TEHRAN – The Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, sat down with a media outlet affiliated with the Leader of the Islamic Revolution to conduct his most expansive interview since being appointed to his new role.

Larijani, who is a veteran statesman, mostly spoke about the 12-day war Israel launched against Iran, how Iran recovered from losses on the first day of the war, and how it managed to turn the tables and force the Israeli regime to ask for a ceasefire.

The security chief also spoke about the future and how Iranians are ready to fend off any similar attacks with more force. He said nuclear talks with Western states are still possible if American and European leaders finally come to the conclusion that they cannot force Iran to concede with threats of war.

The following is the full transcript of the interview, sourced from Khamenei.ir:

Given the current circumstances in which you have assumed this new responsibility, what is the most important task of the Supreme National Security Council? Considering the variety of challenges, can they be prioritized? And with all these challenges ahead, will there be any structural, methodological, or strategic changes implemented in this regard?

I must say that the most important duty of the Council is to manage these challenges in such a way that the overall outcome creates a calm atmosphere for the country’s national development, so that people can enjoy a predictable life. Challenges always exist; today it may be war or other issues, yesterday it was something else, there are regional matters, and there are also international ones.

In the end, the art lies in how diplomacy, the conditions of the Resistance forces, and the military’s capacities are combined to secure the country’s national interests. In reality, this should provide a balanced path of development or progress for the nation and the government.

Naturally, since we are now involved in a war and there is currently a ceasefire, this is a critical issue that must be carefully addressed. We must create capacities that will deter the enemy from even contemplating renewed aggression. At the same time, this situation has its side dimensions, including nuclear issues, regional matters, and other related challenges.

What measures has the Council prepared for such readiness? These days, the first question of those who have access to you is usually whether there will be another war or not—it is the common question of today—and after whether war will happen or not, the second question is how prepared we are for it.

Answering this question partly depends on us and partly on the enemy, because not everything is in our hands. But the most important issue is to see how, with the measures we can take, war can be deterred. My view is that several factors can influence this matter.

The first issue is national unity. Just as in the twelve-day war, national it played a major role. The Iranian people at that time showed a high level of understanding; they analyzed the enemy and rival correctly and, despite all existing differences of opinion, agreed that Iran and Iran’s interests had to be defended. This is a great collective wisdom.

Of course, this unity must be safeguarded. This means that the government, the nation, and all of us must work to preserve this solidarity and unity. On one of our trips, one of the leaders of a foreign country remarked that the world had witnessed Iran’s national unity! So this is a national asset, and preserving it requires multiple efforts, which I will not go into here.

The second point is that one of the key factors for endurance is that the people must enjoy a minimum standard of living. Even if there is war, the management of people’s daily lives must be such that they can withstand hardships. This is one of the issues we are currently discussing, and I believe the government and the president himself are highly committed to it and consider it part of justice. Therefore, a basic level of people’s needs must be properly met.

This requirement looks one way in peacetime and another way during wartime. This, in my view, is the second point that must be provided for.

The next point is the preservation and enhancement of military capacities and resources. We had strong capabilities, which forced the enemy—despite initiating the war—to scramble to end it. Now, even though outside propaganda portrays the situation as if they had great achievements, most major countries and nations have realized that our enemy suffered a strategic defeat in this war. Of course, there are various reasons for this. This outcome is useful for Iran, but it can also tempt the enemy—because an enemy that has failed strategically will naturally seek another opportunity to claim success. How can we disappoint them? We must strengthen the country’s military and security capabilities and address certain shortcomings in our work. Part of our time is therefore spent identifying weaknesses with precision and realism, fixing them, and strengthening our capabilities. This is another major area of our work.

Another aspect involves international and regional interactions and the balances that can be created—that is, more precise dialogue in the international arena, beyond the usual pleasantries and formalities. This must also be part of our work.

My recommendation is truly that attention inside the country should be given to the fact that our war has not ended yet. Political groups and individuals with platforms must recognize that we are in an important situation. Of course, Iran’s deterrent capacity is very high. I am not saying that an actual war exists at the moment, but we should know that a war has already begun, and it has only paused with a ceasefire. Therefore, we must remain prepared and maintain our unity.

