TEHRAN – In examining Iran’s complex path in international relations, a persistent theme emerges—one of diplomacy met with setbacks, trust countered with distrust, and opportunities squandered that have only deepened tensions.

This legacy of friction raises a compelling question: Could a more consistent approach to diplomacy have altered history’s course? And if roles had been reversed, would today’s political "hardliners" and "reformists" have been cast differently? Perhaps this relationship, defined by shifting alliances and sudden reversals, is merely a geopolitical game of musical chairs, with players switching places at each turn.

Since the Islamic Revolution, the West has often cast Iran as an ideological adversary—a power whose anti-Western sentiment, some suggest, could reverberate far beyond its borders, threatening regional and even global stability. As a result, Western narratives frequently portray Iran as an ongoing threat, one to be "contained" lest its influence spread. Yet, one might wonder if this narrative more closely resembles a Hollywood screenplay, rooted in simplistic good-versus-evil themes. A closer look reveals that Western powers have often played their part in fostering Iran’s suspicion, undermining Iran’s democratic movements and, ironically, nurturing autocratic forces in the process.

A glimpse of democracy: the Mossadegh era

Iran’s democratic aspirations reached a visible peak during the leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Taking office in the early 1950s, Mossadegh aimed to diminish the Shah’s power and guide Iran toward democracy. Central to his vision was nationalizing Iran’s oil industry, ensuring that profits would benefit the Iranian people rather than foreign entities, particularly the British, who controlled Iranian oil facilities.

Despite his Western education and lack of hostility toward the West, Mossadegh’s ambitions were met with fierce resistance. In 1953, British and American forces orchestrated a coup d'état, overthrowing him and restoring the Shah’s autocratic rule. Iran’s democratic momentum was halted, and its future was left vulnerable to foreign interests. Mossadegh’s tragic miscalculation may have been his assumption that sovereignty entitled him to oversee Iran’s own resources—a notion incompatible with Western oil priorities of the time. That Iran’s interests might impede foreign profits was, it seems, simply not to be tolerated. The coup left lasting scars, as Mossadegh’s fate served as a reminder of the risks in challenging Western power—a lesson not lost on Iran’s future leaders.

The Iran-Iraq war and Western influence

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) provides yet another chapter of Western interference in Iran’s affairs. During this brutal, eight-year conflict, which claimed around 500,000 lives on both sides and displaced millions, the United States lent substantial support to Saddam Hussein. European allies, including Germany and the Netherlands, provided Iraq with chemicals that would eventually be weaponized, knowing full well the likelihood of their use against Iran. To this day, formal apologies for the humanitarian crisis remain conspicuously absent, aside from a single acknowledgment from former U.S. President Bill Clinton regarding the Mossadegh coup. Here, diplomacy appears as a selective memory game; victories are remembered, but moral debts are omitted from official accounts, and the staggering human costs rarely receive mention.

Bush’s “Axis of Evil” and the rise of hardliners

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush declared Iran part of the “Axis of Evil,” a label that effectively erased years of tentative diplomacy with a single rhetorical flourish. “States like these and their terrorist allies,” Bush proclaimed, “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” The ominous label, fitting more for a comic-book villain than a state, cast Iran in an antagonistic light that stigmatized it in global politics for years to come. While Bush warned of Iran’s potential to destabilize global peace, his administration oversaw U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that ultimately resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, the displacement of millions, and long-term regional instability—all within his two terms in office.

This “Axis of Evil” branding achieved a dark irony: while the phrase served as little more than a rhetorical bogeyman, U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan produced a real-world humanitarian catastrophe. By the end of Bush’s presidency, the concept of “collateral damage” had been redefined, with a tragic toll that might make Genghis Khan seem a benevolent figure by comparison. Meanwhile, Iran—ironically, an ally in America’s early efforts against the Taliban—was cast as the villain. One has to wonder: was Iran’s inclusion in the “Axis of Evil” really about security, or was it simply a political punchline to justify defense budgets and electoral gains? After all, a compelling “us versus them” narrative can be far more profitable than any genuine diplomatic engagement.

Cycles of hope and mistrust

The Western perception of Iranian sentiment often misrepresents it as inherently hostile. Following the September 11 attacks, Iranians gathered in Tehran to express solidarity with the American people, a gesture largely unnoticed in Western media. Yet repeated diplomatic rejections by the U.S. fueled Iran’s hardline factions, paving the way for the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose stance toward the West was far more adversarial. As time passed, cycles of hope and mistrust revealed a recurring diplomatic dance in which both sides seemed intent on stepping on each other’s toes. Each attempt at engagement has been met with hesitance and, ultimately, disappointment—a diplomatic ritual more predictable than productive.

JCPOA: a fragile triumph and its undoing

The presidency of Hassan Rouhani marked a renewed opportunity for diplomacy, leading to intensive negotiations and the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear agreement with the West. Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program and reduce its uranium stockpiles in exchange for economic relief as sanctions were lifted. This accord was hailed as a rare triumph of diplomacy over discord, a moment of cautious optimism that a new era in Iran-West relations was possible.

Yet, this fragile triumph was short-lived. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s consistent verification of Iran’s compliance with the deal. This abrupt withdrawal didn’t merely alter the geopolitical landscape; it also discredited Iranian moderates who had championed diplomacy, inadvertently empowering hardliners within the country. Once again, years of painstaking diplomatic labor were cast aside with little consideration. In a world where even reality television offers more continuity, foreign policy appeared to have embraced a new mantra: “expect the unexpected.”

History Repeating Itself

Iran’s relationship with the West is marked by a series of diplomatic overtures and setbacks. Each time Iran extended an olive branch, Western responses have unintentionally strengthened hardline elements within the country. This cyclical history has defined the present-day status quo, as both sides fail to look beyond immediate, short-term gains. The irony is striking: the very antagonism both sides seek to diminish is only exacerbated by their reluctance to commit to sustained, patient engagement.

And so, the question lingers: is diplomacy in this context more like chess or musical chairs, where the chairs disappear just when they are needed most? Could a more consistent, patient approach to diplomacy have altered this cycle of frustration and mistrust? Or are we destined to witness the same patterns, repeated as though scripted by history itself?