TEHRAN - Tariq Rauf, a former senior IAEA official, tells the Tehran Times that “Iran is now the gold standard for the verification at enrichment plants and this standard should be applied by the IAEA at all enrichments plants under safeguards in other countries.”

Rauf, now a director of the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, says, “For several years now, the world’s most heavily inspected uranium enrichment facilities have been in Iran.”

Following is the text of the interview:

Q: How do you assess the first IAEA report about Iran’s nuclear activities since the JCPOA, commonly called the nuclear deal, went into effect on January 16?

A: The IAEA issued its report on 26 February 2016 on verification and monitoring in Iran in connection with UNSC Resolution 2231. This report was considered at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting 7-11 March. The IAEA has reported that it has confirmed that Iran had implemented the actions specified in the JCPOA and that it has been continuing with monitoring and verification in Iran regarding the nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. As of 1 March 2016, the Iran Task Force was replaced by a new Office in the Department of Safeguards responsible for JCPOA monitoring and verification. The IAEA has confirmed: (1) that construction has not continued of the Arak heavy water research reactor, that Iran has removed and disabled the calandria, has not produced or tested natural uranium fuel pellets of assemblies for the IR-40 reactor; and all existing nuclear fuel remains in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring; (2) Iran has shipped out heavy water brining its existing stock to below 130 metric tons in accordance with the JCPOA; (3) 5060 IR-1 centrifuges remain installed at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz; (4) Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 and its stock of enriched UF6 has not exceeded 300 kg since Implementation Day; (5) 1044 IR-1 centrifuges remain installed at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and no enrichment has taken place at Fordow; (6) all stored centrifuges remain under continuous IAEA monitoring, and the IAEA has performed daily access at Natanz and Fordow; (7) IAEA has deployed on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals, as well as automated collection of measurements, which represent the most modern safeguards measures at enrichment plants; (8) Iran has issued long-term visas to designated IAEA inspectors; (9) Iran is provisionally implementing the Additional Protocol; and (10) Iran has provided early design information for two planned light water power reactors at Bushehr. The IAEA had reaffirmed that all declared nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful use. The IAEA has reported for the first time that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran since 16 January 2016.
The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Agency activities under the Additional Protocol, to ascertain the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, commenced on 16 January 2016 (IAEA, 26 February 2016). In sum, the IAEA has reported that Iran is implementing the JCPOA and has not reported any problems.

Q: Some experts, such as former IAEA official Olli Heinonen, say the report doesn’t include the details. For instance, Heinonen says the report has little information about enrichment, centrifuge components, and implementation of the JCPOA?

A: It is important to understand that with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2231, all previous UNSC resolutions on Iran are no longer operational; and pursuant to Res 2231, the IAEA will report on Iran’s implementation of the nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The IAEA has done so in its 26 February report and the type of details and specific information that the IAEA was reporting under previous UNSC resolutions is no longer required - what is required is overall reporting and that is what the IAEA has done. It is incorrect to expect detailed reports from the IAEA of the type until September last year under previous UNSC resolutions. From Implementation Day onwards, the IAEA is moving to treat Iran as no longer under suspicion or having unresolved safeguards issues; as such the IAEA reports will focus on generic reporting on fulfilment of the JCPOA.

Q: Heinonen also expresses dissatisfaction over IAEA monitoring mechanism of Iran’s nuclear activities and asks for prompt and surprise inspections. Is his request based on IAEA’s monitoring mechanisms?

A: For several years now, the world’s most heavily inspected uranium enrichment facilities have been in Iran at Fordow and Natanz, and the IAEA has reported on the exact number of centrifuges and at the gram level on the production of low enriched uranium -- this is unprecedented transparency and verification. No other enrichment plants anywhere in the world, whether in the EU, China, Brazil or Japan have been subject to same level of intrusive inspection, daily access and use of the latest on-line enrichment monitoring, as in Iran at Natanz and Fordow. Iran is now the gold standard for the verification at enrichment plants and this standard should be applied by the IAEA at all enrichments plants under safeguards in other countries.

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“The IAEA has reported for the first time that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran since 16 January 2016.