One of Hezbollah's most striking and, at the same time, least theorized practices is the martyrdom of some of its members. Most analyses focus on a material perspective, overlooking the potential political dimensions of this practice. At the same time, these analyses are based on an absolute distinction between politics and violence, driven more by ideological assumptions than by descriptive accuracy.

This article, therefore, aims to shed light on what could be termed Hezbollah’s concept of martyrdom and its discursive foundations. It also seeks to question the notion of a complete separation between violence and politics, following the work of Roxanne Euben in "Jihad and Political Violence".

First, it is important to note that for Hezbollah, resistance against Israel—viewed as the ultimate oppressor—is seen as a duty both on national and Islamic grounds. From an Islamic perspective, Hezbollah’s justification for this resistance is rooted in the paradigm of so-called defensive jihad. For Hezbollah, jihad means defending God's cause, which is broadly defined as the cause of the oppressed who protect the sacred, Islam, and the values the group considers as "human values." It is this notion of defending God's cause that makes defensive jihad the central point of the group’s discourse on martyrdom.

From this perspective, any action taken in defense of these values is considered jihad, and any individual who dies defending them—whether or not on the battlefield—is regarded as a martyr.

Hezbollah understands the "greater jihad," aimed at overcoming one's own desires to focus on the path of God and the afterlife, as far more significant than the "lesser jihad," represented by military struggle. However, these two categories of jihad should not be viewed as antagonistic. According to martyr Hezbollah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, the distinction between them is virtually imperceptible. Nasrallah includes resistance to the enemy, both politically and culturally, within the realm of the "greater jihad."

While the idea of defensive jihad exists in both Sunni Islam, the majority tradition, and Shia Islam, represented by Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran, among others, it is the Shia history of sacrifice and martyrdom that differentiates the two traditions. In this context, Hezbollah, as a Shia group, grounds its entire discourse on martyrdom in the historical tradition of the events at Karbala, which took place in 680 CE or 61 AH in present-day Iraq. In brief, the Battle of Karbala occurred between Caliph Yazid I and the group of Ali’s supporters, led by his son Husayn ibn Ali. Husayn refused to recognize Yazid as caliph and denounced his oppression and tyranny. Husayn and his followers were brutally massacred by Yazid's forces after enduring days without water or food. In Shia tradition, the martyrdom of Imam Husayn has become not only a historical example but also an onto-political paradigm of resistance against oppression.

For Hezbollah, each act of martyrdom is therefore framed within this political tradition of resistance inaugurated at Karbala. From this perspective, it is precisely this parallel in the fight against oppression—represented here specifically by Israel—that leads the group to consider all premeditated deaths, as well as unplanned deaths in the struggle against Israel, as acts of martyrdom.

Hezbollah’s martyrdom narrative is what, from its perspective, sets it apart from its Israeli enemy. According to various Hezbollah experts, the Israeli soldier may possess advanced weaponry, but lacks the "will" to fight, as "he fights but does not wish to die," making him inferior to the Resistance fighter. Hassan Nasrallah makes this point clear when he explains that "the strength and superiority of the fighter do not come from the type of weapon he carries, but from his will... and his disposition towards death."

The superiority of Hezbollah’s fighters is articulated through their unique relationship with God and their constant struggle against oppression, defined in existential terms. It's essential to recognize that the fight against oppression and the establishment of justice are core elements in the Quranic language. A key example is the story of Moses and Pharaoh, where Pharaoh transcends being merely a person’s name and becomes a symbolic reference to all forms of domination that violate the principles of justice (see Quran 28:4). For Hezbollah, there is an ontological connection between the paradigms of Pharaoh, Yazid, and Israel, as all represent a transgression of justice.

Another key distinction between Hezbollah and Israel is that, when faced with the choice between fighting oppression to the end or preserving their lives, Hezbollah’s members will always choose the former, unlike Israeli soldiers. This "martyrdom-oriented" choice is better understood when one views the world not merely through a material lens, but as a preparation for the afterlife.

