TEHRAN - After U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA one might ask about the legal grounds on the basis of which Trump ignored the appended signature of the previous government, a come into force treaty by the EU and the voted-on resolutions of the United Nations.

Did Iranian negotiators know how a treaty can be terminated by the executive branch of power in the United States, though the previous government has officially signed it? During nuclear negotiations Iranian supreme leader repeatedly underscored the dire need for a cast-iron provision of surety and surety by foreign parties before any conclusion. Ill-conceiving the advice, however, Iranian negotiators finalized the deal and called it joint comprehensive plan of action while naive about legal undertakings required for any action. That is why the plan granted U.S., EU and hidden parties to a great extent but allotted to the country a meager portion, if at all.

Making a mere claim, Iranian negotiators aspired to a comprehensive legal knowledge over different aspects of the deal, too many aspects is proved beyond the level of their knowledge however, amongst which is the legal and legislative procedures that allows the manager of the executive branch in the united states to terminate any international treaty. Many might think that the U.S. withdrawal from Paris agreement on climate and JCPOA has been an awkward decision made solely by Donald Trump but the fact is that the U.S. is more rule-governed than this. Let us have a look the ways Iranian negotiators turned a deaf ear to serious advice of the supreme leader. Not too late after the deal the Obama’s administration announced that JCPOA is not a binding political commitment. However, Optimism in Iranian side reached to the ceiling when the Security Council resolution 2231 was issued and brought about some vague expectations on the part of U.S. to implement. This could not even satisfy international impartial observers that U.S. stays a bound party because this only provides Iran with an obscure enigmatic ground to pursuit the case according to international law. Yet, though the JCPOA identifies a series of voluntary measures in which P5+1 provides relief from sanctions through U.S. law, EU law and UN security council resolutions, all these promised provisions are separate from the commitments made by the parties. Besides, JCPOA has not discriminated the sanctions imposed on Iran by executive order (like agreements in JCPOA) or by American statute. In the later case, each person in the executive power can return sanctions without heed to international law.  Accordingly, JCPOA is regarded as non-binding political commitment and international law will not punish Trump for withdrawal or reinstating sanctions previously imposed under U.S. law. Too, domestically, withdrawal is so lawful that even does not need congressional or senatorial approval.

Not only about U.S. commitments but also about other parties, the same concern exists. The legal terms in resolution involves both binding and non-binding expressions such as “calls upon” in the second paragraph which brings about different legal commentaries on the case with most of lawyer doubting the binding force of these terms scribed in JCPOA. Even, putting this worry aside, according to American Law, resolutions of Security Council are not seen as self-executing and this does not mandate the president to comply with terms of resolution. So, Trump’s withdrawal from the deal had strong national and international legal grounds previously devised in the JCPOA by the agency of crafted American negotiators. Further investigation on legal aspects of JCPOA shed light on several deficiencies, those which might bring about serious difficulties for Iranian people, let put aside the loss we have suffered by this time.