In any case, one of the key factors in this war was the Leader’s guidance. From the very first day, he carefully monitored the situation, made strategic decisions, appointed commanders, followed up on the war, and spoke directly to the people. Therefore, in these circumstances, this guidance must be fully supported. The rational basis for this is also very strong.

People may have different opinions on some political issues, but when facing a major crisis, our support for the one who is leading and directing the war must be strong. We should not create friction.

 In my view, this is part of a proper understanding of the times. I am not saying there are no differences of opinion—of course there are, in society, among politicians, among parties—but the point is that we must not neglect the current time, place, and situation of the people.

Sometimes neglecting this creates frictions that encourage the enemy to act against us. Therefore, I believe this aspect is also very important and deserves careful attention.

Might the Supreme National Security Council intervene in such matters as well?

The SNSC has always had mechanisms in this regard and has adopted relevant resolutions. So, there is no need for new resolutions, since such measures already exist. I know that in recent times, actions have also been taken in this direction. The important thing is that this mechanism must continue to function—that it engages with experts, journalists, and writers, and provides them with proper explanations. In the past, we also held such meetings, explaining the conditions to them. I believe that most of these individuals possess this intellectual maturity: when conditions are clearly explained, they make reasonable and appropriate decisions.

Although the enemy suffered a strategic defeat in this war, we ourselves also experienced tactical and practical shortcomings in military matters and certain other areas. Since the system’s planning in this regard is concentrated in the Supreme National Security Council, the public may now wish to receive, as far as possible, a report on what measures are being taken to address these security, military, defense, and media gaps before a possible next round of confrontation—if it occurs.

On the defense front, an important decision was taken in the Supreme National Security Council, namely the establishment of a Defense Council. This Defense Council functions as a subsidiary body of the SNSC and its sole responsibility is to address defense issues, rectify shortcomings of the Armed Forces, and devise plans in these matters. Its mechanism has been put in place and it is actively working. One session has already been held, and matters are being followed up regularly.

In this regard, the General Staff of the Armed Forces has assumed certain responsibilities and is pursuing them, the Ministry of Defense is active in supplying the required needs, and everyone is engaged.
 In particular, the IRGC commander and the Aerospace Force commander are both working hard to address, as much as possible, the shortcomings we identified during the conflict.

Moreover, the expertise of specialists, talented youth, and capable professionals is being fully utilized.

In the Secretariat as well, because we have truly entered the era of modern warfare, a new Defense Technology Division has been created to focus specifically on this subject, and it is actively working.

Therefore, initiatives have already begun, and I am personally very optimistic, as many academic experts and specialized university forces have been integrated into this process.

Could you elaborate on this matter with more specific and concrete examples?

For instance, in the field of air defense and radar systems, we had some deficiencies, and now concentrated efforts are being made in this area. Similarly, work is underway on other related matters. Of course, it is not necessary for me to disclose all the technical details here; suffice it to say that, generally speaking, this is how the work is progressing.

That said, we also had many strong points in this war, especially in the missile field and similar capabilities, which in fact broke the enemy’s back. These strengths must continue to be reinforced, and efforts are underway in that direction as well. Thus, the defense dimension is being actively pursued and it will progress well. In fact, the outlook in this regard is quite promising.

In this regard, has the issue of purchasing new equipment also been raised?

Yes, that has also been raised. In any case, our main reliance is on domestic capabilities, but we also make use of assistance from others. Another dimension involves addressing shortcomings in the security sector, and meetings are being held in this regard as well. These are weaknesses that definitely need to be resolved. Of course, it is not just a matter of human resources. For instance, when we speak of “infiltration,” one should not assume that it necessarily means human agents are involved. Yes, that does exist—I do not deny it—but there are other factors as well.

I wanted to raise one of the ambiguities and challenges among our domestic public opinion, which has also been exploited by the enemy in the realm of propaganda. The issue is that no clear report is given to our own people and public opinion about the extent and depth of “infiltration.” I don’t know whether it is possible for the official responsible for the country’s security to speak more specifically on this matter; but if possible, please elaborate a little.

