TEHRAN – Simplified, popular narratives often make history shallow, sterile, and politically charged. These oversimplifications wrap around historical events and figures, preventing a clear understanding and often twisting the truth with clichés. 

Iran's contemporary history is full of such myths. One could argue that these popular misconceptions play a larger role in shaping the story of modern Iran than the actual events themselves. This is especially true for the movement to nationalize Iran's oil and the infamous coup of August 19, 1953 (28th of Mordad).

Ervand Abrahamian's book, ‘The Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup’, which draws on key American documents declassified in 2017, sheds new light on the Pahlavi era. It fundamentally challenges the accepted wisdom about the oil nationalization movement and the coup, and offers a dramatically improved understanding of this pivotal moment in Iran's history.

A coordinated campaign: The press and the CIA against Mosaddegh

Abrahamian's work uses new documents declassified by the U.S. government in 2017 to correct weaknesses in the existing history of the oil crisis. He carefully compares the official reports from U.S. and British agencies with the media narrative being pushed at the time, particularly in the American press.

His analysis reveals a direct link. For instance, a series of attacks on Mosaddegh in the Wall Street Journal were essentially verbatim reports prepared by CIA director Allen Dulles and his team. The unflattering and often ridiculous image of Mosaddegh promoted by the media was heavily shaped by directives from American security agencies.

The documents confirm the CIA drafted a detailed propaganda playbook against Mosaddegh. Its key tactics included bolstering the Shah's image, financially coaxing and guiding newspapers, bribing influential figures, sowing discord among Mosaddegh's supporters, and spreading rumors linking him to the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party. Other planned operations involved distributing fake leaflets attributed to the Tudeh Party that attacked Islam and called for the clergy's destruction, and building connections between army commanders and tribal leaders. While earlier research by Iranian scholars had noted these were part of a British propaganda effort, the new documents provide concrete proof.

Abrahamian also highlights a meeting on July 29, 1952, between U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson and British diplomat George Middleton in Tehran. They concluded that removing Mosaddegh would require a military coup, which needed the buy-in of Tehran's military commander and must be done in the Shah's name—though the Shah himself was terrified of being publicly associated with the plot. The CIA station even suggested persuading the Shah to publicly criticize Britain to boost his popularity and initially pretend to support Mosaddegh. The Shah himself told Henderson that without the ambassador's actions, the monarchy would have already fallen. 

The myth of a communist threat

A major section of the book is dedicated to dismantling the long-held belief that a powerful Tudeh Party and the threat of a communist takeover justified foreign intervention.

The standard argument has always been that the U.S. and U.K. were convinced to orchestrate the coup to stop Iran from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. Abrahamian’s evidence, however, shows this "communist threat" was largely a fabrication by American intelligence.

In reality, the Tudeh Party at the time posed no serious threat to the U.S., the Shah, or even to religious forces. What truly motivated the British and Americans was business: protecting the interests of oil companies. They were also terrified that Iran's successful nationalization would set a precedent, inspiring other countries (like Egypt with the Suez Canal) to do the same.

The real danger they perceived was the disruption of the global economic order and the potential for Iran's instability to spread across the region. While they successfully sold the public on the idea of a communist menace, the declassified files show that U.S. officials knew there was no significant Soviet activity in the oil dispute and no real threat from the Tudeh Party. The "Red Scare" was a convenient narrative to disguise their true motive: preserving corporate interests and the international status quo. 

This manufactured fear of communism went on to become a permanent feature of Iran's political landscape, with the Pahlavi state later genuinely believing the very myth it had helped to create.

The staged US-UK rift Mosaddegh came to believe

Another critical section of the book covers the political battles in Iran’s parliament, showing how the U.S. manipulated legislators to isolate Mosaddegh. It also details a crucial deception: Mosaddegh’s belief in a genuine policy split between the U.S. and Britain.

Abrahamian shows that the very public disputes between American and British diplomats like Henry Grady and Reader Bullard were essentially a "fake fight." While Grady criticized the British in public, he privately opposed Iran's oil nationalization just as much as they did. This staged disagreement was meant to mislead, and it worked. Many, including Mosaddegh, were duped into thinking the Western powers were divided, when in fact they were completely united in their goal to stop nationalization.

The book also disproves the idea that U.S. Democrats opposed the coup, showing their administration was fully involved. In a fascinating detail, the documents reveal that one Associated Press reporter in Tehran was actually a CIA operative.

The false notion of the clergy's role in Mosaddegh's fall

In the final section, Abrahamian explicitly rejects claims that the clergy played a significant role in toppling Mosaddegh. He argues that historians like Darioush Bayandor promote this idea primarily to use Mosaddegh's popularity as a weapon against the Islamic Republic, retroactively projecting current conflicts onto the past.

The historical record doesn't support this view. When CIA operative Donald Wilber tried to recruit clerics to oppose the Tudeh Party, he was met with a wall of silence from the leading Shi'a authority, Ayatollah Borujerdi. Key clerics on Ayatollah Kashani's list in Tabriz were actually pro-Mosaddegh. Furthermore, prominent religious figures like Mahmoud Taleghani, Reza Zanjani, and even Morteza Pasandideh (Imam Khomeini's brother) were all supporters of the Prime Minister.

The only major cleric who sided with the coup was Ayatollah Behbahani, who was widely seen as a "court cleric" rather than an independent religious leader. Finally, Abrahamian argues the coup wasn't caused by economic collapse. On the contrary, he presents evidence that Iran's economy was stabilizing, and suggests the coup was launched precisely because Mosaddegh's policies were starting to succeed, proving nationalization could work. This is supported by historian Gasiorowski, who cites U.S. sources noting Iran's active commercial situation at the time. 

Mosaddegh overthrown to prevent a trend

Based on the new trove of documents, The Oil Crisis in Iran makes it abundantly clear that the Shah owed his rule to American and British powers, a dependency that was utterly shameful. The Americans weren't charmed by the Shah; they were terrified of the global trend toward nationalization. They overthrew Mosaddegh to make an example of him and stop the idea from spreading.

The narrative of a communist threat was just a public relations tool to frame the conflict within the familiar terms of the Cold War. The real goal was always to protect the profits of international corporations, in which many powerful Western figures had a direct stake.

Despite his competent leadership, Mosaddegh was outmaneuvered by a staged conflict between allies and lost his political support in parliament. And while the Shah returned to power, he forever ruled in the shadow of Mosaddegh and under the weight of his own humiliating dependence on foreign powers.