The Axis of Resistance has recorded and continues to score successive triumphs since the victory of Hezbollah in May 2000 and July 2006 to the victories of “Saif al-Quds” and “Revenge of the Free” in Palestine. 

This confirms the precision of Imam Khomeini (R)’s approach and the complementarity in structure and goals between the Axis of Resistance’s forces, extending from al-Quds to Tehran, passing through Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Sana’a and other spots of steadfastness. 

In the early days of the July 2006 war, analysts expected the Zionist regime’s hostility; the residents of the villages under the Israeli fire were waiting for a hand to save them; that was the hand of the heroic Resistance fighters, who have registered a major and exceptional paradox in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

On the 16th anniversary of the 2006 victory, it is necessary to shed light on what Hezbollah has achieved in that unequal war, in which the Resistance fighters were ready to sacrifice their blood to defend the nation’s honor and sovereignty. To cast light on the July war, also known as the 33-day war, Tehran Times has exclusively interviewed Sayyid Haidar, one of the Islamic Resistance’s generals who led major defensive operations and contributed to achieving that strategic victory.

First of all, it would be great if you remind the readers how the war began.

At exactly 8:45 a.m. on July 12, 2006, a crew from the Fifth Zionist Brigade went out with their Hummer vehicles on a regular patrol, along the border fence with Lebanon until they reached the point where the Resistance had planted an explosive device. A non-recoiling cannon that had been positioned on a hill, outside the town of A’aita-el-Saha’b, fired a shell directly at the rear of the patrol. At the same time, medium ammunitions were fired at the two vehicles from the same location. Two Zionists were killed in the backhoe, while the third was killed while trying to flee. Minutes later, two shells were fired at the front Hummer from a distance of 40 meters, so it plunged about 20 meters to a stop. The Zionists admit that two members of the second Hummer crew fled, while Hezbollah withdrew with its captured Zionist soldiers, i.e. the patrol’s commander and the driver. The Resistance’s storming group, which was lying among the forest trees, quickly opened the door of the Hummer and pulled the two soldiers to a 4-wheel drive vehicle that was waiting on the other side of the border, whereby another support group blew up the fence with an explosive device that enabled it to move the soldiers easily. In their military investigations that were published later, the enemy’s intelligence acknowledges their failures, as they did not notice dozens of Hezbollah’s elite fighters who had been waiting for the Israeli patrol.

To what extent was the resistance ready to repel that aggression?

In times of war, individual concerns cease and turn into providing the means for a collective victory. Indeed, if the simple definition of victory in wars, according to the most famous German military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, is breaking the will of the enemy and preventing it from achieving its goals, then victory in war is not based on the sort of weapons, but rather on the victory of principle one upholds.

In this context, the Resistance’s mujahedeen set out –since day one- to fulfill their duty in deterring the open war launched by the Zionists - under a full American umbrella - for the sole purpose of ending Hezbollah. At the time, George Bush and Condoleezza Rice were heralding the so-called “New Middle East”, using the temporary occupation entity as a spearhead, after mobilising all possible support from the shameful “Arab” puppet regimes, who dare not raise their heads before their masters in Tel Aviv and Washington. Until today, those notorious regimes still hope for the fall of the Axis of Resistance, which exposes their cheapness. However, the Zainabiyyah cry, “Never to Humiliation” proves its effectiveness, and it will remain. Hezbollah entered the war with clear definite goals, namely the liberation of its prisoners in exchange for the two Zionist soldiers.

You have mentioned the US green light to the occupation. In your opinion, to what extent was the United States involved in this aggression?

The US administration has not only been involved with the temporary entity; it has always been its political and military sponsor. Overtly, it was financing the enemy and supplying it with everything needed to bomb and annihilate Lebanon, terminate its infrastructure and murder its civilians. This was not limited to their mainstream media’s incitement against Hezbollah, and their opposition to any cease-fire, but was represented in the intelligence cooperation between Washington and Tel Aviv. SID Today, a website affiliated with the US National Security Agency, has revealed confidential information on how Israeli military officials in Unit 8200 (specialized in technical espionage) have pressured their American counterparts to help provide information on the “kidnapped Israeli soldiers in Lebanon,” and “Iran’s role in these kidnappings.”

In your opinion, what supporting role did the resistance media play in achieving the July 2006 victory?

Before delving into the answer, and as a matter of thanks and appreciation, we specifically mention among others Al-Manar TV and Al-Nour Radio’s correspondent, Hajj Ali Shua’yeb, who had a prominent role in covering the war moment by moment. Indeed, His Eminence, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, has dropped the Cultural Implantation Theory followed by some political and economic systems to create dependent fragile societies that fully approve what they are indoctrinated, which is what suspicious ‘Arab’ media do to present normalization with the Zionist occupier an unavoidable option, in a bid to inculcate psychological defeat in the Ummah’s conscience and behavior. The same applies to US imperialism which uncompromisingly tries to promote the supremacy of its unbeatable policy. Sayyed Nasrallah has laid down a theory settling that the media is a partner in making victory. During the July 2006 war, the Resistance’s media became a source of accurate and reliable information, not only for their viewers but also for the enemies. Sayyed Nasrallah stresses that the Resistance media is an active part of the rules of engagement. Furthermore, a report by the Commission for the Examination of the Events of the 2006 Campaign in Lebanon clearly indicates the role media played which highlighted how the Resistance defeated the occupation army.

