The three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, despite their small size, carry strategic and distinctive importance. These islands indeed play a crucial role in controlling maritime movements at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

The enduring and legitimate presence of Iran has been instrumental in upholding stability and security in this critical regional and global thoroughfare. This strategic presence has thwarted attempts by Western powers to assert control through their allies and undermine the region's security. However, the names of the three islands have Persian origins. “Abu Musa” is short for “Bum Musa,” referring to the house of Musa, while “Tunb” is derived from the Persian Tangestani, meaning hill and mound. 

Examining historical records reveals that these islands have been an integral part of Iran's territory until the interference of Western colonial powers in the region. In the early 16th century, the Portuguese were the first colonial power to enter into the Persian Gulf, subsequently seizing Hormuz Island. Over time, other colonial powers began to make their way into this region. British forces entered the Persian Gulf under the guise of securing shipping routes and curbing the slave trade. After some time, they occupied these Iranian islands and handed them over to the emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. After 68 years of persistent efforts by Iran, Iranian forces reasserted sovereignty over the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands on the morning of November 30, 1971. This took place one day before the official withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf and two days prior to the formation of the United Arab Emirates.

After the Iranian forces assumed control of the islands, the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and Sharjah concerning Abu Musa Island stands as an official and valid document, preventing any interference by other external parties. Furthermore, the restoration of the Tunb Islands to Iran relies on an implicit understanding, given the absence of disputes over Iranian ownership and sovereignty. Avoiding a written agreement was intentional, as any such document could introduce uncertainty regarding Iran's unquestionable sovereignty and absolute ownership of these two islands. The memorandum of understanding between Iran and Sharjah on November 29, 1971, authorized Iran to deploy its forces to Abu Musa. On November 30, 1971, Iranian forces landed on the three islands. This was carried out with the presence and approval of certain Sharjah officials and with prior notification to Britain. Iran's conduct since that date has been entirely grounded in this memorandum of understanding, fully respecting the rights accorded to the emirate of Sharjah and its citizens in Abu Musa. 

What renders the UAE's claim legally invalid?

Despite the wealth of historical documents, some of which are in languages other than Persian, there is no doubt about the historical ownership of the three islands by Iran. Before the imperialist presence of Portuguese and British naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Oman and Saudi Arabia were the only Arab states in the region. During that period, the sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were not recognized as states at all. Consequently, for the few Arab residents of Abu Musa it was legally impossible to have their citizenship. This is while, most of the Persian Gulf islands, including Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, have been under Iran's ownership and sovereignty. Indeed, after Iran reasserted its sovereignty over three islands in 1971, the United Arab Emirates declared its establishment through the union of six emirates on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, including the sheikhdom of Sharjah (claiming Abu Musa). A year later, the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, the sheikhdom claiming Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, joined the union as the seventh member. Therefore, Sharjah's assertion that the residents of Abu Musa belonged to the Ghasemi tribe, and the ruler of Sharjah shared the same lineage, does not constitute evidence for the citizenship of the state established in the subsequent years. Moreover, historical records indicate that the Ghasemis were divided into two groups, one Iranian and the other Arab. 

In the claims put forth by the sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, it has been consistently asserted that Britain recognizes these three islands as belonging to these two emirates. Despite Britain considering these emirates as belonging to the mentioned sheikhdoms due to its protectorate and safeguarding of its interests, Western countries, including Britain itself from 1770-1898, officially portrayed those islands as being under the sovereignty and within the territory of Iran. Regarding Iran's sovereignty over the three islands, there are at least twelve official reports prepared and dispatched to the British Foreign Office in London by the War Office and the Admiralty, the East India Company, and the British political representatives in the Persian Gulf. One common point in these reports is that they consistently refer to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb as territories under the sovereignty of Iran. It is evident that Britain recognized the three islands as part of Iran until the early 20th century, and their stance shifted after occupying them.

The sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah have asserted their sovereignty over the three islands based on their occupation and possession over the years. However, the mere passage of time does not validate their claim to sovereignty over these islands. Indeed, the initial settlers who inhabited these islands and constructed buildings on them held Iranian citizenship. Furthermore, the argument that they spoke Arabic is not regarded as evidence of sovereignty in international law.

