TEHRAN - In a commentary late last month, the Atlantic Council said Syrians’ “public patience may close far sooner than anticipated” if the HTS government fails to “address immediate needs”.

Calling the challenges “daunting,” it said HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa’s “mandate comes with an expiration date".

It also said, “In the absence of progress, the government may revert to centralized security measures as a way to maintain control.”

The commentary, headlined “Syria’s post-Assad honeymoon is over. Now the hard work of state-building begins”, is written by Sinan Hatahet, a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The following is the text of the article:

The fall of the Assad government was met with relief and hope by Syrians of all backgrounds, including even some former loyalists disillusioned with Assad’s inability to address Syria’s worsening crises. However, Syrians are now faced with a new government whose leadership remains largely unfamiliar. While some have praised the governance and economic management model developed in Idlib under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), many others question whether such a system can be scaled to govern the entirety of Syria. The disparity between localized governance successes and national-scale governance requirements has become a focal point of concern, particularly given Syria’s fragmented political landscape and the competing interests of various factions.

The initial euphoria has now given way to a sober realization of the monumental task ahead. As the Syrian saying goes, “The intoxication is over, and now comes the reckoning.” Syrians, while politically diverse, share a common urgency for solutions to their daily struggles: securing electricity, rebuilding shattered infrastructure, creating jobs, and ensuring access to basic necessities. These immediate needs are non-negotiable and form the cornerstone of any trust that the transitional government hopes to build. Without addressing these, the government risks losing its fragile legitimacy, and the window for public patience may close far sooner than anticipated.

Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, finds himself at the center of this fragile transition. For now, he enjoys considerable popular support and faces limited competition from rivals unwilling to shoulder the immense responsibility of rebuilding. Yet, his mandate comes with an expiration date. Syrians are watching closely, expecting swift and meaningful action to restore stability and improve livelihoods. The stakes for Sharaa are extraordinarily high: Failure to demonstrate effective leadership could not only undermine his position but also open the door to renewed fragmentation or even chaos.

The challenges are daunting. HTS, which holds significant influence in the new government, lacks sufficient technocratic expertise to manage a nation as complex as Syria. The group’s governance in Idlib relied heavily on improvisation and local alliances, but governing an entire country requires a far greater degree of institutional capacity and expertise. HTS leadership must now tackle the immense challenge of bridging its localized governance methods with the demands of a unified national administration. Its ability to navigate Syria’s volatile political landscape will be critical.

Throughout the conflict, Syrians have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and ingenuity in developing local solutions. Self-reliance has become a hallmark of survival. In cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, basic services are often managed locally, with minimal involvement from the state. Communities have turned to solar energy, grassroots initiatives, and small-scale enterprises to sustain themselves. This self-reliance has extended to governance as well. For example, in major cities, traffic management and security are often overseen by just a handful of individuals. Syrians have shown a willingness to adapt to and support change, provided it brings tangible improvements.

However, the success of these localized solutions is not guaranteed. The scale of Syria’s national challenges requires coordination and resources that local efforts alone cannot provide. There is also a growing concern that, in the absence of progress, the government may revert to centralized security measures as a way to maintain control. Should this happen, it would replicate the authoritarian methods of the Assad regime, which alienated the population and produced no meaningful results. The risk of adopting such solutions is compounded by the international community’s reluctance to support a strong centralized authority in Syria, leaving the government with limited options and resources.

A further complication is the deeply fractured nature of Syrian society after years of war. The scars of conflict have not only created physical destruction but also eroded trust among different communities. To address these divisions, the government must ensure that governance is inclusive and representative of Syria’s diverse political factions. Without meaningful participation across the spectrum, there is a real risk of alienating key groups, further destabilizing the fragile transition.

The international community, particularly the United States, has a vital role to play in supporting Syria’s recovery. To date, US policy has focused on allowing other states—mainly regional countries—to provide financial assistance to the transitional government. This was made possible through US Treasury this month issuing General License 24, which allowed for the provision of energy supplies and wage subsidies but failed to extend similar support to Syria’s private and civil sectors. The policy, while useful in keeping the government afloat, has been a huge letdown for Syria’s private sector.

Throughout the conflict, the private sector, supported by local communities, financed livelihoods and provided essential services in the absence of state support. To truly foster stability and rebuild the Syrian economy, the international community must lift sanctions on critical financial institutions, such as the central bank, as well as facilitate foreign investment and empower private enterprises. Without such measures, the economic pressures on Syrians will only intensify, jeopardizing the fragile progress achieved so far.

Syria’s transitional government faces a pivotal moment. To build a sustainable and inclusive political future, it must focus on enabling the private and civil sectors. Empowering them would not only reduce pressure on the government but also build trust with the population, which is critical for long-term stability.

Delays in lifting sanctions and providing targeted support risk undermining these efforts, potentially dealing a fatal blow to Syria’s prospects for recovery. The coming months will determine whether Syria’s post-Assad era will be a story of renewal or yet another missed opportunity. Syrians are yearning for change, but they cannot carry the burden alone. The stakes could not be higher—not just for Syria but for a region desperate for hope and stability.