Naturally, it is not necessary to go into too much detail, since that could certainly be harmful. But it is absolutely necessary that these matters be pursued—and they are. What is important is that attention has been given to this issue and it is under follow-up. The initial perception is that infiltration consists only of those individuals wandering in the streets or elsewhere and passing information to the enemy. But this is not the case. When you look at the scene of infiltration, you realize that with new technologies and the vast intersection of data, foreign services can gain much more than that.

So, technological mastery of information can be extremely helpful in this field, and this aspect is the greatest challenge. In other words, what others do is not just sending human agents—that belongs to the old methods. Yes, that too still exists, but more importantly, intelligence services can derive insights from the totality of data they obtain and from cross-referencing it, and they can use that optimally for operations. Therefore, much greater attention must be paid to this technological dimension of the issue.

And of course, part of our shortcomings also concern media narratives.

Overall, I do not consider the state of Iranian media to be bad. Many people are working hard in this area—writing articles, speaking on radio, television, and elsewhere. Given that this war was unexpected, to some extent a surprise and carried out dishonorably—meaning it involved deception—we must admit that our media also suffered a sudden shock at the time. But they regained themselves and began to take an active role.

Now, however, the important issue is that we must both expand and make our media capacities more technical. In my opinion, our media approach is somewhat flat, and this has limited impact. Audiences need short, precise, well-packaged information that meets their needs. Of course, I do not mean that everything must always be brief. If a subject is compelling, people may also listen to or read something extensive. But generally speaking, they prefer shorter segments.

Another very important factor is the honesty of the message. Everyone accepts that due to security concerns, not everything can be said. But at the same time, lies must not be told. People must definitely feel that the media do not lie. You may say, “At this time we cannot disclose certain matters”—and that is acceptable, people will understand. But if falsehoods are told, credibility is lost. This principle must be the foundation of media work. Especially in wartime, just as people rely on the Leader to advance objectives, they must equally rely on the media’s truthfulness in order to accept the realities of the times and be able to adjust themselves accordingly.

You have likely had meetings with the Leader of the Islamic Revolution during this period as well. In the first meeting and session you had with him after assuming this new responsibility and position, what was his most important request from you?

His main request was that we do everything possible to safeguard the national interests of the country and to achieve lasting security. This is a broad matter that includes various domestic, regional, and international issues.

His view is that this must be pursued with steadfastness, perseverance, and firmness. His conduct is indeed like this. Throughout this war, I never saw the slightest doubt in him regarding the path he was taking.

Did you also maintain communication with him during that period?

Yes, I did, and his guidance reached us fully. We had meetings, we regularly sent him our views, and we also received his feedback. This was completely evident. And now, after the war, our communication has even increased.

He moves forward on his path with great confidence, and this behavior is very similar to Imam [Khomeini]. I recall when Imam was in Paris, the late Martyr Motahhari visited him for several days. When he returned, Ali Motahhari and I went together to the airport to welcome him. On the way, we asked him, “How did you find the Imam?” He replied: “I found him to be a man of faith in the cause, faith in the path, faith in the people, and faith in God.” Later, he also wrote this down in one of his books—that the Imam had four “beliefs”: belief in the goal, belief in the path, belief in the people, and belief in God.

In these circumstances as well, I have seen the same spirit in Ayatollah Khamenei. His steps are taken with complete confidence. And this is a defining trait of leaders who follow a divine path and are goal-oriented.

We were in the middle of negotiations when the enemy practically bombed the negotiating table. Therefore, our outlook and approach to negotiations today are certainly different from what they were before June 13. In your view, is diplomacy still possible under such circumstances, and if so, under what conditions?

My consistent advice is that Iran should never abandon diplomacy, because diplomacy is itself a tool. The Leader of the Islamic Revolution once said: always keep the flag of negotiations in your hands; this is absolutely correct. In fact, diplomacy is an integral part of governance, and it makes no sense to set it aside. The key point is when and how we make use of it.

