MADRID – The recent defense agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan represents one of the most significant developments in West Asian and South Asian geopolitics in the past decade. 

It is not merely a bilateral maneuver or a pragmatic response to immediate security needs. On the contrary, the new pact symbolizes the dramatic erosion of the old foundations of Western-imposed security architecture and signals the beginning of a stage in which regional states appear determined to redefine, on their own terms, the framework of their alliances and the nature of their sovereignty.

Any analysis seeking to grasp the significance of this agreement must place it within the sequence of profound crises the region has experienced over recent years, particularly in the wake of the recent Israeli attack on Qatar. The message has resonated deeply: no U.S. ally can consider itself immune to regional violence and instability, nor fully protected by Washington’s proverbial “security guarantee.” 

This symbolic and political shock has accelerated the recognition of what Iran has long emphasized: the tutelary presence of external actors, far from providing stability, has exacerbated fractures, mistrust, and the vulnerability of regional states.

For decades, Western—and especially U.S.—narratives placed their allies under a near-sacred umbrella of protection. Military bases, bilateral treaties, arms trade, and diplomatic agreements guaranteed a landscape in which Arab elites could grow or survive under the shadow of the superpower. Yet recent events directly challenge this foundational myth: neither security nor regional order is now ensured by proximity to imperial power.

The Israeli attack on Qatar exposed the cracks in the supposed invulnerability; uneven responses and the absence of strategic consequences for Tel Aviv illustrate the decline of this model. Washington’s “guarantee” is revealed as an impossibility. Viewed from this perspective, the Saudi–Pakistan agreement is far more than a mere self-protection maneuver: it marks a symbolic—and potentially political—rupture with old certainties. Former U.S. allies no longer see Washington’s guarantees as sacred or sufficient.

Those who, out of necessity or inertia, cling to the fading rites of U.S. protection will eventually discover that the collapse of imperial certainties leaves them exposed both to unforeseen threats and to the inexorable erosion of their own independence. The old order is fading; the construction of a new one has just begun, but its contours are already perceptible.

The strategic history of the Saudi–Pakistan relationship: An Iranian critical reading

The military relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has deep roots going back to the 1960s. Islamabad sent troops, advisors, and senior officers to Riyadh, participating both in the training of local forces and in the protection of strategic installations. Over the following decades, particularly in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia financed military and religious projects in Pakistan, seeking to consolidate its influence and counter the presence of regional actors such as Iran. Thousands of Pakistani officers served in Saudi bases, reinforcing the kingdom’s dependence on Islamabad as a “human shield” against internal and external threats.

However, from an Iranian perspective, this historical relationship reveals a short-term, dependent policy, focused on external tutelage rather than sustainable regional security. Saudi strategy, based on purchasing loyalties and importing security, reflects the continuation of a logic of subordination to extra-regional powers, particularly the United States. For Iran, this model is not only vulnerable to geopolitical shifts—as demonstrated by the Israeli attack on Qatar—but also fosters sectarian imbalances and internal fractures, weakening regional cohesion and resilience.

The new agreement, while seeking to diversify and strengthen Riyadh’s security, does not entirely break from this historical pattern. The key difference is that the initiative no longer depends exclusively on Washington, acknowledging that external protection alone cannot guarantee stability. Nonetheless, the Iranian critique underscores that Saudi Arabia continues to seek security solutions outside an endogenous regional framework, while Tehran insists that true stability can only emerge from cooperation among regional actors, grounded in shared sovereignty and strategic balance.

The transition towards endogenous security

The political-theological dimension of this crisis is significant. Regional order is no longer granted by U.S. decree. The myth of the “guarantor” has collapsed: protection must now be built locally, through pacts forged in response to concrete risks and threats, not under the fiction of an American pax that exists only in the memory of past generations.

In this sense, Saudi Arabia has chosen Pakistan to erect the first major pillar of its new defensive model. Islamabad, possessing the only nuclear force in the Islamic world and an experienced military apparatus, provides strategic credibility and tactical flexibility. For Riyadh, the alliance with Pakistan is both a military insurance policy and a recognition of the need to diversify alliances and sophisticate its foreign policy in a more volatile and less predictable terrain. The joint declaration mentions cooperation on asymmetric threats, air defense, intelligence, and technological coordination: elements inconceivable without the crisis of confidence in the previous alliance structure.

