TEHRAN – Iran and China share a long history and, on paper, a robust strategic partnership cemented by a 25-year cooperation agreement. Yet, beneath the rhetoric of mutual friendship and shared opposition to Western unilateralism, the relationship is marked by unfulfilled potential.

During an interview with the Tehran Times, the Director of Iran-China Strategic Studies Institute, Hossein Qaheri, said there are more than just sanctions holding back the full flourishing of Iran-China ties.

He argued that while sanctions are a significant factor, some of the core impediments are internal to Iran. In his view, Iran can pour more efforts into constructing a framework to effectively engage with its Eastern partner.

The interview also explored the limited scope of military cooperation, the misconception of the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the actionable steps Iran must take to increase its strategic weight.

Below is the full text of the interview, edited for clarity and conciseness:

Has the snapback of UN sanctions affected Iran–China relations? If so, to what extent?

Sanctions can be understood in two dimensions. The first concerns the sanctions that were already in place, which have undoubtedly had a considerable impact. Major Chinese companies operate across global markets, including the United States—China’s largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 14% of its trade. Naturally, these firms seek to avoid exposure to sanctions risk, and it is therefore expected that they exercise caution and refrain from certain activities.

Regarding the recently imposed snapback mechanism, it has not produced any additional effect on Iran–China relations. Whatever influence existed was already present. It is reasonable to expect that, were sanctions to be lifted, investment volumes would increase accordingly. At present, however, an estimated 90% of the Iran’s available potential ties with China remains unutilized. The channels of engagement established previously still exist; it is merely the modalities that have changed.

Beyond sanctions, what are the main challenges in Iran–China relations?

The principal challenge is that Iran lacks a defined mechanism and the requisite political will to establish a long-term, coherent framework for relations with China. We have not afforded this relationship a strategic identity. We possess neither a comprehensive strategy nor a long-term program. Although a 25-year comprehensive agreement was concluded—of which nine years have already elapsed—no substantive implementation has followed.

Equally significant is the absence of a single, responsible authority in Iran charged with overseeing relations with China. This institutional gap is a key reason we have been unable to secure concessions from Beijing. We also lack the administrative capacity to utilize the credit lines China has extended. Despite being provided with finance and ample time to draw on it, we have yet to utilize even half; yet we express dissatisfaction that China does not extend further finance.

The question is not why China refrains, but why we have not made use of what has already been provided. The core issue is the absence of a designated authority responsible for managing this relationship.

China is important to Iran’s economy, but Iran represents only 0.24% of China’s economic structure. Under such circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect China to pursue us; the responsibility to engage rests with Iran.

If sanctions are lifted, do you believe Chinese engagement with Iran would expand?

Yes. With reduced sanctions, the financial environment becomes more open and less dependent on state mediated channels. In the absence of sanctions, the private sector could engage directly with Chinese partners, attract investment, and cooperate more freely through banking institutions.

What is your view of Iran–China military and security cooperation? How far can it expand under current conditions?

Under present conditions, China is unlikely to conduct joint military exercises with Iran. Beijing seeks to avoid unnecessary costs or actions that heighten regional sensitivities among countries with which it maintains significant cooperation. China is already active in the Persian Gulf; from its perspective, there is little rationale for activities that could elevate tensions.

No state assumes additional costs for another without a compelling strategic basis.

China is not aligned with either Iran or the Persian Gulf states as a matter of loyalty. Its approach is driven by economic interests and economic weight.

How can Iran increase its strategic weight?

Some argue that we have not integrated China into our long-term national planning. Whenever opportunities have arisen, governments in Iran have tended to pivot toward the West; China has never been treated as a genuine strategic counterpart.

Consider China’s “Malacca Dilemma,” or its historical competition with India. What has Iran accomplished in southeastern Iran to address China’s concerns? Conversely, what have the Indians achieved in that region over the years? Very little. From a strategic standpoint, Iran could have allocated a role to China. On what basis was it given to India instead?

We have not aligned ourselves with China’s strategic priorities, yet we harbor unrealistic expectations of China—expectations that ignore the absence of a comprehensive partnership.

If UN and U.S. sanctions are lifted, could Iran gain that desired weight? Or is it achievable even without sanctions relief?

Such weight is achievable even without sanctions relief. Iran’s potential economic weight could be significantly higher; we could at least reach Iraq’s position, meaning Iran’s share in China’s economy could rise to 1%—four times the current level. Achieving this would have a profound and positive impact on domestic conditions.

What steps must be taken to achieve this?

We must assign genuine strategic importance to this relationship and develop dedicated leadership, institutional authority, and long-term planning structures to support it.

But if major Chinese firms avoid Iran due to sanctions concerns, what options remain?

Consider the large volume of Chinese automobiles entering Iran. All of these companies maintain partnerships with European firms. Name a major Chinese automaker without European ties—there is none. Chinese companies seek profit and will find lawful avenues to pursue it. European firms likewise seek profits. Iran must establish conditions that prevent such companies from becoming entangled or exposed to undue risk.

Regarding the Belt and Road Initiative, some argue it is a geopolitical instrument—China’s version of Western imperialism or a new form of U.S style dominance. What is your view?

What evidence substantiates this claim? It is frequently repeated by Western media and individuals unfamiliar with China’s historical behavior. Consider the past millennium: which countries has China colonized? The 19th century, when China was weak, is not an appropriate benchmark. Prior to that, China was an empire—and yet colonialism is not part of its political or cultural tradition.