It’s important not to reduce this to a mere rejection of the earthly world in favor of the afterlife. This simplistic interpretation is often the most common when explaining Hezbollah's concept of martyrdom. It’s typically characterized as a "culture of death" that facilitates martyrdom operations. However, this analysis tends to confuse martyrdom with suicide, ignoring the significant differences between the two. Suicide, which is explicitly forbidden in Islam, involves an act of self-destruction that doesn’t align with the norms of fighting against oppression. In contrast, martyrdom, as mentioned, is viewed as a tool for the oppressed. Moreover, there is an existential justification for martyrdom as part of a perpetual struggle between the "party of God" (Hizb-Allah) and the "party of Satan" (Hizb al-Shaytan), which is absent in the act of suicide.

Additionally, Hezbollah exercises a degree of control over martyrdom operations, adding a layer of pragmatism to its Islamic discourse. This is evident in the statements of Nai’m Qasim, Hezbollah’s second-in-command after Hassan Nasrallah. In one of his public addresses, Qasim stated that "before someone decides to sacrifice themselves, they must obtain permission from a religious leader, as the soul is invaluable and can only be sacrificed for religious reasons. Furthermore, this decision is only made after the political movement has assessed the political and military advantages of such a sacrifice."

This demonstrates that Hezbollah is not intellectually inconsistent in seeking martyrdom as a means of effectively confronting oppression on one hand, and prioritizing the preservation of life when martyrdom is either ineffective, unnecessary, or when there is no oppression to confront, on the other. This pragmatic dimension challenges the supposed division between the afterlife and the world of the living, as well as the separation between violence and politics.

As noted by Islamic political scholar Roxanne Euben, the notion of a clear-cut distinction between violence and politics is a self-imposed Western construct that obscures the relationship between the two categories in Western history itself. Euben highlights that Western political history is marked by foundational moments steeped in violence (such as Athenian democracy, which was built on the exclusion of women and foreigners). Furthermore, she argues that jihad cannot be classified as mere violence, as it possesses an undeniable political dimension: the establishment of divine sovereignty on Earth. From this perspective, the idea that Hezbollah’s martyrdom reflects a disregard for the living world must be reconsidered.

Indeed, from an Islamic standpoint, both resistance and martyrdom are not ends in themselves but are sanctified behaviors insofar as they represent pathways to the afterlife, specifically to paradise. However, this does not mean that the living world is of no concern to Hezbollah. Acts of martyrdom also serve to reshape the world according to the standards of justice laid out in Quranic imperatives. In other words, although mujahideen may yearn for the unattainable rewards of the afterlife, jihad and martyrdom entail a political struggle to establish a just community that embodies divine sovereignty in this world.

It could be concluded that most Western experts fail to grasp the fundamental concepts necessary to understand Hezbollah, particularly its embrace of martyrdom. This willingness to sacrifice is seen by the Lebanese group as a fight against oppression, with Israel as the primary embodiment of that oppression. From this martyrdom-centered perspective, Hezbollah believes that Israel finds it difficult to comprehend that the group’s losses do not automatically equate to defeat, as Hezbollah does not share Israel's aversion to casualties. Hezbollah regards its greatest weapon as this "will to martyrdom," or readiness to die, which becomes a strategic advantage in its asymmetric warfare against Israel. One of the clearest examples of this "martyrdom will" was Hassan Nasrallah’s reaction to the death of his son in 1987 at the hands of the Israeli army. In a public appearance just hours after his son’s death, Nasrallah declared, "My martyr son chose this path of his own free will. Israel may think it has achieved victory by killing the son of the Secretary General, but this fighter was not simply walking down the street when they killed him—he was alongside his comrades on the front lines."

As Hezbollah expert Amal Saad points out: "Israel is essentially facing an enemy it can never fully understand. An enemy that celebrates the deaths of its fighters as martyrs and is grounded in a doctrine that proclaims 'come and kill us.'"

For Hezbollah, the obligation to resist Israel is not primarily based on the defense of Lebanese territory. While the preservation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity is a political concern for the group, it is not the central issue in its resistance against Israel. Rather, by framing resistance in existential terms, as mentioned earlier, Hezbollah sees this struggle as a confrontation between justice and oppression, transcending mere territorial defense. An example of this existential struggle can be seen in the criticisms made by Naim Qasim in 2017 when Hamas decided to amend its charter to accept the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, effectively recognizing the state of Israel. Hezbollah’s objections to this decision illustrate how, for the group, resistance is primarily an existential battle.