If the enemy turns the diplomatic arena into a stage for theater and spectacle, nothing meaningful will come out of that diplomacy. Or if its purpose is to use diplomacy as a cover for another agenda, then clearly diplomacy as such was never their real intent.

But if diplomacy is meant to say that we gain nothing from war, now we want peace, then this is where diplomacy has genuine value—and this is true diplomacy.

Right now, I do not see the situation in that way; I feel that the diplomacy they are pursuing is mainly to create pretexts. Nonetheless, we should never say that we are cutting off diplomacy altogether.

Under what circumstances, then, can negotiations be fruitful?

Negotiations succeed only when the other side realizes that war has no utility, and instead wants to resolve issues through dialogue. But if they intend to use negotiations as a pretext for launching another operation, then that is not a genuine negotiation. Our condition is that negotiations must be real.

If you are pursuing war, then go about your business; whenever you regret it, you can come back for talks. But if you truly come to the conclusion that this steadfast and resilient nation cannot be forced into submission through war—this nonsense they keep saying that we must pressure Iran until it surrenders, which the Leader has already responded to, and which they also discovered in this war: that Iranians are not a people who surrender—then the condition for genuine negotiation is that you grasp this reality.

What will be the outlook of the Islamic Republic regarding resistance groups and the Resistance Front after the twelve-day war? You recently traveled to Iraq and also to Lebanon. Currently, Hezbollah in Lebanon is under heavy pressure to lay down its arms—something Israel could not achieve through direct military confrontation. At the same time, in the international media space there is this analysis that the groups supported by the Islamic Republic under the title of the “Resistance Front” are now weakening.

If they are weakening, then why is there so much insistence and pressure against them? If they are weak, then they are weak—so why all this effort?

Usually pressure is applied where there is strength, not weakness. To me, this is one of those strange claims. If we go back four or five years, before these recent developments, the talk was not about their weakness. Back then, the prevailing rhetoric was that Iran was making a mistake, that these groups were insignificant, and that supporting them was nothing but a cost for Iran.

They would say Iran was wasting resources on them and that they were “not a factor.” Now they say the Resistance Front is weakening. Well, if they are weak, then leave them alone! Why all this planning and pressure?

In my view, in the past two years they have inflicted tremendous suffering on themselves and on the people of the region: they killed civilians, wounded many, and imposed hunger. But these are the crimes of a regime that recognizes no red lines, does whatever it wants, and whose barbarity has been tolerated by the Western world.

Now the question is: if you claim to have eliminated Hamas, then why are you still afraid to take Gaza?

You killed and starved the people, yet you failed to eliminate Hamas. Why is that? Because it is in their own hands: when you kill people, they have families, they have youth, and you push them into the position of having no choice but to resist you.

How was Hezbollah formed? It was born when Israel occupied Beirut. When that happened, which nation would accept foreign domination and occupation of its capital? So a group of young people said, *we must defend ourselves,* and that became the nucleus of Hezbollah. Now they claim Iran created Hezbollah. No, it was their own behavior that created Hezbollah. Yes, we supported them—we do not deny it, we helped and we still help—but the essence of Hezbollah was created by the Lebanese themselves, and it became a strategic asset: a small country able to stand against Israel.

The same is true for Hamas: when you occupy a land and tell its people they have no rights, naturally they rise up against you. The same thing happened in Iraq. When the Americans invaded and occupied Iraq, resistance movements emerged because of that occupation and the oppressive, arrogant behavior of their soldiers. And in Yemen, too: the Houthis had always had disputes with the government, but when the bombing campaign began, they realized they had to resist, and the resistance movement took shape.

Therefore, resistance is always created by their own actions. The more pressure they apply, the deeper resistance becomes. They claim they have struck Hezbollah—yes, they inflicted blows, that is true. But the question is: did Hezbollah rebuild itself or not? They had so many young fighters that they quickly began rebuilding.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, has a book in which he even cites poems by artists. In it, he highlights a reality: in the Middle East, there exists a deep political awareness among the youth and a widespread resentment toward the United States. For example, he quotes a Senegalese poet who expresses this sentiment.

