may not be reached in one go. However, very shortly we will find out whether the P5+1 and Iran have succeeded in reaching a final agreement or not.
The only reasonable option seems to be for the two sides to declare that they have reached a final agreement, but its implementation would be dependent on a number of steps. First step should be announcing the details of a comprehensive agreement; secondly, allowing enough time (may be a couple of months) so that both Congress and Iranian Majlis will be able to approve or reject the details of the deal; thirdly, the signing of the agreement by both sides, which would mean the implementation of the steps that Iran has agreed to take, and the lifting of all sanctions. This formula would satisfy the demands of all sides and would end in a new resolution by the Security Council to remove its earlier restrictions.
Q: In addition to non-proliferation, one of the purposes of the IAEA is “nuclear disarmament” but why has no tangible progress been made in this regard?
A: As mentioned above, the NPT is based on three principles, non-proliferation, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and disarmament. Nuclear powers stress the first principle but ignore the other two. What is needed is for all non-nuclear states to demand that the provisions of both the NPT and the Additional Protocol are observed by all countries, including the nuclear powers that are required to get rid of their nuclear weapons. This needs concerted international action, especially by non-nuclear nations. Pressure should be put on nuclear powers by international organizations, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference Organization, the African Union, the Arab League, etc. in the United Nations and in all other organizations to ensure that all the provisions of the NPT are met and true nuclear disarmament is achieved.
Q: What will be the impact of a nuclear deal between on the 2016 U.S. presidential election?
A: I believe that if a successful nuclear agreement is reached between Iran and the West it would be regarded as a great achievement both for President Hassan Rouhani’s government and for President Barack Obama and the Democratic Administration, and it should help the Democratic candidate in the next election, as it will also help the Iranian government in the next Majlis and presidential elections.
[highlight]
The NPT is based on three principles, non-proliferation, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and disarmament. Nuclear powers stress the first principle but ignore the other two.
Some of the demands made mainly by Neoconservatives opposed to a nuclear deal with Iran are so extreme and so one-sided that they are meant to prevent a deal