The phase between two wars
LONDON - Both the Islamic resistance of Lebanon and the Israeli occupation entity are preparing for the next war, but it will not be like the current war. At this stage, the resistance plans to end the war and not opening a new one. This regional phase is about closing this war, not opening a new one. The resistance is adhering to the decision to remove weapons south of the Litani River out of commitment to the state and the agreement signed on November 27th, not because it believes the other side is right.
Since the other side has not adhered to this ceasefire agreement at all, the resistance has the right not to adhere to it either. The agreement is considered void because the other side has not respected it. When it becomes completely clear that the occupation entity does not restrain itself and continues all forms of violation, then response becomes necessary. It commits these violations even without being responded to, justifying them with various excuses, such as claiming that the resistance is growing.
Here another equation emerges: If the erosion inflicted by the enemy on the resistance is less than the rate of the resistance’s growth and restoration of its capabilities, then strategic patience ensures a general policy of continued growth. This is despite the enemy’s expansionist ambitions.
However, if the pace of strikes increases to the point where the losses and erosion exceed the growth, then the equation may change, and the resistance may decide to respond in whatever manner it deems appropriate. At that point, there could be an open war.
Lebanon is a special case compared to other resistance fronts. Each front has its own conditions, circumstances, and methods of resistance. In Lebanon, the resistance represents a portion of the population, and many parties are not part of the resistance. A large segment does not believe in the resistance option or even conspires against it.
The resistance takes this into account and seeks to maintain a degree of majority support, since achieving consensus in this domain is very difficult. However, when the needs of the resistance become a national necessity because of the enemy’s violations, the internal atmosphere becomes ideal for coordinating resistance action and creating deterrence. That is, forming a comprehensive national deterrent balance.
Until now, there are still voices within Lebanon, mostly from Christian parties, calling for disarmament. When popular demands express themselves in the streets, calling for the necessity of responding, then the response becomes a popular demand rather than a unilateral decision by one party dragging the country into war, which the resistance aims to avoid.
The Lebanese state can say yes or no to the Americans who come with the demands of the Israeli entity. The decision to submit or to comply with American demands is in the hands of the state. If the state satisfies American demands at the expense of sovereignty and independence, then that is submission.
As for the resistance, it has never initiated a war. Its actions have always been a response to wars imposed on it. These are defensive wars, and defensive wars are fully justified. Sometimes when the enemy’s strikes cause damage and destruction, the resistance may choose to delay, postpone, or withdraw, not out of weakness, but in preparation for a phase in which it can establish a deterrent equation within what is called strategic balance. Should there be reliance on the supposed “good intentions” of the enemy, or do we absolve it of all its crimes?
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