This is indeed a fact. When the Americans insist on their so-called doctrine of peace through force, what does that mean in practice?

It means surrender.

Exactly—either surrender or war. Which honorable people would ever accept such surrender? Yet Netanyahu, even more reckless than his predecessors, repeats the same nonsense, claiming that Israel will impose “peace through force.” What does that mean for the region? It means telling countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, or Kuwait: you must either surrender to us or face war. Naturally, that provokes everyone and puts them on edge. So today the region’s overall sentiment is that everyone has developed a guarded stance toward Israel. They may not think exactly as we do, but they reject Israel’s behavior and they understand that Iran is a barrier against it.

So, in my view, the Resistance is alive, it is moving forward, and it will only grow stronger.

After the twelve-day war, will the Islamic Republic’s policy remain the same—supporting and strengthening the Resistance movement?

There is no doubt that decisions must always be made in accordance with the times. But the Islamic Republic will always support the Resistance, because we regard it as an authentic movement and a strategic asset.

Did the enemies abandon Israel? Has the United States stopped supporting Israel? No, they still back it. So if Iran refrains from supporting those who claim to defend the interests of Islam and who are concerned about Iran, that would be political shortsightedness. Iran must use its capacities. When the enemy makes use of all its assets, both big and small, why shouldn’t we do the same?

Sometimes I hear people say that the Resistance has done nothing for us. In reality, they are trying to influence your mindset and suggest that these groups are a burden, costly to Iran, and should be abandoned so that “peace” could be achieved.

Recently, in a conversation with one world leader—who is even a member of the UN Security Council—I asked him: Why do you have these international regulations? When we are attacked and you, as a Security Council member, do nothing, then what is the point of these rules? He replied, These regulations are nonsense, because the international arena is about power. That is how it is: if you do not protect your power, you will be harmed. It is an ugly reality, like a jungle, but it exists. Whether you accept it or not, the less you acknowledge it, the more you will suffer.

Therefore, you must strengthen your elements of power. Domestically, the people are vital—you must keep their trust, ensure their needs are met, and treat them as partners, not subjects.

In the region, too, you must make use of available capacities and remain united with them. Thinking that Hezbollah or the Resistance groups are a burden on us is a strategic mistake.

In my view, both they need our help and we must benefit from theirs—because isolation is not in Iran’s national security interests.

During your trip to Lebanon, you also met with Sheikh Naim Qassem. Can you share, in broader and less diplomatic terms, your impression of Hezbollah’s reorganization and renewal?

I have spoken about this before. I truly found Hezbollah’s forces and its leadership deeply determined in their path. Even now, both the leadership cadre and the young members are steadfast. At the reception ceremonies and at the shrine of Martyr Nasserallah, where we spoke, you could see the new generation—though that was just a glimpse. No one had invited them; they came on their own.

Their spirit is that they feel oppressed, and so they have devoted their lives to defending Lebanon. Now some are telling them to surrender! Surrender to whom? For what reason? Naturally, they are indignant.

Our position has always been that the Lebanese should resolve their issues through national dialogue. We still uphold this principle.

 We have never imposed anything on the Resistance. Now they say Hezbollah is connected to Iran. Yes, of course they are—because they are our brothers, not because they are our subordinates.

Our approach is never one of command and control. We believe they have the maturity to make their own decisions. This is exactly where Iran’s approach differs from others: their strategy is always “either surrender or war,” but our belief is to respect their intellectual and political maturity.

We say not only must we be strong, but the region itself must be independent and strong. Lebanon’s government should be strong, Iraq’s government should be strong, Saudi Arabia’s government should be strong. We do not seek to dominate or keep them subordinate.

What we believe in is brotherly relations and rational cooperation, and we have faith in strong, independent governments in the region.

Our strategy has always been—and will remain—supporting the Resistance.

You have long experience with the nuclear file and with dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). How do you assess the performance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent developments and during this war? What plans does the Islamic Republic have for dealing with this issue, both in terms of engagement with the Agency and possible legal follow-ups?

