TEHRAN – Robert E. Hunter, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, says a new Cold War between the West and Russia would not benefit any side.

“A new Cold War would not be productive for anyone,” Hunter tells the Tehran Times as NATO staged its largest war game in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War earlier this month.
The 10-day military exercise involved 31,000 troops and thousands of vehicles from 24 countries including Germany.
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has broken ranks with NATO allies, accusing the alliance of “warmongering” against Russia.  In his interview with Bild am Sonntag newspaper, Steinmeier said,   “The one thing we shouldn’t do now is inflame the situation with loud sabre-rattling and warmongering.” 
The statement by the chief German diplomat shows serious differences with the alliance. 
Hunter says, “Given that there are some differences of view within the Alliance underscores the importance of NATO’s striking a balance in regard to policies toward Russia and also seeing if a revival of diplomacy is possible anytime soon.”  
Following is the full text of the exclusive interview with Hunter:
Q: Recently NATO staged large scale military exercises in Poland near the borders with Russia. Do the war games indicate the emergence of a new Cold War? 
A: The NATO military exercise was designed to be sure that Russia (Vladimir Putin) understands that further Russian or Russian-condoned military actions, either deeper into Ukraine or in any of the other Central European countries will be unacceptable to the West and will have negative consequences, though these have not been directly specified.  Perhaps Putin has no such intention.  But many conflicts have begun because of a lack of clarity about what will happen if one side begins taking steps that conflict with the legitimate security and defense requirements of others.  In my judgment, NATO does need to strike a balance, however, between, on the one hand, “sending a message” to the Russians and reassuring vulnerable countries like the three Baltic States and, on the other hand, enabling Putin to argue with his population (his domestic politics) that NATO and the West are somehow trying to “surround” Russia and also not give it what Russians believe is their proper status as a “great power.”
Q: What would be the possible response of Russia to the recent NATO activities in Eastern Europe?
A: It is of course not possible to judge what Russia might do in response to this and other NATO activities which, of course, are the product of what Putin did by seizing Crimea and promoting military actions, including by Russian forces, in other parts of southeastern Ukraine.  This fact underscores the need for diplomacy, to begin with to try clarifying the interests on all sides and, without condoning anything that Russia has done, to begin exploring possible ways out of the current crisis. It does appear that there will be no serious Western attempt to regain Crimea for Ukraine; but there do need to be efforts to get Russia to change is policies and practices in other parts of Ukraine, and that includes a formal restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over contested territories (though not Crimea).  At the same time, the government in Kiev needs to do several things, some functional for its own effectiveness, notably reducing corruption; and some practical for a potential resolution of conflict in Russian-speaking and Russian-ethnic parts of the country, and that probably means some form of autonomy.  At the same time, there needs to be a major infusion of economic resources into Ukraine, coupled with reduction of corruption.  As happened in the latter part of the Cold War, such economic developments can send a message to Moscow that is potentially “stronger” than a Western military buildup.

“The government in Kiev needs to do several things, some functional for its own effectiveness, notably reducing corruption; and some practical for a potential resolution of conflict in Russian-speaking and Russian-ethnic parts of the country, and that probably means some form of autonomy.”  
Q: German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has strongly criticized NATO war games in Eastern Europe, calling it “warmongering” against Russia. What is your assessment of such a statement?
A: Minister Steinmeier’s comments illustrate the need to “strike a balance” in what NATO and the West do, along with emphasis on diplomacy – assuming, of course, that Putin is also prepared to see a value in diplomacy in the course of which he will need to change some of the things he has done.  We do need to test whether he is largely seeking a “place in the sun” for Russia or whether he is, at the extreme, trying to reestablish the old Soviet Union and to intimidate his Western neighbors.  Perhaps the “truth” of his motives, to the extent he knows them, himself, likes somewhere in between.  It should be clear that no one has anything to gain from an expansion of the conflict (except perhaps for the Russian population in Ukraine); and that even a new Cold War would not be productive for anyone – and especially not for Russia. (Russia does need us more than we need it; but this is not a point to be made in public, since it plays into a sense of Russian wounded pride, given that the Soviet Union /Russia “lost” the Cold War and superpower status.)
Given that there are some differences of view within the Alliance underscores the importance of NATO’s striking a balance in regard to policies toward Russia and also seeing if a revival of diplomacy is possible anytime soon.  But I do not believe that these differences within the alliance are ultimately crippling for it.
Q: Considering the existing differences within NATO, Turkey's differences with the alliance regarding its presence in the Black Sea to stop the flow of refugees to Europe, and NATO’s role in Syria, what is your prediction of the future shape of the alliance?
A: Even more complicated is what is happening in the southeast of the Alliance, with Turkey’s position as both a European and a Middle East country, with difficult relationships in both directions, as well as its “identity crisis” as President Erdogan tries to reshape Turkish society, even to the point in some respects on a pre-Kemalist basis. You will see the efforts by European countries to gain Turkish cooperation in slowing the flow of refugees from the Middle East, and especially from Syria, into Europe.  This is now tied up with the broader agenda of Turkish-EU relations and at the moment does not seem to be leading toward an effective resolution.  In regard to Syria, I do not see NATO’s getting directly involved, as NATO – there would not be a consensus for acting and that would be required – although a  few of the NATO  allies might choose at some point (not now) to become more deeply involved.  Obviously, the tensions within the alliance over Syria, the Kurds, and the evolution of Turkish government, politics, and society are quite serious, though I do not believe that they will lead to a basic breakdown of overall alliance cooperation.  Too much is at stake for each of the allies to permit this to happen.
Q: Will there be any changes in the alliance, especially if Trump, who talks about the necessity of changes in NATO, takes the helm at the White House?
A: I do not believe that Trump will win the U.S. presidency, but if he did, it is not really possible to predict what he would do: he has said so many contradictory things and he has had no experience in facing real foreign policy and national security issues.  Having said that, I do believe there NATO is going through another period of redefinition.  In particular, it has to work out how to balance difference challenges, especially those coming from the direction of Russia with those coming from North Africa and the Middle East (especially refugee flows), along with the need to develop effective relations with the European Union, which continue to lag far behind what is necessary.