MADRID – The relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the interim Taliban government in Afghanistan are far from straightforward. Despite deep ideological and religious differences, both countries maintain ties based on a complex web of regional interests and power dynamics, a context that is often oversimplified in Western analyses.

This article seeks to delve into these relations, avoiding the pitfalls of what Afghan anthropologist Anila Daulatzai refers to as the "discursive occupation of Afghanistan." According to Daulatzai, the prevailing narrative is reduced to two limited approaches: one that attributes the conflicts to local culture as a deterministic explanation, and another that links all the violence in the country to the "fundamentalist Islam" of the Taliban. This perspective, often used to justify external interventions, overlooks Afghanistan's historical and political complexity, perpetuating a superficial and biased understanding.

Relations between Iran and the Taliban have been marked by a pragmatic approach from Tehran, especially after the first period of the Taliban regime. In 1998, following the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif, the group’s image in the Islamic Republic was tainted by the brutality of the massacre of ethnic minorities, such as Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, allegedly carried out by the Taliban in the city. That same year, the Taliban attacked the Iranian consulate and murdered 11 diplomats and the correspondent for IRNA, Mahmoud Saremi, nearly triggering an Iranian invasion. Though the Taliban rejected involvement in the attack, the situation was only averted through UN mediation.

This episode, whose memory remains vivid in Iran, helped shape the view of the Taliban as a sectarian group, focused on a Eurocentric notion of the nation-state and with a clear ethnic perspective in its politics. However, it is crucial to avoid falling into racial stereotypes that portray the Taliban as a "rural insurgency" driven solely by the conservative and predominantly Pashtun south.

Relations between Iran and the Taliban were profoundly influenced by the Mazar-e-Sharif massacre, which shaped Iranian policy towards the group until the U.S. invasion in 2001. During this period, the Taliban were viewed by Tehran as an anti-Shia threat. In 2002, Iran played a key role in the Bonn conference to address the "Afghan crisis," marking the beginning of a political pragmatism towards the Taliban regime.

Despite the discourse generated by the massacre, Iran attempted to approach the less hostile factions within the Taliban, seeking a non-aggression agreement. One example of this approach was the opening of a Taliban political office in the Iranian city of Zahedan in 2012. However, these diplomatic efforts were poorly received by the Iranian public, who still considered the Taliban a threat. Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the need to prevent what was perceived as a potential "genocide" against the Hazara population, the Afghan Shia minority.

Iran's strategy of reaching out to the less sectarian factions of the Taliban failed, as it did not succeed in allowing these factions to prevail over the more radical elements of the group. Meanwhile, in 2014, the United States made its plans for withdrawal from Afghanistan public. In September of that year, an agreement was signed between the Afghan government and the U.S. that allowed for the continued presence of 10,000 American troops after the completion of the "combat mission" in January 2014.

As expected, the Islamic Republic strongly opposed the presence of Western troops in Afghanistan, arguing that instead of improving regional security, it would only contribute to further destabilization. This stance is in line with one of the key principles of Iranian foreign policy: to prevent any Western military presence in the region.

In 2015, the growing presence of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) further complicated relations between Iran and the Taliban. The common threat of this extremist group prompted Tehran and the Taliban to search for points of convergence, though without full trust between them.

That same year, the nuclear agreement with the Obama administration (JCPOA) did not alter Iran's perception of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan or the likelihood of the Taliban's return to power. Faced with this dual threat, Iran attempted to rebuild diplomatic channels with the Taliban, while maintaining a cautious stance and withholding full trust in the group.

The hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, strongly criticized by Tehran, and the Taliban's return to power led Iranian authorities to intensify their efforts to reach a minimal agreement with the group. This shift was interpreted by some Western analysts as a change in Iran's stance. However, the Supreme National Security Council clarified that it was not a rhetorical shift, but rather a political pragmatism that did not entail abandoning the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic or crossing its red lines in its relations with Afghanistan.

An example of this pragmatism was the decision to keep the Iranian embassy in Kabul open and operational during the Taliban's takeover of the city.

Key challenges

One of the most significant challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran has been defining its stance toward the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. During a meeting with Iran's diplomatic corps, then-Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian outlined Tehran's red lines.

Amir-Abdollahian stated that Iran did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. However, he clarified that the group must be considered part of the country's political framework and involved in power processes. Iran's position called for an inclusive government that would represent Afghanistan's diverse ethnic communities, a key condition for ensuring regional stability.

A fundamental aspect for Tehran was the protection of the Hazara Shiite minority, which has historically been persecuted by the Taliban. The security of this community became a cornerstone of Iran's policy toward Afghanistan.

The dispute over water rights of the Hirmand River, essential for agriculture and human consumption in Sistan and Baluchestan, has been one of the most significant points of tension between Iran and Afghanistan. In a meeting with the diplomatic corps, then-Iranian Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian reminded that the Taliban must honor the 1973 agreement, which stipulates that Iran receives an annual quota of 820 million cubic meters of water from the Hirmand River. However, the agreement has been repeatedly violated, not only by the Taliban but also by previous Afghan governments.

Over the past five decades, Afghanistan has developed plans to control its water resources, especially in the Harirud and Hirmand river basins, with hydroelectric projects that have sparked friction with Iran.

Fada Hossein Maleki, a member of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has held the Taliban government responsible for the construction of dams in Afghanistan and the failure to honor water rights agreements with Iran. Maleki emphasized that, unlike previous governments, the current Afghan rulers have adopted positions that have transformed Afghanistan's international relations, particularly regarding water resources.

The Iranian parliamentarian explained that prior to the Taliban's rise to power in August 2021, there was consistent interaction on key issues between Afghanistan and Iran. However, with the Taliban in control, Tehran has observed a radical shift in their approach, evidenced by a lack of cooperation on crucial matters such as the management of shared river basins.

The conflict over water resources in Afghanistan not only involves its immediate neighbors, such as Iran, but also has repercussions for international actors. This was highlighted by Ojjat Mianabadi, an expert in water diplomacy, who emphasized the influence of various countries in Afghanistan's water projects.

Mianabadi explained that a significant portion of the dams built in Afghanistan has been supported by Turkey, even under the Taliban regime. He also pointed out that Qatar funded the acceleration of the Bakhshabad Dam construction and, during Ashraf Ghani’s government, contributed 300 million dollars to complete the Salma Dam, which directly impacts water supply to Iran.

The researcher noted that the Taliban receives advice from exiled Afghan experts, who guide them on the strategic use of projects like the Qosh Tappeh canal, designed to connect the Amu Darya River with key agricultural areas. This project has become a key asset in reinforcing the Taliban's geopolitical position.

According to Mianabadi, the Taliban's strategy aims to strengthen Afghanistan's position against regional and global rivals such as China, India, and Iran. The construction of water infrastructure addresses domestic needs but also serves as an effort to consolidate international influence.

The researcher emphasized that one of Iran’s main mistakes in its attempt to secure its water rights has been failing to understand the complexity of the issue. "For 20 years, we have addressed the water conflict with a limited perspective, focused solely on direct negotiations with Afghanistan," he noted. "Suddenly, we realize that countries like China, Turkey, India, and Qatar are involved in water projects in Afghanistan. What has the United Kingdom done? What is the stance of the United States?" Mianabadi questioned.

To make progress in water negotiations, Mianabadi believes it is essential for Iran to recognize that the water issue in Afghanistan is intrinsically linked to the interests and actions of multiple international actors. Without this understanding, he warned, Iran's policies will remain ineffective.