As far as I know, from the time of Mr. ElBaradei and even his successors, the Agency was never in such a destructive state as it is today. At least back then some measure of rationality prevailed.
Yes, they acted under Western dominance, but they also observed certain international norms. The current Director seems to have given a blank check to the Zionist regime and the United States—he was practically fueling the fire in this war.

It is shameful. The IAEA Statute and the safeguards system clearly state that the Agency must defend NPT member states and, in case of attack, immediately convene the Board of Governors and refer the matter to the UN Security Council.

Yet he simply stood by and watched—without even issuing a condemnation! Does such a person deserve to be Director General of the IAEA? ElBaradei, at least, acted rationally. Of course, he too was under pressure, but he managed the Agency with some professionalism, enough to maintain its credibility. Not entirely, but at least to some degree. This current Director, however, has abandoned everything and surrendered completely.

During the war, our nuclear sites were bombed. Did the IAEA even issue a statement condemning it? Not at all. It is a disgrace.

In my opinion, the first step is to reconsider the Agency itself: what is its function? Today, countries legitimately ask: What is the use of the IAEA? We are members of the NPT, but what is the benefit of working with the Agency? I am not saying we should withdraw from the NPT, but this is a logical question for our people and for all nations.

Is leaving the NPT one of the options for the Islamic Republic?

This possibility has always existed. Of course, I am not saying that anyone is going to do this right now, because such a move must be carried out with prudence, and we need to see whether it has any real benefit or not. We are not pursuing a bomb.

If a country seeks to build a bomb, then it should not accept the NPT; but if it is not seeking a bomb, then it should accept the NPT, and there is no reason not to. However, the reality is that the NPT has had no real benefit for us.

Whenever you act with power in such matters, you make progress—that’s the nature of the international arena. But if you think that, for example, problems will be solved in diplomacy through hugs and handshakes, no, that’s not how it works. If you have power, you will move forward. Therefore, Iran must pursue power.

What does this approach mean in terms of Iran’s current nuclear policy?

In practical terms, it means that negotiations should never be abandoned, but at the same time Iran must never surrender in those negotiations. Instead, we should put forward rational and constructive solutions. I am not saying that flexibility is out of the question—flexibility is sometimes necessary, but only when the other side genuinely seeks a resolution. As the Leader once described it, “heroic flexibility” applies only when the counterpart also intends to reach a solution. But if the other side demands outright submission, then there must be no compromise—there, Iran must stand firm.

In the coming weeks, Iran will face the issue of the “snapback” mechanism, a process that has been under discussion for months. The Europeans appear to be taking the lead in pursuing it as a tool of pressure against Iran. How do you assess this instrument and Europe’s behavior?

Europe’s behavior is obvious; it hardly needs further evaluation. They are simply carrying out part of Washington’s agenda. But even here, there are serious disagreements. Many countries, including Russia and China, have issued statements stressing that the snapback mechanism was designed for cases where one party violates the JCPOA.
Now, who has actually violated it? Our facilities were bombed—so why should the mechanism be activated against Iran? From the perspective of international law, the scene is quite tragic, even absurd. It is as if one party commits the act, yet another is punished. Unfortunately, such injustices are not rare in today’s international system.

There are also procedural problems. If one seeks to invoke snapback, the process requires several steps: first, submitting a request; then review by a panel of experts; then consideration by a ministerial body; and only afterward can the matter reach the Security Council. Instead, they have rushed straight to the Security Council.

Another point: since the U.S. has withdrawn, only six participants remain—Iran, Russia, China, and the three European states.
That makes it three against three. In such a case, how can they claim to have a majority? When it was seven, majority rules had meaning; now it does not.

The logical path would have been to resolve the issue through negotiation. But they seek to impose solutions through pressure—whether in the American way of military bombardment, or in the European way of brandishing snapback as a threat over Iran.
In reality, the text of the agreement does not support this approach, which is why there is still significant disagreement over it.

