TEHRAN - Arman-e-Emrooz, in an analysis, addressed the growing rift between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The paper wrote: In recent months, tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA have reached their peak. One of the main points of contention is Director General Rafael Grossi’s request to inspect nuclear sites damaged in military attacks. The dispute is not merely technical but also political. Under pressure from Western countries, the Agency is demanding full access to verify Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, while Iran insists that inspections must be conditioned on drafting a new protocol tailored to wartime circumstances. At the international level, this tension could have far-reaching consequences. Iran has proposed banning attacks on nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision, but these proposals have been rejected by the United States. The crisis reflects the depth of the divide between Iran and international institutions. While the West views Iran’s nuclear program as a threat, Tehran insists it is peaceful and its legitimate right. Without addressing the root issues—such as condemning attacks and defining new protocols—disputes will persist and may lead to heightened tensions.

Sazandegi: Why did China support UAE’s claim over Iran’s three islands?

The repetition of the United Arab Emirates’ claims over Iran’s three islands during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Abu Dhabi may at first glance seem like the continuation of an old dispute. What makes this stance more troubling, however, is the gradual support of major powers and influential international actors for the UAE’s claim. To understand Abu Dhabi’s motivations and the alignment of others, these developments must be analyzed within three broad contexts: Iran’s overall foreign policy and its place in global equations. At present, Iran has effectively been excluded from meaningful engagement networks with Western powers. In this situation, the country’s foreign policy has tilted more heavily toward reliance on China and Russia. Since Iran has no place in the West’s foreign policy basket, Beijing and Moscow feel no obligation to incur costs in defending Iran against Arab or Western rivals. Then, the UAE’s regional ambitions and adventurism, and finally, the expanded relations of China and Russia with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Iran is neither a theater of competition between China and the West nor has it created incentives that would compel Beijing to show greater sensitivity in preserving its position in Tehran. This imbalance is the direct outcome of the particular foreign policy path Iran has chosen.

Javan: Iran and the opportunities ahead

In a commentary, Javan addressed the expansion of the BRICS organization. The note emphasized that this expansion, framed as a counterweight to the United States, offers Iran a significant opportunity—particularly since Washington’s campaign against Tehran, within the broader context of Washington’s anti-Iran policies, has lent credibility to Iran’s anti-Western strategy. In fact, the U.S. assault has yielded fewer benefits for Washington than it has provided Iran with a platform to intensify its anti-American activities through frameworks such as BRICS. Moreover, the current policies of Russia, China, and Iran to confront the United States and its sanctions-driven economy have ignited a global engine for resisting Washington and escaping what they describe as neo-colonial economic domination. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. on China, Russia, and Iran have underscored the need for an alternative payment system to blunt their impact. Against this backdrop, Iran’s membership in BRICS could cover a substantial share of anti-sanctions initiatives. With support from some BRICS members, Iran would not be isolated or forced into submission; rather, it could define a new arena of confrontation with Washington in economics, politics, and security, and design counterstrategies from within these organizations.

Hamshahri: Importance of Araghchi’s visit to Moscow

Hamshahri highlighted the significance of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s trip to Russia. A major part of Araghchi’s agenda in Moscow is focused on strengthening Iran–Russia convergence on the nuclear issue—a matter of particular importance given Russia’s presidency of the UN Security Council. Recently, discussions have surfaced about Moscow’s potential role in mediating between Iran and the IAEA toward resuming inspections in Iran. Although it has been broadly announced that “regional issues” are also on the agenda, the timing of Syrian transitional government leader Ahmad al-Shara’s visit to Russia suggests that Tehran and Moscow’s consultations on developments in Syria are hardly unexpected. Following the 12-day war imposed by Israel against Iran, the strengthening of Iran–Russia defense and military cooperation has drawn special attention from international media. This issue has resurfaced recently in the context of manufacturing several Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets for Iran. Thus, beyond Tel Aviv’s regional provocations, defense and military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow appears to be one of the key axes of these talks.