This shift, however, is not without a significant paradox: Pakistan maintains strong ties with Iran and, unlike other Islamic powers, has resisted pressures to fully fall into an anti-Iranian orbit. Pakistan shares a long border with Iran, as well as common challenges such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and energy security. Both countries have developed pragmatic cooperation mechanisms even during moments of tension. Islamabad, despite external pressures, has avoided breaking with Tehran.

Thus, the possible—though still remote—tripartite alliance between Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia haunts Washington and Tel Aviv as an unsettling specter. It would demonstrate that the “divide and rule” tactics no longer have their former effectiveness.

The shock caused by the Israeli attack on Qatar exposed the strategic isolation of the Persian Gulf states. The lesson is devastatingly clear: no balance with Washington or Tel Aviv, no opening or concession, guarantees effective protection against regional violence.

Qatar, which had cultivated its image for years as a balanced actor and mediator, was taken by surprise by the realities of power politics. The reverberations quickly reached Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Muscat, and beyond: the risk is no longer potential or theoretical, but palpable and urgent.

It is in this space of exposure that the Iranian thesis finds tacit recognition. For decades, Iran has maintained, at considerable international and regional cost, that the region can only achieve peace and stability through locally negotiated solutions, without the omnipresence of the United States or Israel’s disruptive logic. Time has proven Tehran right: the persistence of external agendas has exacerbated insecurity rather than resolving it.

The vindication of the Iranian agenda

The new agreement acts as a validation of Iran’s foreign policy strategy. Far from ideological slogans, Iranian diplomacy has promoted regional forums, endogenous multilateral pacts, and collective security mechanisms grounded in sovereign equality and mutual respect.

The Riyadh–Islamabad agreement, although it does not yet include Tehran, effectively represents a step toward that horizon: the creation of sustainable regional instruments not dependent on the West. This transforms the regional power matrix, freeing key actors from structural dependence on Washington and delegitimizing Israeli rhetoric about “containment” and “preemptive defense.” It also suggests an opening to forms of dialogue in which Iran is no longer the essential “other” to be isolated, but an actor whose pragmatic rationality may be necessary to manage the complexity of future threats.

The U.S. reaction, oscillating between suspicion and unease, confirms the novelty of the situation. Washington rightly perceives that the era of top-down bilateral agreements is in crisis. Selling arms or guaranteeing exercises is no longer sufficient; trust frameworks must now be woven from the ground up, based on convergent interests.

The Saudi–Pakistan agreement heralds the gradual maturation of a self-sufficient, pluralistic foreign policy in the region. Although power rivalries, conflicting interests, and historical grievances make rapid consolidation of a joint regional defense improbable, the underlying movement is unmistakable: the pursuit of independent instruments, the abandonment of U.S. tutelage, and the reshaping of alliances according to on-the-ground needs.

The immediate challenge will be to convert this trend into a stable institutional architecture: truly inclusive regional dialogue forums capable of managing conflicts and giving a real voice to parties currently subordinated to extra-regional interests. Iran, with its history of resisting external pressure and advocating autonomous multilateralism, can become a key partner in this transition.

The example of the Saudi–Pakistan agreement has dual potential. On one hand, it could seed a denser, more versatile platform of cooperation among Muslim countries, shielded from Washington and Tel Aviv’s interference. On the other, it could help create parallel diplomatic networks—economic, energy, and technological—resilient to external sanctions and geopolitical shocks.

Political perspectives: The post-imperial future of the region

The deepest lesson of this moment is that West Asia is at the beginning of a process of sovereign reclamation of its destiny. The crisis of the old guarantee model has forced regional actors to look inward and recognize one another as legitimate interlocutors, overcoming fragmentation induced by decades of imperial manipulation.

The possibility of inclusive, genuinely regional security—even if imperfect at this stage—represents the greatest victory of the logic Iran has defended. On a more abstract level, the region is witnessing the emergence of a new regime of political truth: legitimacy now rests not on external blessing, but on the capacity to negotiate, pact, and defend collectively.

That is, to create order without foreign fiat. Between crises and openings, the horizon of a post-imperial policy emerges: neither unanimous nor guaranteed, but closer to the complex, plural reality of Gulf, Levant, and South Asian societies.

In conclusion, the defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan transcends bilateralism and becomes a symptom of the region’s political maturation. It vindicates Iran and its longstanding suspicion: as long as stability and sovereignty depend on external factors, the cycle of vulnerability and interference will continue. Only through the creation of autonomous, inclusive, and genuinely regional structures can a sustainable security horizon be aspired to. The path will be long, but the first real crack in the edifice of imperial certainties is already open.