You have past experience with the strategic cooperation agreement with China. Under current conditions, how do you see Iran’s relations with China and Russia developing?
Some say they have not acted as strongly as expected during the war. What is your assessment of our ties with these two countries, and where are we headed?

Overall, our relations with both China and Russia are good. We have very strong political and commercial exchanges with them, as well as cooperation in the military and security fields. Each country engages with us according to its own calculations and framework, and we do the same. One should not expect every country to act exactly as we would prefer.

When Western countries refuse to cooperate with us, what are we supposed to do? Those who argue that we should not work with Russia or China are, in effect, saying that Iran should stand entirely alone. But when the West closes its doors, we naturally turn to other partners. That is why we built strategic relations with these countries, and to be fair, they have cooperated with us. During the sanctions, it was precisely through cooperation with such countries and our neighbors that we managed to keep moving forward.

In politics, there are as many options as there are countries. Western powers may imagine that by frowning at Iran, we will simply surrender. But Iran will always find alternative paths. I believe the decision to rely more on our neighbors and other partners was correct. Of course, sanctions have had their effects, but at least we did not sit idly by and let pressure overwhelm us. Some countries cooperated more, others less, but overall the approach has been right.

In the past year, even before the war, there was a perception circulating, and toward the end of the war it resurfaced again. Now, as we have gained some distance from the conflict, the same whispers are returning—namely, to what extent diplomacy and the field are aligned and coordinated. Are they advancing a single project, or is each side pulling the rope in its own direction?

These two domains are not separate at all; rather, they are all elements of national power.

Over the past year, there has been a perception that, for example, diplomacy seeks one course of action while the field seeks another, particularly regarding how to deal with Israel.

This is exactly my point: diplomacy and the field are not two separate domains with distinct logics. Nations that seek to strengthen their national power always consider these elements together — and even include the economy in that equation. Naturally, they strike a balance: they say, for example, ‘Here we take this step because it is necessary for our national power; diplomacy, you must do this; the field, you must do that; the economy must contribute here; culture must play its part there.’

In essence, the core action is the pursuit of national interests and national power. Its reflection is then expressed in the battlefield, in diplomacy, in the economy, in culture, and in society. A successful country is one that, after defining its principal action in the realm of national power and deciding on the correct step forward, manages to properly translate it across these fields and to take those steps in a timely manner.

Have these elements been coordinated for us?

They have always been coordinated, and they remain so today. We do not face any issues in this regard; they move forward side by side. In particular, it is the primary responsibility of the Supreme National Security Council to determine, whenever an issue is crucial for national security, what diplomacy should do, what the field should do, and what the economic sector should do. According to the Constitution, the Supreme National Security Council is the body where the economic, defense, and diplomatic domains must be considered together. Accordingly, the Council’s membership includes all military, economic, foreign policy, and domestic elements.

What is your assessment of the recent Armenia–Azerbaijan agreement brokered in the U.S.? Could it pose a threat to Iran, and how should we respond?

Overall, this falls within a larger strategic design that is not solely about Iran; it relates to the extensive use of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in which the U.S., NATO, and similar actors certainly have a misleading perspective. There is pressure on Russia, and there is pressure on us as well. The question, however, is whether this action could create a geopolitical stranglehold for Iran. That depends on how we relate to this development.

As far as I know, the Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council contacted me and explained, coordinated with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and even reached out to the President. I am not saying their actions were perfect—they could have been more precise—but their point is that they conducted a commercial project and want to facilitate multiple routes to ensure this path is accessible, and under no circumstances do they intend to block the North-South corridor. Of course, this needs to be formalized; a phone explanation alone is not sufficient.

If it is properly documented and agreed upon, it cannot create a geopolitical stranglehold for us. That is one thing; another is different. But if it obstructs access, it could. So it all depends on how we handle this issue, and that is exactly what is currently being discussed between us and them.

So the developments happening on the ground, by themselves, do not constitute an inherent threat to us?

Yes, by themselves, they may not constitute a threat, provided that certain actions are taken. Of course, some safeguards are always necessary; I am not saying there is no risk at all.
 

