TEHRAN - Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the non-proliferation program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), believes that Iran and the major powers will agree on a “comprehensive” nuclear deal this summer because “both sides have made significant compromises”.

“I believe that a comprehensive agreement will be reached this summer, although probably not by the 30 June deadline. Both sides have made significant compromises,” Fitzpatrick says in an exclusive interview with the Tehran Times.

He says both Iran and its negotiating partners “should not let the remaining issues stand in the way of an agreement.”

Iran has said it will not allow inspection of military sites or interview with its nuclear experts under the Additional Protocol once it signs a final nuclear accord with the 5+1 group and insists it must be treated like other NPT signatories.

However, Fitzpatrick says “it will be necessary for Iran to accept some verification measures that go beyond the Additional Protocol” given questions on ‘possible military dimension’ of its past nuclear activities.

Iran has said PMD is a forgery invented by ill-wishers to harm the cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Also on June 16, Secretary of State John Kerry said the U.S. is 'not fixated' on PMD.

Following is the text of the interview with Fitzpatrick:

Q: Don’t you think that demands by some Western members of the 5+1 group for inspection of Iranian military sites and interview with nuclear scientists are excessive and go beyond the Additional Protocol to the NPT?

A: One of the most vexing issues remaining to be negotiated between Iran and the six major powers regards future inspector access to military sites. From a Western perspective, it is a no-brainer that Iran should not be able to hide nuclear weapons work at military bases. Iran, on the other hand, has a legitimate need to protect military secrets that are unrelated to illicit nuclear activity. The answer is to allow managed access.

After all, the safeguards Additional Protocol, which Iran has agreed to implement, allows for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to take environmental samples anywhere in the country where there is reasonable suspicion of nuclear material- or nuclear fuel cycle-related activity taking place. Military sites are not excluded from the sweeping provision of ‘anywhere’. The Additional Protocol provides for what is called ‘complementary access’ by inspectors to sites in order to resolve questions relating to the correctness and completeness of a state’s nuclear declaration.

Q: Some countries like the U.S. and UK have signed the Additional Protocol, so aren’t these countries’ military facilities subject to inspection by the IAEA as well?

A: The IAEA Additional Protocol applies the same rules to all of the non-nuclear weapons states that have accepted it. So if the IAEA had suspicions about nuclear activity at a military base in Japan or Germany, for example, the IAEA would have the right to access. But Japan and Germany have not given the IAEA any reason for suspicion. The case of the USA and United Kingdom are different, because as nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT, they operate under a different set of safeguards. Since they already are acknowledged as nuclear-armed states, there is no reason for the IAEA to seek to determine their non-nuclear status under the Additional Protocol. It would not make sense.

Q: Generally, don’t you think that the 5+1 group is seeking to impose new things on Iran under the pretext of the Additional Protocol?

A: The Additional Protocol is an international norm that has been accepted by most states of the world. It will not be ‘imposed’ on Iran. Rather, Iran is asked to accept it as part of a negotiated settlement to the concerns that have been raised about its nuclear program. Given Iran’s history of safeguards violations and the evidence about past nuclear activities of a ‘possible military dimension’ I believe it will be necessary for Iran to accept some verification measures that go beyond the Additional Protocol, in order to overcome what former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei called Iran’s ‘confidence deficit’.

Q: How do you see the future of the talks? Can both sides reach a final agreement?

A: I believe that a comprehensive agreement will be reached this summer, although probably not by the 30 June deadline. Both sides have made significant compromises. They should not let the remaining issues stand in the way of an agreement.

Q: In addition to non-proliferation, one of the mandates of the IAEA is nuclear disarmament; however, nuclear armed powers mostly insist on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is somehow put into oblivion. Please explain?

A: Actually, the IAEA mandate does not include nuclear dismantlement. Its mandate is threefold: non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear safety. Perhaps you are referring to the disarmament goal of the NPT. The nuclear powers have agreed to that goal, and they have made significant strides toward reaching it. The nuclear arms race has not only been stopped, as called for in the NPT, but it has been reversed. The United States has reduced its nuclear arsenal by 80%.


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Iran has a legitimate need to protect military secrets. The answer is to allow managed access.