Consequences of the U.S. Global War on Terror: Afghanistan
September 29, 2015 - 0:0
Within a month of the attacks on the United States of America, which occurred on 11 September 2001, Washington launched its Global War on Terror (GWOT), which remains ongoing to this day. The official purpose of the GWOT is to confront and combat terrorism anywhere in the world that threatens the United States, its interests, or its allies.
The American-led GWOT is responsible for two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as numerous military operations conducted throughout the Middle East and North Africa, primarily through the use of airstrikes and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes. However, despite, nearly a decade and half of military operations and trillions of dollars spent, Washington has failed to make a real impact on countering terrorism. In fact, it can even be argued that Washington’s efforts have been counter effective, and have significantly contributed to the increase in terrorist organizations, influence and attacks.
Washington set clear objectives in Afghanistan for destroying al-Qaeda, removing the Taliban from power, and bringing democracy to the people of Afghanistan. Although the United States and its allies were, arguably, initially successful in producing meaningful results towards reaching their goals, the overall impact of the GWOT in Afghanistan indicates that they will ultimately fail to fully achieve their objectives.
Even though the American-led coalition significantly reduced the influence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and successfully killed or captured a substantial number of their operatives in Afghanistan, they were unable to destroy the organization or curb its influence. In fact, one can argue that the war in Afghanistan actually helped al-Qaeda gain influence and further develop a series of networks throughout the Middle East and Africa, which continue to thrive and actively conduct terrorist operations throughout the region.
While the United States and its allies were able to push back the Taliban from key strongholds, they never effectively defeated the Taliban, nor curbed their desire to regain control of their former strongholds in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that United States possesses a dominant military force, it was never able to successfully adapt to unconventional warfare. While the United States begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban have displayed their strength and ability to successfully regain control of territory they previously lost to coalition forces. There is a high probability that within the next few years, the Taliban will regain power over the majority of the provinces they formally controlled.
Even though a democratic government was installed after the removal of the Taliban, democracy is likely to fail in the majority of Afghanistan, due to two major factors. One is the increasing strength and control by the Taliban, and second is that Afghanistan is a predominately tribal country, which makes the adaptation of democracy more difficult. In comparison, although the United States established its democratic system over 200 years ago, the indigenous population, which consists of multiple tribes, has still not fully integrated into American society. In fact, Native Americans were not granted U.S. citizenship until 1924. Moreover, some of the indigenous tribes continue to function as separate nations on reservations (designated land granted to tribes by the U.S. Government). The United States has experience with tribal communities and witnessed first-hand the difficulties of establishing an American identity and democratic system among tribes; however, fascinatingly, the United States failed to successfully analyze and draw upon its own history when planning its approach to Afghanistan. It is incomprehensible as to why the United States believed it could establish a successful democracy in a country divided by not only decades of both internal and external wars, but also a society both strongly divided by and tied to tribal communities.
Although the United States could establish a democratic government in Kabul, the government has proven to have little influence over remote tribal areas, as well as regions strongly influenced by the Taliban. A weak central government cannot effectively combat extremism or terrorism. Proper analysis and effective policy are crucial to the success of counterterrorism; unfortunately, in the case of Afghanistan, it is evident that the policies of GWOT in Afghanistan were inadequate and flawed. The GWOT in Afghanistan not only failed to accomplish its objectives, but has created the conditions for the further expansion of extremist ideology and terrorism.