In the analytical framework of the Islamic Republic, how would you define “geopolitical suffocation” in that region—at what point would we say, if this happens, we oppose it?

Geopolitical suffocation in this context would occur if, at this stage, your access to Armenia were cut off. If the route is blocked and you have no access, that would indeed constitute suffocation.
However, the explanations that Armenia has provided to Iran do not indicate that this is the case. If suffocation were occurring, we would certainly have to respond; but so far, their explanations suggest that this is not the issue. Of course, this needs to be examined more precisely, and I think the Iran President’s upcoming visit there will largely clarify the matter.

Our relationship with one of our neighboring countries and the nature of our interactions with them has raised some questions among the public, particularly regarding rumors about their cooperation with Israel during the military aggression against our country. Could you provide some clarification on this?

The notion that they cooperated with Israel was certainly not something we expected.

So has the Islamic Republic now concluded that they collaborated with Israel during the twelve-day war?

So far, we have no indication of that. We must speak based on evidence. Some people make claims, but they need to provide us with precise documentation. At this point, we have no evidence; the Azerbaijani government itself explicitly denies any such thing, and we have nothing to put on the table.

Furthermore, it should be noted that Azerbaijan is a neighboring Muslim country, culturally very close to us, and a friend. Naturally, there are areas where we have disagreements—just as there are countries in our southern regions with whom we have similar complex relations.
Of course, in friendships between countries, we always take such factors into account. Friendship itself is a nuanced matter; you can be close with a country in some areas, and maintain reservations in others.
Even major countries like Russia and China, with whom we have relations, also have ties to Israel. But in this matter, we pursue our own interests.

We must accept that in today’s world, such multiplicity exists, and the perception we hold of the Zionist regime is not shared by many countries. Of course, some countries—like Iraq and a few others—share our perspective.

My question was not about their intentions or perspective; it was about whether they could be the source of a security threat against us.

That is always potentially possible, but at present it has not occurred. The explanations provided by the Azerbaijani government do not indicate that they have taken any action against us.
At least for now, we have no strong evidence in the Security Council on this matter, and we believe that the Azerbaijani government—a neighboring, Muslim, and friendly country—would not take such action. Based on our investigations so far, there is no evidence in this regard.

Of course, if something emerges in the future, we would have to act differently, but for now, without proof, we cannot act on baseless claims.

Returning to the snapback mechanism, many expect it will soon be triggered. How will Iran respond if that happens?

This is currently under review domestically, and as far as I know, some countries are making efforts to negotiate to prevent it. Russia and China also have positions aimed at blocking it.

If a proposal to extend is offered, would Iran accept it?

There is disagreement on this. Our position is that we do not accept it. Some countries have proposed it, but Iran does not support it. The concern is that such an extension would become a recurring arrangement—first six months, next time a year, and so on.
We had an agreement that was supposed to be completed within ten years; it is not meant to be repeatedly extended.

Iran truly does not accept this. Of course, some domestic voices have suggested it might be acceptable to agree to, for example, six more months, but overall, we do not accept it.

So if this happens, what is the Islamic Republic’s plan for dealing with it? It seems this would be the worst-case scenario.

We will handle it when the time comes. You are considering the worst-case scenario, but for now, that moment is still ahead of us.

Finally, if you think there is any point that should be added, please share it.

My real belief is that under the current circumstances, all our efforts should focus on meeting the needs of the people; this is the most pressing issue causing concern for us right now. I believe solutions do exist, but it requires determination. For instance, when people in the country struggle to meet their basic needs, that is more painful than anything else and must be addressed.

There are also other issues, such as electricity and gas shortages, which are solvable. Efforts must be made; we cannot allow our factories to stop operating. When factories halt, national wealth declines—and this must not happen in Iran. Meanwhile, the government is working through its dialogues with other countries to resolve these challenges and imbalances. Perhaps this is the central point where everyone must exert effort. Of course, most of the responsibility lies with the government and parliament. We handle the national security aspect, but we are concerned, because these issues directly affect the stability and resilience of the people.