MADRID – In West Asia, the illusion of control often proves more compelling than control itself. Policy toward Iran, marked by external pressure and an obsession with “regime change”, has repeatedly shown that simple solutions are, in reality, dangerous mirages.

The recent leak to the Israeli public broadcaster KAN—in which a senior official called for “toppling the Iranian regime” before the end of the Trump administration in January 2029—adds a new chapter to a strategic playbook whose ineffectiveness has been repeatedly demonstrated. Behind the bellicose rhetoric, however, a more sober argument emerges: Israel’s strategy, founded on coercion and destabilization, is not only failing but actively strengthening the very system it intended to destroy. What remains is a desperate bet, a show of force launched after Israel had expended its capacity for surprise during the June war, without provoking a single significant defection.

The dominant narrative in Washington and Tel Aviv portrays the Islamic Republic as a colossus with feet of clay, always on the verge of internal collapse. It is a dangerously simplistic reading.

Iran’s political system has repeatedly demonstrated resilience that is often overlooked. To assume that a combination of threats, sanctions, and targeted attacks could precipitate its fall is to ignore four decades of adaptation and consolidation under near-constant external pressure. Far from crumbling, the Islamic Republic has learned to transform external aggression into a source of internal legitimacy, as each challenge is not seen as an attack on its power but as an assault on the nation’s revolutionary sovereignty.

The June 2025 war marked a turning point, an event that deserves a dispassionate examination beyond the headlines. The attacks, undoubtedly significant, were presented as a devastating blow to Iran’s capabilities. Yet what happened afterward proved more revealing than the impact of the bombs themselves: there were no popular uprisings, no protests demanding the dismantling of the defense program, and no signs of fracture in institutional loyalty.

The state’s response, by contrast, was methodical: reconstruction of facilities, relocation of critical infrastructure, and acceleration of underground programs. Satellite images of the craters at Natanz, now covered with soil, do not symbolize defeat but a will to resist and recover—something Iran’s adversaries appear incapable of accurately assessing.

This episode highlighted a major strategic failure for Israel. For decades, Israeli security doctrine has relied on credible deterrence through overwhelming military superiority.

However, the large-scale June attack exposed the limits of that approach: it did not deter Iran from continuing its nuclear activities within the framework of its civilian program, nor did it alter Tehran’s strategic resolve. Worse, it may have had the opposite effect, accelerating and reinforcing Iran’s defense program, now more dispersed, protected, and determined than ever.

Even more revealing was the subsequent intimidation campaign, notable both for its scope and its ineffectiveness. According to widely reported accounts, the Mossad resorted to cold calls to Iranian officials, with direct threats extending even to their families.

This level of pressure—more reminiscent of a spy thriller than realistic security operations—failed to achieve its objective: it did not provoke defections, leaked recordings, or visible signs of panic. On the contrary, it likely reinforced the resolve of its targets. When coercion reaches such extremes and still fails, it signals that it has met a wall of resistance far stronger than anticipated. This episode underscores an uncomfortable truth: the loyalty of Iran’s security establishment to the system is stronger than any external threat.

Israel’s strategy appears to be based on a fundamental misdiagnosis: it confuses the existence of internal tensions with national disloyalty. True, there are frictions within Iranian society linked to the economy and government management. But recent regional experience, from Iraq to Libya, offers a clear warning: external intervention, especially by actors perceived as hostile, tends to consolidate a sense of unity in the face of foreign pressure. The majority of Iranians do not wish their future to be decided from Tel Aviv or Washington. Sovereignty remains a central pillar of modern Iranian national identity.

The nuclear issue exemplifies this clash of narratives. From Tehran’s perspective, its uranium enrichment program and missile development are essential components of its autonomy and deterrence doctrine, respectively. This stance is rooted in lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, when the world largely ignored the use of chemical weapons against the country, and from the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which surrounded Iran with U.S. forces.

When President Masoud Pezeshkian asserts that “we seek peace, but we will not be coerced into abandoning our nuclear science or our right to self-defense,” it is not empty bravado. He is articulating a national security posture deeply rooted in a traumatic historical experience.

Iran’s refusal to grant unrestricted access to facilities such as Fordow to IAEA inspectors must be understood in this context. It is not merely an act of opacity but a calculated response to what is perceived as covert espionage under the guise of verification. Every location data point, every structural blueprint, could, in Tehran’s logic, be used to plan a potential attack. In an environment perceived as an existential threat, full transparency is considered strategic suicide.

Meanwhile, the economic pressure machine continues to operate. U.S. sanctions, whose removal Iran has persistently sought, have had a significant impact on the economy and the daily lives of its population. Yet again, the strategic results are ambiguous. If the goal was to bend Iran’s foreign policy or provoke internal uprising, it has failed. Instead, the sanctions have fostered an economy of resistance and pushed Iran to deepen ties with extra-regional actors such as Russia and China, contributing to the consolidation of a multipolar world order less susceptible to Western pressure. The net result is a more self-sufficient Iran, less integrated into the Western system, but not necessarily weaker or more compliant.

The idea that Israel, perhaps with a last push from the Trump administration, could attempt a decisive strike against the Islamic Republic is, in reality, a dangerous chimera. There is no magic wand capable of provoking what the West calls “regime change” in a country with deep historical and political roots.

What does exist is a tangible risk of uncontrolled escalation. A large-scale attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would not overthrow the government in Tehran; it could trigger a regional war of catastrophic proportions, far exceeding the scale of the 12-Day War. Iran’s precision missiles, though not infallible, provide significant defensive capability, sufficient to deter direct aggression. For any rational observer, the cost-benefit calculation underscores Iran’s resilience under external pressure and the improbability of externally imposed regime change.

Israel’s obsession with toppling regional governments is a mirage that obscures a realistic understanding of the landscape. Iran is not a “fragile regime” on the verge of collapse but a political structure with deep historical memory and remarkable capacity for resistance. The June war and its aftermath revealed the limits of Israeli coercive power rather than Iranian weakness. Mossad threats, far from intimidating Iran’s elite, are perceived as symbolic gestures highlighting the strategic and moral bankruptcy of this approach. Persisting along this path is not policy; it is a dangerous fantasy that only guarantees more conflict, instability, and suffering for the region’s peoples.

The first step toward lasting security is not government overthrow but abandoning the illusion that it is possible and confronting the complex reality of a region where coercion has largely exhausted its utility.