Well, what impact has also the July war left on the Palestinian Resistance?

Undeniably, the Palestinian Resistance has learnt the greatest lessons from the 2006 war, as it has rapidly escalated its fighting level in more than one confrontation, especially in the recent battles of Jenin. Here, it is necessary to refer to the combat tactics that have been developed by Hezbollah during the July war, and then assimilated by the Palestinian resistance, mainly: tunnel fighting, maneuvering missile launches, and wire communications technique that has significantly thwarted the enemy’s cyber capabilities. At the very least, the temporary entity is no longer in a position of superiority, attack, and initiative. Thus, it has moved from a vulnerable position to a defensive one. The July 2006 war has overthrown the scandalous agreements of Oslo in 1993, Wadi Araba in 1994, the Deal of the Century, followed by the satanic sanctions, brutal sieges and colorful revolutions at times through takfirist ideologies, and at other times through anti-Resistance TV channels aimed at sowing discord between Sunnis and Shiites, between Arabs and Persians, and between the Resistance and its environment.

Let us return back to the role of the Mujahideen. There are a large number of them who fearlessly led the war. Some of them joined the caravan of martyrs. It would be great if we briefly mention their heroic roles.

The victory of July 2006 was architected by various martyr leaders, witnessed many battles since 1982 until July 12, 2006, and then they completed their jihad desiring one of the 2 good deeds either victory or martyrdom. Among these martyrs was Ibrahim Mahmoud al-Hajj, aka Abu Muhammad Salman, who got martyred in Iraq in 2014. During the capture operation, the martyr assumed the task of securing the Resistance’s attacking forces. The leadership of the Resistance decided that he should remain in A’aita-el-Saha’b in order to manage the combat formations (elite forces, general mobilization, etc.) to maintain a single pace of a consistent combat format. The martyr took care of the conditions of the wounded of the resistance, the burial of the martyrs’ bodies, and managing the affairs of the civilians who remained in their homes. One day, he learned about the infiltration of an Israeli group. He was the first to open fire on them. He got injured in his foot, so he bandaged it himself, so that no one would know about it. The leadership of the Resistance sent him a message asking him, “Can you stand firm and continue?” He replied, “We can fight until the last breath. Our morale is high.” He concluded by addressing Sayyed Nasrallah, “You have men who do not fear the Zionist army. Know, our leader, that you have martyrs in A’aita-el-Saha’b. We will continue to fight until our last breath.”

It is sufficient to point out that Hezbollah’s victory has a major role in maintaining the equations that Lebanon has imposed, starting with the maritime demarcation, which took place exactly as Lebanon requested, to challenging ‘Israel’ through the tents erected in the Kfar Shuba’a hills.I also mention Hajj Khaled Bazzi, who got martyred in Bint Jbeil, the city in which Sayyed Nasrallah delivered his famous words “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web,” leading the battle of steadfastness during the 2006 war. The enemy repeatedly tried to occupy the city in a bid to raise the Zionist flag in its stadium to restore their shaken consideration; it thought that it would only take 48 hours, but the Resistance fighters routed them. Hence, the enemy made a decision to destroy the entire city. Most of its buildings were leveled to the ground, and one of them was over his holy body along with his two companions, Martyrs Muhammad Abu Ta’am and Kifah Sharara. Hajjj Khaled Bazzi refused to back down, telling his comrades, “I’d rather have their tanks trample over my body than retreating.”

Another prominent Martyr is Muhammad Qanso, aka Sajid al-Dewair, who got martyred in Beit Yahoun in 2006. He accumulated tremendous military experience early on, and contributed to the formation of Hezbollah’s Special Force until he became its commander before 2000. In 2005, he was entrusted with leading the operation to capture Israeli soldiers in GHajjar. He also participated in the operation to capture the soldiers in A’aita-el-Saha’b, on July 12, 2006. He returned to Bint Jbeil, where he managed the battle alongside his companion Hajj Khaled Bazzi and other comrades. He was wounded 3 times in the war, as he was engaging the enemy from a very few meters away. His last words were, “I will get martyred. Don’t let the Israeli take my body. Victory is very close.”

Among the martyrs also is Ali al-A’asheq, aka Hajj A’abbas, who got martyred in Palmyra in 2017. During the July War, he was one of the field commanders of the Resistance as he was at the forefront of the military leaders that liberated the Syrian lands from the Takfiri terrorists.

