Biden missed the chance to rejoin JCPOA swiftly via executive order: analysis
TEHRAN - In a commentary on August 22 published on the Responsible Statecraft website, Eldar Mamedov, a political adviser for the Social Democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP), says U.S. President Joe Biden missed the opportunity to quickly rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) through a presidential executive order.
“Joe Biden’s election offered a chance to quickly rescue relations with Iran from a Trump-era freefall. However, the Biden administration missed that chance by refusing to rejoin the JCPOA swiftly via a presidential executive order,” Mamedov said.
Following is an excerpt of the article:
As the talks to revive the nuclear accord known as the JCPOA are reaching the critical stage, the traditional Washington view holds Iran solely responsible for its antagonistic relationship with the United States.
That such a nuance-free view of Iran dominates the Washington discourse across the political spectrum renders any potential rapprochement with Tehran a far-fetched prospect. To break this vicious cycle of enmity, it could be more useful to recognize that since the 1979 Iranian revolution both sides have been guilty of missing opportunities to improve relations.
However, the Islamic Republic has also a pragmatic streak that repeatedly led its leaders to make overtures to Washington. Of note, Iran helped the United States overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after 9/11, only to be slapped by then-President George W. Bush as part of his infamous “axis of evil.”
The conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, under presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, was a proof that, with the right leadership, both sides can set aside their deep antagonisms and pragmatically focus on achieving deals for mutual benefit. In that period, Iran also de-facto cooperated with the United States against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hinted that a successful implementation of the JCPOA might open the way for dialogue on other issues dividing the United States and Iran, such as the broader security in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
“Washington needs to recognize that Iran’s demands to provide some reassurances that the sanctions relief would survive a next U.S. administration, particularly if Republicans were to return to the White House, is not an ideological aberration.”
Donald Trump chose to ignore these opportunities. Instead, he withdrew from the JCPOA and imposed the “maximum pressure” campaign that was purportedly meant to achieve a “better deal.”
Trump wanted it so badly that he requested to meet President Hassan Rouhani on no less than eight occasions. Although these requests generated some debate in Iran of whether they should have been accepted, Trump’s failure to offer any substantive sanctions relief convinced the Iranians not to reward him with what they saw as merely a photo opportunity. No “better deal” arrived, and Iran has accelerated its nuclear program.
Joe Biden’s election offered a chance to quickly rescue relations with Iran from a Trump-era freefall. However, the Biden administration missed that chance by refusing to rejoin the JCPOA swiftly via a presidential executive order while it still had a willing partner in the Rouhani government.
Negotiating with the Raisi administration has predictably proved more difficult. Yet as the subsequent negotiations have shown, there are pragmatists also within the current political camp: after much criticism of the Rouhani-Zarif team for supposedly giving in too much, the Raisi team has arrived at the same place: recognizing that any diplomatic negotiation involves gives and takes.
It is now the responsibility of both governments to ensure that the revival of the JCPOA does not add to the long list of missed opportunities. Iranians should not overplay their hand as closer relations with Russia and China are no substitute to a re-integration into the world economy, where the United States still plays a leading role. Meanwhile, Washington needs to recognize that Iran’s demands to provide some reassurances that the sanctions relief would survive a next U.S. administration, particularly if Republicans were to return to the White House, is not an ideological aberration, but only prudence: you don’t need to be a fanatical anti-American not to want to be fooled twice.
The road to ending the U.S.– Iran enmity lies in pragmatically seizing on the opportunities for engagement and building on them. The leaders in Tehran are not impervious to the notion of the national interest. Reducing tensions with the U.S. is clearly in the interests of Iran. Likewise, at a time when the United States faces potent challenges from Russia and China, de-escalating tensions with a middling power in the Persian Gulf that poses no vital threat to U.S. security should be a low-hanging fruit.