TEHRAN – Professor Paul Pillar, who was CIA intelligence analyst for 28 years, tells the Tehran Times that “much of the opposition to the JCPOA in the United States attempts to confuse people with vague references to "anywhere, anytime" inspections, and the Trump administration has joined in some of this confusion, the U.S. statement at the IAEA meeting appears to be within the bounds of what was agreed to in the JCPOA.”

Pillar also says, “The PMD issue always has been one of the issues opponents have liked to raise.  With the Iranians complying with the agreement, according to repeated declarations by the IAEA, the PMD issue will continue to be a popular opposition argument.”

“The IAEA director general is in a delicate position.  He cannot afford to alienate himself from the United States, but he also must maintain the integrity of his own organization and the integrity of its inspections,” Pillar tells the Tehran Times.

Following is the text of the interview:

Q: U.S. delegation in IAEA after recent session in IAEA announced that “We welcome the Director General’s statement that the IAEA continues to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and to conduct complementary access inspections to sites and locations in Iran. Any new and credible concerns of undeclared nuclear activities, including any potential weaponization-related issues, can and must be pursued by the IAEA. According to this, what means “complementary access inspections to sites and locations in Iran”? Is this access beyond the Additional Protocol?

A: The reference is to inspections under the terms of the Additional Protocol.  The surrounding portion of the U.S. statement refers specifically to the Additional Protocol and the standards observed by other nations that have accepted it.  Although much of the opposition to the JCPOA in the United States attempts to confuse people with vague references to "anywhere, anytime" inspections, and the Trump administration has joined in some of this confusion, the U.S. statement at the IAEA meeting appears to be within the bounds of what was agreed to in the JCPOA. 

Q: Why U.S. again try to bring up Iran PMD Case in IAEA?

A: Those who tried to kill the JCPOA before it even came into effect have not given up their effort to kill the agreement.  Of course, the opponents now have a U.S. president on their side; Mr. Trump has been outspoken in his opposition to the JCPOA.  The PMD issue always has been one of the issues opponents have liked to raise.  With the Iranians complying with the agreement, according to repeated declarations by the IAEA, the PMD issue will continue to be a popular opposition argument.  It carries the implication that Iran might be doing something questionable in secret, even if the opponents cannot point to any evidence of a violation.

Q: IAEA Director General ask Iran for “more” verification about Section T. It seems that Director General Yukiya Amano’s message is closing to Nikki Haley, United States Ambassador to the United Nations. What is your opinion?

A: The IAEA director general is in a delicate position.  He cannot afford to alienate himself from the United States, but he also must maintain the integrity of his own organization and the integrity of its inspections.  Vague references asking for more is one way to make noises of the sort that the Trump administration likes to hear, without imperiling the soundness of the IAEA's exercise of its duties to monitor compliance with specific requirements in the JCPOA. 

Q: Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA Reza Najafi highlighted that “ by limiting Iran’s benefits from the deal the U.S. Government in contradiction with both letter and spirit of the agreement, particularly paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the JCPOA, has taken a negative approach to undermine “successful implementation” of the JCPOA.” This statement is while U.S. try to place sanction Iran on the name of Human Rights and terrorism. What will happen for JCPOA if Iran limited from benefiting of the agreement?

A: The JCPOA rests on a basic and well-understood bargain, in which Iran agreed to specified limitations on its nuclear program and additional international monitoring, in return for suspension or elimination of certain economic sanctions that had been imposed in response to Iran's nuclear activities.  The JCPOA also contains additional obligations for the non-Iran parties not to impede Iran's normal economic activity in ways that would negate the economic benefits from sanctions relief.  The fulfillment of all obligations in the agreement is essential for the agreement to survive.  Iran cannot be expected to continue meeting its commitments if the United States does not fulfill its own commitments.