Another martyr is Ali Ahmed Fayyad, aka A’alaa Al-Bosna, who got martyred in Aleppo in 2016. “If we searched in all Arab homes, we would not find braver than you,” this is how Martyr Sayyed Mustafah Badr-e-Din mourned him. Hajj A’ala has clear imprints in Bosnia, where he fought there in the 1990s on the side of the oppressed. During the July War, the martyr was keen to be at the top of the list to participate in any qualitative operations against the occupation. He assumed responsibility in the villages surrounding A’aita-el-Saha’b, where he participated in planting explosive devices, ambushes, and anti-tank fists. His presence in the field boosted the morale of the mujahedeen until August 14, 2006.

Among the martyr leaders who participated in the July heroic tournaments was also Martyr Hasan Muhammad al-Hajj, aka Abu Muhammad al-Eqleem, who got martyred in Hama in 2015. Since he was from the founding generation of the Resistance, he was familiar with all the details of the interlocutors. With the outbreak of the 2006 war, and with the enemy advancing towards the town of Bayada in Tyre, the martyr instructed the Resistance fighters to distribute ambushes along the sea line. At the same time, he supervised the firing of missiles at hostile targets in occupied Palestine.

I also remember Martyr Hassan Lakkis, aka Resistance’s creative mind, who got martyred in Beirut’s southern suburbs in 2013 in an assassination operation carried out by Mossad. During the July 2006 war, Martyr Lakkis moved around the southern suburbs supervising the Resistance’s communications system. He was subjected to more than one assassination attempt. On August 7, 2006, his son, Ali Al-Ridha, got martyred during an assignation attempt that aimed at targeting him.

Another martyr is Hatem Hemedeh, aka HajjA’ala, who got martyred in Aleppo in 2016. He was an electrical engineer who planned several military operations. During the capture operation on July 12, 2006, he was charged with the responsibility of dispersing enemy fire targeting the group entrusted with capturing the Israeli soldiers. After that, Hajj A’ala quickly moved to the central operations room in Beirut’s southern suburbs to lead the Resistance’s air defense groups.

After all this presentation, we come to talk about the pivotal role played by the master of the pro-Resistance martyrs, Hajj Qassem Soleimani, during the July War. How has Hajj Qassem contributed to achieving victory and then maintaining it?

During the early days of the July 2006 war, Martyr Qassem Soleimani conveyed an urgent verbal message from the Islamic Revolution Supreme Leader, Sayyad Ali Khamenei, to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, stating, “This war will be harsh, but rely on God, and you must stand firm. We have full confidence in the victory of the Resistance. Moreover, we are certain that this resistance will win and turn into a regional force.” Hajj Qassem was present “at the forefront,” as Sayyed Nasrallah put it, under Israel’s bombardment, after he insisted on being present in Beirut’s southern suburbs, despite Sayyed Nasrallah’s concerns. He urged him not to take risks because American evil lurks at every crossroads.

However, HajjQassem insisted on keeping abreast of all the details related to the aggression and securing all the support the Resistance needed on various levels. The war ended and he did not leave until after the Resistance’s enforced ceasefire came into effect to set out on the mission of sheltering the displaced, and rebuilding their homes until they become “more beautiful than they were.”

At the end of this valuable interview, what has the temporary entity lost in your opinion, and what has the Resistance gained?

In the 2006 war, the occupation lost in distorting Hezbollah’s image, but it contributed to increasing the number of those who have joined the Resistance. on the side of the pro-Resistance axis, Hezbollah fought a global war against Syria and emerged victorious. For its part, the Palestinian united factions have fought the battles of Saif al-Quds, the Unity of the Arenas, and the Might of the Free. The West Bank has joined these heroic battles too, and the commando operations have escalated. The image of the Resistance is getting brighter.

In a closer look at the nature of Israeli goals explained in Western and Israeli studies, we notice today a sharp drop in the ceiling of these goals, chiefly the elimination of the Resistance.

Hezbollah nowadays has bettered its deterrence equation. Following the July 2006 war, Anthony Cordesman, an American researcher, published a detailed study entitled “Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war”, in which he presented 3 chief goals that the Israeli leadership settled, namely: the destruction of Hezbollah’s military strength; restore credibility to the Israeli deterrence force; and weakening Hezbollah within Lebanon. 16 years have passed since Cordesman’s study, during which Hezbollah’s military power has grown and extended to the rest of the pro-resistance groups.

The July victory was an example for these factions that the impossible becomes possible if the basic elements of the battle are available, the most important of which is commitment to the inevitability of the occupation’s collapse. It is sufficient to point out that Hezbollah’s victory has a major role in maintaining the equations that Lebanon has imposed, starting with the maritime demarcation, which took place exactly as Lebanon requested, to challenging ‘Israel’ through the tents erected in the Kfar Shuba’a hills. The Resistance has stood firm despite the ferocity of the war and its vicious phases. Besides, the spirit of Resistance among the peoples of the region has not been broken, despite the wicked methods to enforce normalization. It has also proven that Iran has not invented the Axis of Resistance, rather empowered it when others withdrew from the honorable approach of resistance. Hezbollah has not imported the resistance from Iran but rather assumed this praiseworthy task as the temporary entity insists on attacking Lebanon. The July 2006 war has been harsh; however, out of the mercy of the challenges, the pro-Resistance Axis has grown sturdier.