Upon becoming aware of the occupation of the mentioned islands in 1904, Iran promptly issued an official protest. Iran consistently voiced its protest on numerous occasions in the years that followed. Iran asserted its authority by lowering the flag of Sharjah and hoisting its own flag in lieu of the sheikhdom on the islands. Throughout this period, Iran made several attempts to regain control of the islands, achieving success in 1934 when they were returned to Iranian sovereignty. Iranian officials have visited these islands at different times, and negotiations between Iran and Britain to restore Iran's sovereignty over these territories have consistently persisted. At various junctures, the Sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah displayed a hesitancy to exercise their control over these islands. On numerous occasions, they formally lowered their flag, thereby relinquishing control of these islands. Therefore, the sovereignty of the UAE has not been conclusively reconciled, unchallenged, undisputed, and uninterrupted. 
One of the justifications put forth by Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah for their claim is the proximity of these islands to the sheikhdom of Ras Al Khaimah. However, there is a clear response to this claim. As indicated by maps, both Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb are situated closer to the Iranian coastline. Furthermore, Abu Musa is located near Siri Island, one of Iran's islands.

Conclusion

Throughout various historical periods, Iran has consistently rejected the sovereignty of any nation or colonial power over the islands in the Persian Gulf. The historical occupation of certain islands by the British forces has consistently prompted protests from Iran. An assemblage of evidence, encompassing international law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, official documents from Iranian and British embassies, correspondences, reports from British Foreign Office, the doctrine of promissory estoppel affirming Iran's sovereignty, adherence to the Law of State Succession, and the content of the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding, collectively establishes irrefutable proof of Iran's enduring ownership and sovereignty over the three islands in the Persian Gulf. 

Years after successfully settling differences regarding these islands, the UAE is attempting to reopen the case with the support of third parties lacking legitimate rights and shares in this matter, thereby creating an issue known as the islands dispute. Iran believes that there is no dispute; rather, what exists is the baseless claim and ambition of the UAE regarding Iranian territory. In recent years, the UAE has exerted extensive diplomatic, political, and propaganda efforts to shift the discourse surrounding the three islands from a bilateral matter between Iran and the UAE to a regional, then Arab, and ultimately an international issue. Undoubtedly, this adventure, entangled with the provocation of Western powers, has the potential to seriously jeopardize regional and international stability and security. While the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently pursued regional security and stability, recent history, including the eight-year Iran-Iraq war wherein Saddam Hussein aimed to challenge Iran's sovereignty over its western provinces and the three islands, highlights Iran's seriousness in responding to foreign territorial adventures without any hesitation.

From a geopolitical and geostrategic standpoint, the three islands hold fundamental importance not only for Iran but also for its friends. Consequently, it is expected that nations with friendly relations will approach this issue with heightened sensitivity and a strong sense of responsibility. 

Recently, the repetition of Russia's detrimental stance towards the Iranian islands has prompted strong negative reactions from politicians across all political spectrums, academic elites, and the public opinion of Iran, who expressed unified dissatisfaction. Indeed, this has reignited concerns within Iranian political and academic circles. This stance has reinforced a growing perception that Russia's willingness to sacrifice Iran for its own interests is casting doubt on its role as a strategic partner. There is a concern that if Beijing falls into the same trap set by the UAE and Western powers, China's positive and friendly image, cultivated as a supporter of the Iranian nation during challenging times, may be tarnished, aligning it with the negative historical image of Russia. This has the potential to pose a notable challenge to the friendly and strategic cooperation between the two countries during the critical decade of regional and international developments. 

China and Iran maintain a friendly and comprehensive strategic partnership, demonstrating unwavering support for each other on issues concerning their vital interests and fundamental security concerns, irrespective of external influences from Western powers. Hence, by fostering mutual cooperation and remaining impervious to external manipulations, both nations can play a pivotal role in reinstating peace and stability in the West Asia region and globally. Over many years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently adhered to the principle of One China and recently, in response to the Taiwan election results, Nasser Kanani, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, emphasized that “the Islamic Republic of Iran bases its foreign policy on respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states. Within this framework, Iran has consistently expressed its support for the One China principle.” 

 Amir Mohammad Esmaeili is PhD Candidate at Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University